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Abstract 
South African local government literature suggests a historical problem of 
municipal non-consultation in services identification and provision that goes 
hand-in-hand with community non-participation in municipal activities, 
coupled by a ‘culture of non-payment’ for these services. This research, which 
was conducted between 2002 and 2005 in the city of Johannesburg 
municipality, had the central purpose of ascertaining the manner and ways 
in which the city of Johannesburg provides its basic services to the Soweto 
communities and, in turn, of understanding if communities participate in 
municipal activities and hold possible attitudes of non-payment for municipal 
services. In order to attain the research purpose, six research questions were 
identified through local government theories and literature and advanced.  
 
The first set of four questions was aimed at the Soweto communities: How 
affordable are the basic municipal services to the Soweto communities? What 
are community’s perceptions of the importance of the various municipal 
services? Are the communities participating in the services identification and 
provision? How satisfied are the communities with the service delivery?  The 
second set of two questions was aimed at service providers or the municipal 
services managers and councillors: What methods does the municipality use 
in identifying and delivering service? What does the municipality perceive to 
be their application and enforcement of service quality management 
standards? 
 
The original methodological intent was to interview the Soweto communities 
and the city of Johannesburg municipal services managers and councillors. 
200 Soweto households were indeed interviewed from the eight townships of 
Chiawelo, Diepkloof, Dobsonville, Dube, Jabulani, Meadowlands, Naledi and 
Orlando, which were randomly selected. The survey amongst the heads of 
these 200 households was followed by four focus group meetings at Chiawelo, 
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Dobsonville, Dube and Meadowlands and between five and eleven households 
participated in the discussions in clarifying survey outcomes. It was only 
possible, however, to interview three service managers from the city of 
Johannesburg services utilities Pikitup, Johannesburg Water and the 
Contract Management Unit.  
 
Frustrated attempts to interview municipal councillors in the city of 
Johannesburg led to obtaining permission for proxy interviews from the MEC 
of Local Government and Traffic Safety in Mpumalanga municipalities of 
Govan Mbeki and Emalahleni and the inclusion of the KwaZulu-Natal 
municipality of Emnambithi. The usage of proxy interviews is thought to be 
relevant since the perceptions on service provision relate to the application 
and implementation of the uniform countrywide local government structures 
and systems. A total of 24 interviews were conducted with the Mpumalanga 
MEC, the city of Johannesburg service managers (3), councillors (9) and 
senior municipal administrators (11). In order to confirm or repudiate service 
provider findings from the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal municipalities, 
supplementary interviews were held with persons knowledgeable about 
service delivery in Soweto between 2002 and 2005. A total of four additional 
interviews were thus conducted. 
 
In the analysis of the community survey data, townships were classified as 
well-off and worse-off on the basis of household incomes and thus 
participation in municipal activities, payment of services and other attitudes 
were compared between the two strata. The findings of the research reveal 
low levels of ability to pay for municipal services by communities in terms of 
household incomes. However, the household possessions of the living 
standard measurement (LSM) utilities indicated otherwise. The use of 
income as a measure of affordability to pay is suspect in methodological 
reliability; hence income related findings should be interpreted with caution. 
The worse-off townships preferred state provision of the basic municipal 
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services. There was less inclination to participate in municipal structures 
such as ward committees and Integrated Development Plans (IDP) processes 
by the well-off townships, although they were the least satisfied with service 
provision and municipal performance. 
 
The city of Johannesburg municipality was found to be addressing service 
backlogs as a method for service identification and prioritisation. The 
municipality has semi-privatised basic municipal services such as water, 
electricity and garbage collection through section 21 companies in order to 
overcome service provision inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. This has 
devastating effects in terms of the community’s inability to pay, leading to 
services disconnection. Communities in general, however, believed that 
service provision has improved through these utilities even though the 
municipality has not finalised its performance management contracts with 
the utilities. 
 
Whereas the service provider interviews were conducted in Mpumalanga and 
KwaZulu-Natal, additional telephone interviews with service provision 
experts for Soweto agreed that municipal challenges throughout the country 
are generally the same since they operate within relatively new policy 
frameworks. It is acknowledged, however, that metropolitan municipalities 
and specifically the city of Johannesburg face some unique challenges too. It 
is concluded that the central role of the local government as the custodian of 
basic municipal services cannot be disputed; however, the inefficiencies and 
ineffectiveness of the market forces require private-public partnerships. It 
can also be concluded that non-participation is an outcome of, among other 
things, poor participative capacity within communities, apathy, feelings of 
distrust of both the municipal institutions and municipal councillors and the 
lack of information regarding community obligations to municipal 
institutions. 
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The research recommends the use of similar service utilities in both 
townships and former white suburban areas in order to overcome the 
perceptions of the municipal services level disparities that are formed on the 
basis of townships versus white suburban areas; an overhaul of the 
municipality’s billing system to overcome its debt and service charges 
collection problems; ward committee participation capacity improvement for 
both the municipal councillors and communities and the development and 
communication of clear guidelines on the roles of regional services 
management centres. 
 
Further research is recommended on, among other things, whether 
privatisation of municipal services results in better access by all and 
improves efficiency and payments, and on the functionality and effectiveness 
of ward committees as vehicles for community participation and in 
developing new and more reliable socio-economic modelling for assessing 
community ability to pay for government services. 
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Opsomming 
Uit ’n literatuuroorsig van plaaslike regering in Suid-Afrika het dit geblyk 
dat daar ’n historiese probleem van nie-oorlegpleging by die identifisering en 
lewering van dienste deur munisipaliteite bestaan. Hierdie probleem gaan 
hand aan hand met niedeelname aan munisipale aktiwiteite deur 
gemeenskappe en ’n kultuur van “geenbetaling” vir dienste gelewer. Die 
hoofdoel van hierdie navorsing, wat tussen 2002 en 2005 in die stad 
Johannesburg gedoen is, was om vas te stel hoe die stad se munisipaliteit 
basiese dienste aan Soweto lewer en of daar enige gemeenskapsdeelname aan 
aktiwiteite is en of gemeenskappe ’n geenbetaling-houding inneem. Om die 
navorsingsdoel te bereik is ses vrae deur middel van literatuur en teorieë oor 
plaaslike regering geïdentifiseer.   
 
Die eerste vier vrae is gemik op gemeenskappe in Soweto: Hoe bekostigbaar 
is die basiese munisipale dienste aan die gemeenskappe in Soweto? Wat is 
die gemeenskap se mening oor die belangrikheid van die onderskeie 
munisipale dienste? Het gemeenskappe deel aan die identifisering en 
lewering van dienste? Hoe tevrede is die gemeenskappe met dienslewering?  
Die laaste twee vrae is gemik op die diensleweraars of munisipaledienste-
bestuurders en raadslede: Watter metodes gebruik die munisipaliteit om 
dienste te identifiseer en te lewer? Wat beskou die munisipaliteit as op hulle 
van toepassing sover dit die afdwingbaarheid van kwaliteitstandaarde in die 
lewering van dienste en bestuur betref? 
 
Oorspronklik was die doel om onderhoude te voer met gemeenskappe in 
Soweto sowel as munisipaledienste-bestuurders en raadslede van 
Johannesburg. Onderhoude met hoofde van 200 huishoudings in Soweto is 
wel gevoer. Hierdie huishoudings is ewekansig uit Chiawelo, Diepkloof, 
Dobsonville, Dube, Jabulani, Meadowlands, Naledi en Orlando gekies. Die 
onderhoude is gevolg deur vier fokusgroepvergaderings te Chiawelo, 
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Dobsonville, Dube en Meadowlands, en tussen vyf en elf huishoudings het 
aan besprekings deelgeneem ten einde duidelikheid te verkry oor bevindinge 
van die ondersoek.  Dit was egter net moontlik om onderhoude met drie 
dienstebestuurders van die stad Johannesburg te voer, naamlik Pikitup, 
Johannesburg Water en die Kontrak Bestuursgroep.  
 
Verskeie vrugtelose pogings om onderhoude met raadslede te bekom het 
uiteindelik gelei tot die verkryging van toestemming vir plaasvervangende 
onderhoude met die LUR vir die Plaaslike Regering sowel as 
Verkeersveiligheid in die volgende munisipaliteite: Govan Mbeki en 
Emalahleni in Mpumalanga en Emnambithi in KwaZulu-Natal. Hierdie 
plaasvervangende onderhoude is as toepaslik beskou, aangesien die menings 
oor dienslewering te doen het met die toepassing en implementering van die 
uniforme landswye plaaslikeregering-strukture en -stelsels wat dus op 
Soweto ook van toepassing is. ’n Totaal van 24 onderhoude is gevoer met die 
Mpumalanga-LUR (1), die dienstebestuurders van die stad Johannesburg (3), 
raadslede (9) en senior munisipale administrateurs (11). Om die bevindinge 
van die Mpumulanga- en KwaZulu-Natal-munisipaliteite te bevestig of te 
weerlê, is aanvullende onderhoude met persone wat kennis van 
dienslewering in Soweto het tussen 2002 en 2005 gevoer.  Altesaam vier 
addisionele onderhoude is dus gevoer. 
 
Tydens die ontleding van die gemeenskapsdata is gemeenskappe as gegoed of 
minder gegoed geklassifiseer op grond van huishoudelike inkomste en dus is 
deelname aan munisipale aktiwiteite, betaling vir dienste en ander 
gesindhede tussen die twee strata vergelyk. Daar is bevind dat  min mense 
munisipale dienste kan bekostig in terme van huishoudelike inkomste, maar 
dat huishoudelike besittings wat lewenstandaard bepaal op die 
teenoorgestelde dui. Die gebruik van huishoudelike inkomste as ’n maatstaf 
van die vermoë om te betaal is ’n aanvaarbare metode, maar moet tog met 
omsigtigheid benader word. Die gemeenskap wat die slegste daaraan toe was, 
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verkies dat die staat basiese munisipale dienste voorsien. ’n Laer geneigdheid 
tot deelname aan munisipale strukture soos wykskomitees en geïntegreerde 
ontwikkelingsplanne is by die meer gegoede gemeenskappe aangetref, hoewel 
hulle die grootste ontevredenheid toon met dienslewering en munisipale 
werkverrigting. 
 
Daar is gevind dat die munisipaliteit van die stad Johannesburg die 
agterstand in dienste aangespreek het as metode om dienste te identifiseer 
en te prioritiseer. Om die probleem van oneffektiewe en ondoeltreffende 
dienste te oorkom, maak die munisipaliteit gebruik van artikel 21-
maatskappye vir dienste soos water, elektrisiteit en vullisverwydering. Dit lei 
tot die beëindiging van die dienste van gemeenskappe wat nie kan betaal nie.  
Oor die algemeen is inwoners egter van mening dat dienste deur hierdie 
maatskappye verbeter is, hoewel die munisipaliteit nog nie sy 
prestasiebestuurkontrakte met hierdie maatskappye gefinaliseer het nie. 
 
Terwyl die onderhoude met diensverskaffers in Mpumalanga en KwaZulu-
Natal gevoer is, is verdere telefoniese onderhoude met kundiges op die gebied 
van dienslewering in Soweto gevoer. Laasgenoemde het saamgestem dat 
munisipaliteite regoor die land oor die algemeen voor dieselfde uitdagings te 
staan kom, omdat hulle binne relatief nuwe beleidsraamwerke funksioneer.  
Daar word egter toegegee dat stedelike (metropolitaanse) munisipaliteite, en 
spesifiek die stad Johannesburg, ook met sekere unieke uitdagings te kampe 
het. Die gevolgtrekking waartoe gekom is, is dat die rol van plaaslike 
regering as die toesighouer oor basiese munisipale dienste nie betwis kan 
word nie, hoewel oneffektiwiteit en ondoeltreffendheid privaat vennootskappe 
vereis. ’n Verdere gevolgtrekking is dat niedeelname onder andere ’n gevolg 
is van ’n gebrek aan deelnemende kapasiteit binne gemeenskappe, apatie, 
wantroue in munisipale instellings en raadslede, en ’n gebrek aan inligting 
rakende gemeenskappe se verpligtinge jeens munisipale instellings. 
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Die navorsing beveel aan dat gelyke dienste gelewer word in swart 
gemeenskappe en in tradisioneel wit gemeenskappe ten einde die siening dat 
daar onderskeid getref word, te verander. Daar behoort ook ’n hersiening van 
die munisipaliteit se rekeningestelsel te wees ten einde die 
skuldinvorderingsprobleme uit die weg te ruim. Deelnemende kapasiteit vir 
raadslede en gemeenskappe binne wyke moet verbeter word. Duidelike 
riglyne oor die rol van streeksdienstebestuursentrums moet ontwikkel en aan 
gemeenskappe oorgedra word.  
 
Verdere navorsing word aanbeveel om te bepaal of die privatisering van 
dienste tot beter toegang vir almal sal lei en of dit doeltreffendheid en 
betaling sal verbeter. Die funksionaliteit en effektiwiteit van wykskomitees 
as meganisme vir gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid sowel as die ontwikkeling van 
nuwe en meer betroubare sosio-ekonomiese modelle vir die bepaling van 
gemeenskapsvermoë om vir dienste te betaal, behoort ook ondersoek te word. 
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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introductory background 
For South Africa most of the 20th century was riddled with segregation and 
discriminatory legislated practices of the apartheid policies introduced in 
1948 by the Nationalist Party (NP) government. These policies and practices 
created huge uncertainties, conflicts and mistrust among citizens of different 
racial groups. Parliament represented only the white constituencies and 
mainly the Afrikaners through political parties like the NP, Federal and 
Democratic Party, while non-whites, which includes blacks, Coloureds and 
Indians, had no representation. Later in the 1980s, however, Coloureds and 
Indians were afforded separate representation through the Tricameral 
Parliament. Blacks had their ‘independent governments’ in their homelands, 
namely the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) and self-
governing territories of Gazankulu, Kangwane, Kwandebele, Kwazulu, 
Lebowa and Qwaqwa as defined in the Self-Governing Territories 
Constitution Act (Act 21 of 1971). Without getting into the details of this 
political dispensation, it is sufficient to indicate that the above-mentioned 
government structures created unevenness in the distribution of the 
country’s resources and turned blacks into ‘foreigners’ within the country of 
their birth. However, in order to have continuous labour supply, black 
townships were established to surround the ‘white cities’. The legislations 
that governed these townships, their municipalities, community 
representation and service delivery received enormous criticism until their 
abolishment in the early 1990s. 
 
Some of the systematic and most effective legislation used in fostering 
separation and racial imbalances included the Blacks (Urban Areas) Act (Act 
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21 of 1923), the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (Act 25 of 1945), the 
Urban Black Councils Act (Act 79 of 1961), the Black Affairs Administration 
Act (Act 45 of 1971), the Black Communities Development Act (Act 4 of 1984), 
the Community Councils Act (Act 125 of 1977) and the Blacks Local 
Authorities Act (Act 102 of 1982). The aftermath of the introduction of the 
various phases of this legislation was extreme underdevelopment of the 
black, Coloured and Indian townships. The black communities were severely 
affected by this legislation more so than any other, leading to, among other 
things, high unemployment, under-education and lack of local government 
services. For all of South Africa, this legislation had a devastating impact on 
the sense of nationalism with the effect of enticed non-patriotism, violence 
and vandalism of government properties. The development of local 
government in its entirety, the formulation of its policies and putting in place 
of its structures were, according to Cloete (1995:2C), largely influenced by 
and followed on from apartheid policies. This history of separation, defiance 
and non-provision of local government service in the black townships is 
discussed in the third chapter. 
 
Literature suggests that even in its infancy stages, local government in South 
Africa and in Johannesburg in particular, starting with the Sanitary Board 
in 1887, was undemocratic and excluded the participation of blacks 
(Mashabela, 1988:55-58). Even during its earliest days in 1905, the South 
Western Townships (Soweto), when it was still known as Klipspruit, was run 
by whites who were not elected by the communities and the state of service 
delivery was highly erratic, even absent in some sections (Moss and Obery, 
1987:51-55). 
 
Coming back to the history of the problem, in 1986 more than 27 000 
residents of Soweto owed rent for two to three months totalling R2.5 million. 
In June 1987, residents owed about R27 964 293 in rent and services arrears 
to the Soweto Local Authorities, mainly as a result of unabating boycotts 
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(Mashabela, 1988:58). In some townships services were terminated, people 
evicted and their houses reallocated to people who had been on the waiting 
list. During 1987, after the Rand Supreme Court evicted rent defaulters, 
President Botha met with Soweto residents to negotiate rent cuts (Howe, 
Quin and Bennett, 1988). A critical review given by Kane-Berman (1993) 
reveals that, during the days of ‘resistance’, payment for government services 
was perceived to imply support for apartheid. Rent boycotts were formally 
organised and informed township politics, which in turn also shaped them, 
although it is difficult to distinguish the political impact of the boycotts 
themselves from related or even coincidental events (Moss and Obery, 
1987:68). Apart from the political uncertainty that led to boycotts and non-
payment of services, most services were decided upon and rendered without 
consultation with communities. 
 
A commission of inquiry by the people of Soweto into the effect of and reasons 
for the service payment boycott in 1989 revealed Soweto to be faced with a 
combined debt of R701 million, which included arrears totalling R200 million 
that accumulated during the boycotts. The report revealed that between 1979 
and 1989 approximately R400 million was spent on the upgrade of roads, 
electricity, storm water drainage and sewerage systems, although no 
comparative figures for the same period in the white suburbs were given. 
Also reported was that in Soweto, service quality was perceived to be very 
poor and that most residents were also too poor to afford the payments. Some 
of the report’s recommendations included a need for an upgrade of water and 
sewerage supplies. However, it also noted that a single tax base system for 
the whole of Johannesburg and Soweto was necessary in order to foster 
development in the townships (PLANACT, 1989). Government could not take 
the above recommendation seriously since it was a direct confrontation of the 
existence of segregated residential practices. 
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Real changes in local government can only be traced to the 1990s with the 
ushering in of the multi-party democratic framework. These changes came 
about through the passing of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
200 of 1993 (the interim Constitution). This Act repealed the existence of, 
among other things, the Tricameral Parliament and the homeland system 
whose creation was enabled through the Representation between the 
Republic of South Africa and Self-Governing Territories Act (Act 46 of 1959). 
The interim Constitution preceded the tabling of the Local Government 
Transition Act (LGTA) (Act 209 of 1993), which is the first democratic local 
government legislation. The LGTA purported to “provide for the recognition 
and establishment of forums for negotiating restructuring of local 
government; for the exemption of certain local government bodies from 
certain provisions of the Act; establishment of appointment transitional 
councils in the pre-interim phase; delimitation of areas of jurisdiction and the 
election of transitional councils in the interim phase; issuing of proclamations 
by the administrators of the various provinces; establishment of Local 
Government Demarcation Boards in respect of the various provinces; and 
repeal of certain laws”. The passing of the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), and the Local Government: Municipal 
Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000), referred to hereafter as the Structures and 
Systems Acts, respectively, heralded significant changes in the local 
government sphere. 
 
The success or failure of current and future local government, as noted by 
Hoosen (1999:10), will largely depend on the achievement of the central focus 
of the Structures and Systems Acts. This success or failure will depend on 
whether or not communities are participating in municipal activities and 
whether or not municipalities are self-sufficient, which is effected through 
communities’ payment for the services. In turn, whether or not communities 
pay for their services may come to depend on whether or not they are 
receiving value for their money and whether or not they can afford to pay. 
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The laws of supply and demand may already be operational in that 
community satisfaction with rendered services and service standards, 
including the price of such services, determines their willingness to pay. 
There is just one shortcoming to this analogue though, and that is that 
service provision remains monopolistic by the local government and without 
competition from the provider, prices and performance standards could be 
compromised. It is for this reason that participation by all stakeholders is 
propagated through the democratic means in order to overcome all these 
possible shortcomings regarding performance standards, satisfaction and 
non-payment. 
 
The argument against privatisation of basic municipal services like water, 
electricity and garbage removal is often used as a reason for non-payment 
and price hikes in Johannesburg. For this reason the Igoli 2002 vision, whose 
outcome was the establishment of corporatised service utilities like 
Johannesburg Water (JW), Pikitup and City Power, received criticism. It is 
worth noting that service concessions in the 1890s during the days of the 
Sanitary Board failed when prices steadily rose and delivery became erratic 
(Musiker and Musiker, 1999:170). 
 
Over the past few years of democratic local government, there is already 
some indication that popular participation is not easily attainable given the 
historical culture of non-participation and boycotts. The African National 
Congress (ANC) government, which introduced and encouraged non-
participating and boycotts during its banned days, has to play a leading role 
in this culture transformation. The ANC government has as such introduced 
numerous campaigns to encourage people’s participation, payments of 
services and customer-centredness through the Masakhane and Batho Pele 
campaigns. The result of these campaigns and of the new municipal 
legislation in attaining a culture of participation and payment for services is 
a mixture of success and failure stories in various municipalities throughout 
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the country. In the city of Johannesburg, these campaigns are deemed to 
have little success considering huge protests against privatisation and 
municipal debts. 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
The above background has provided the gist of the research problem, which is 
historical non-participation in municipal activities and non-payment of 
municipal services by the historically black township communities. Even 
within the current system, there is still, on the one hand, finger-pointing to 
the past exclusionist problems posed by the apartheid system. The argument 
presented by various authors such as Hoosen (1999), Johnson (2000) and 
McDonald (2002) on municipal and community behaviour is that there is a 
culture of rent boycotts and non-payment of municipal services that was 
cultivated during apartheid. On the other hand, what remains unknown is 
the communities’ reason for non-participation in municipal activities and 
non-payment for the provided services. Current arguments are that it is only 
fitting that everybody pays for their municipal services since municipalities 
subsidise poor households with a certain amount of water and electricity 
monthly, while extremely poor households may receive free services through 
the municipal indigent policies (Van Ryneveld, Muller and Parnell, 2003, and 
Participatory budgeting, 2001). According to the City of Johannesburg (2003), 
poor households are receiving ‘free basic services’, which includes 6 000 litres 
of water per month and total exemption in the informal settlements. Thus 
non-payment in the current scenario will only prevail among those that can 
afford to pay. 
 
Debates on non-payment often evoke a political response since the current 
livelihoods of the black communities were also largely determined by the 
politics of the apartheid government. It is for the same reason that the ANC 
was the one to take a political stand by introducing the Masakhane 
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Campaign to stimulate participation and payment for municipal services. 
Members of Parliament in 1997 took a stand as well to pay their arrears at 
the Parliamentary villages in order to set examples of good citizen behaviour. 
The Government Communications Services and the Department of Public 
Works publicised these actions, hoping that they would be assimilated 
throughout the country (Communications Services Department, 1997). 
 
In view of the democratisation processes of the 1990s, many South Africans 
hoped that a transition to majority rule would deliver the country from its 
political limbo and that the establishment of new representative local 
government authorities would lead to an improvement in services delivery 
(Cloete, 1995:2). There seemed to be a light at the end of the tunnel when 
provision was made in the LGTA to democratise the local government 
institutions. The transformation process has been a tedious one that 
primarily required structural corrections in order for the new local 
government to reflect the democratic values imbedded in the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), referred to hereafter as the 
Constitution, and at whose core is local participation and representivity. 
Following the abolishment of the old structures, the city of Johannesburg 
merged four transitional metropolitan local councils (TMLCs) and some 
portion of Gatsrand Transitional Local Council (TLC), Kempton 
Park/Thembisa TMLCs, Midrand/Rabie and a portion of Ridge/Ivory Park. 
The city of Johannesburg became one of the six metropolitan municipalities 
countrywide and now has 11 wards, which have desegregated the black 
townships of Soweto and Alexandra. It has been about 9 years now since the 
new local government system came into being, but the city of Johannesburg 
still reports enormous figures in services arrears and debt. 
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Table 1: City of Johannesburg services payment arrears 
 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 
Budget deficit R183 million R134 million Nil Nil 
Overdraft R405 million R241 million Nil (Jan 2000) Nil 
Service arrears R2.6 billion R2.9 billion R2.8 billion R2.8 billion 
Source: Igoli 2002 
 
One can assume that if the stipulations of municipal indigent policies that 
exempt the households that cannot afford to pay for municipal services are 
followed to the letter, these figures therefore points to the refusal to pay 
rather than inability to pay. Other possibilities are that even the households 
that cannot afford to pay may be included in the figures if such households 
lack knowledge of the existence of the indigent policies and have thus not 
applied for exemptions. In the analysis of this problem, it is accepted that 
non-payment and non-participation behaviour was carried over from the 
apartheid era and now ‘it might just be too good not to pay’. 
 
Some of the city of Johannesburg problems range from cost recovery to wrong 
billing systems that have received criticism over the years (Tabane, 2004). 
These problems have sparked debates around the need for privatisation and 
services outsourcing on the realisation of the inefficiencies of the municipal 
administration. This neo-liberal approach, which is being seriously 
considered in other municipalities and is already implemented in 
Johannesburg, carries a high price tag of disconnections of services, and even 
evictions, for non-payers. The problem with privatisation is that the ‘public 
good’ element of the government fades away when the focus becomes profits 
and efficiency – leading to massive outages and price hikes, etc. (Gqulu, 
2002). 
 
Another major problem is that the apparent inability of the government to 
provide public service to its citizens at acceptable levels and standards is 
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often overlooked (Cloete, 2000:2). When non-payment for local government 
services is cited, there is often short-sightedness about consumers’ 
preferences and satisfaction with the rendered services. This is often the case 
because the government services provision is not comparable to services 
provision by the corporate sector. It is for this reason that Chapter 7 of the 
Constitution emphasises the importance of performance and community 
participation in order to provide a democratic and accountable government 
for the local communities, ensure the provision of services to communities in 
a sustainable manner, promote social and economic development, prioritising 
the basic needs of communities (section 153) through the municipal councils’ 
employment of personnel that are necessary for the effective performance of 
its functions (section 160) and encouragement of community involvement and 
their organisations in the matters of local government. 
 
Local communities like consumers in any other sector would expect optimal 
and efficient service delivery, especially where payments are due. The 
argument is that this has not been the case in the municipal structures that 
existed prior to 1995/6. Thus Chapter 4 of the Systems Act is dedicated to 
community participation and Chapter 10 to the monitoring and setting of 
standards. 
 
1.3 Definition of terminology 
Terminology that is used consistently in this research and that informs the 
basic understanding as recommended by research methodologists such as 
Cresswell (1994) and Leedy (1993) is defined in this section. These definitions 
are pertinent to the subject of the report. 
 
Local government is also known as municipality and is defined as “a 
decentralized representative institution of government with general and 
specific powers devolved on it in respect of an identified restricted 
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geographical area within a state” (Heymans and Totemeyer, 1988:2). Van 
Niekerk, Van der Waldt and Jonker (2001) define local government as an 
administrative level of government that is closest to the local communities it 
serves. The common factor in all definitions of local government is that it is 
another governmental level, closer to the people, and aimed at rendering 
some basic common services. In his exploration of the agenda of local 
governments, Clarke (1996:3) distinguishes local governments from local 
governance. He sees local government realities as depicted in their 
traditional framework and in the institutions of the local authorities, 
whereas local governance is the process which shapes and directs localities, 
the public choice and the setting of priorities for the provision of services. 
When local government is defined, other new elements such as democratic 
processes are lately also included. Ismail, Bayat and Meyer (1997:3) think 
local government refers to the system of managing the affairs of a locally 
established authority comprising elected and appointed officials, who operate 
within a specific geographical area to provide services to the local community. 
 
The representatives of the local communities in a municipality are known as 
municipal councillors as defined in the Structures Act. Municipal councillors 
are elected into public office in terms of the Electoral Act (Act 73 of 1998). 
They are political representatives of community wards within the municipal 
council and are at the same time chairperson of their ward committees. 
 
The municipal wards are geographic demarcations in terms of the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998). Ward committees, 
formed from organised community interest groups and chaired by a ward 
councillor, may be established only in the local and metropolitan 
municipalities and not within district municipalities. The objective of the 
ward committees is to enhance participatory democracy within the 
municipality by the local communities. The municipal council, which is made 
up of the ward committee councillors, appoints its chairperson, who is 
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referred to as the municipal mayor. In the case of a metropolitan 
municipality, an executive mayor is appointed. 
 
Included in the purpose of the municipality and its councillors are the 
identification and prioritisation of municipal services to be rendered to the 
local communities. In terms of the Systems Act: 
 
…the municipality must develop a culture of municipal governance that 
complements formal representative government with a system of 
participatory governance and must encourage and create conditions for 
the local community to participate in the affairs of the municipality1 
 
This Act identifies the basic needs of the community as the priority focus of 
the municipality, that is, ensuring community access to at least the minimum 
level of basic municipal services such as water, electricity, sewerage and 
garbage removal. Emphasis is also placed on the democratic principles of 
equitable provision and access with the application of economic principles of 
efficiency and effectiveness in the use of these resources. 
 
South Africa has a history of the township boycott of municipal rent and 
service charges. Rent boycott involves refusal to pay for either or both the 
municipal house rentals and municipal service charges. Rent and service 
charges are in practice indistinguishable to the township residents as they 
are billed and paid together. The state, however, attaches great importance to 
the theoretical distinction and only recently, municipalities have been issuing 
title deeds for the houses to residents, bringing to an end the payment of 
rent. Rent in principle is made up of site tax or house rent and service 
charges cover the cost of township development capital and basic services 
                                                
1 Chapter 4 of the Municipal Systems Act speaks of community participation and the 
mechanisms that should be in place to enable such participation. 
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provision (Moss and Obery, 1987:51). 
 
1.4 Research questions 
The main aims of this thesis are, firstly, to ascertain the manner and ways in 
which the city of Johannesburg renders its basic municipal services to the 
Soweto communities and secondly, to understand if communities hold 
attitudes that may be classified as ‘the culture of non-payment’ for municipal 
services and their participation in municipal processes. In order to achieve 
these aims, four research questions were posed to services consumers and two 
to the service providers. These questions were identified from theory and 
literature. 
 
Questions to the municipal services consumers 
a) How affordable are the basic municipal services to the Soweto 
communities? 
 
b) What are community’s perceptions of the importance of the various 
municipal services? 
 
c) Are the communities participating in the services identification and 
provision? 
 
d) How satisfied are the communities with the service delivery? 
 
Questions to the municipal service providers 
a) What methods does the municipality use in identifying and delivering 
service? 
b) What does the municipality perceive to be their application and 
enforcement of service quality management standards? 
 
   
 
13
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis structure enables provision of answers to the research questions 
raised. Here is a brief description of each chapter of the thesis: 
 
Chapter one is the introduction, which provides a brief background to the 
local government in South Africa and the research problem and outlines the 
research questions. Some of the central terminology to the thesis is also 
defined here. 
 
Chapter two is called Contemporary and theoretical background and provides 
an argument for the state or local government as a bearer of basic municipal 
services. The central aim of the discussions in the chapter is to identify 
questions for investigation among municipal services consumers, which are 
the Soweto communities, and among the municipal services providers, which 
are service managers and councillors. Two important sources of literature 
were used in the search for these questions, namely local government 
theories and general local government literature. Theories provide an 
argument for the municipal provision of basic services and for the general 
behaviour relating to the payment of the municipal services (Burrell and 
Morgan, 1979).  Among the theories discussed is the public choice theory 
defined by Cullis and Jones (1998:45) as the study of non-market decision-
making or simply the application of economics to politics. The basic needs 
theory argues that the government should meet the basic needs of 
communities for welfare and humanitarian purposes (Streeten, 1984:9). The 
dependency theory argues that the welfare approach leaves communities 
dependent on government and unwilling to pay (Dorfman, 1997; Downs, 
1998; Myles, 1995, and Graaff and Coetzee, 1996). The theory of change in 
local government assumes that for local government to stay abreast of local 
issues, it should constantly change with the ever-changing needs and 
requirements of its constituencies (Conyers and Hills, 1984:114). 
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Chapter three is entitled Context of the local government in South Africa. 
The aim of the chapter is to provide a general understanding of the evolution 
of local government in South Africa. The focus throughout the various stages 
of evolution is on basic service delivery, community participation and services 
payment. The chapter identifies three main phases of local government in 
Johannesburg. The first is the introductory phase of local government in the 
1880s, which was called the Sanitary Board and was characterised by the 
basic services concessions. The interim phase is between 1922 and 1994, 
characterised by the establishment of black urban authorities that presided 
over basic services delivery in the townships without being elected. The final 
phase started with the first democratic local government elections in 1995, 
which saw new legislation that defines the new municipal structures and 
systems. This phase is again characterised by services concessions in the city 
of Johannesburg. 
 
Chapter four is an outline of the research methods. The chapter is divided 
into two sections: the first section outlines the selected research participants 
from both the municipal services consumer side and from the municipal 
services provider side. These are the number of Soweto townships and 
households that were sampled, the number of community focus groups and 
participating townships. From the services providers’ side, the initial plan 
was to interview both services managers and municipal councillors in the city 
of Johannesburg. Interviews with municipal councillors in the city of 
Johannesburg could not be secured. In the light of related work that the 
researcher was doing in Mpumalanga, proxy interviews were requested from 
the Mpumalanga Member of Executive Committee (MEC) for Local 
Government and Traffic Safety and the justification for this is also provided 
in chapter four. Later, however, supplementary interviews were conducted 
with persons knowledgeable about service provision in Soweto during the 
period 2002-2005. The reason for these interviews was to confirm if the 
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findings from the proxy municipalities were applicable to the Soweto 
situation. The second section of the chapter outlines technical methodological 
aspects, such as sampling, developing survey questionnaires and conducting 
focus groups. 
 
Chapter five presents the consumers’ perceptions of municipal service 
delivery in Soweto.  The presentation of the findings is made systematically 
in line with the four research questions raised for the municipal services 
consumers. These questions, which were identified through theories and 
literature indicated in chapter two, include the community’s ability to pay for 
municipal services, perception of the importance of the various municipal 
services provided, participation in municipal activities such as voting and 
ward committees and lastly, satisfaction with municipal provision of basic 
services. Both the empirical data and focus group information are used in 
support of each other, to provide answers to these questions. 
 
Chapter six provides the service providers’ perceptions of service delivery in 
Soweto. Findings emanate from interviews with the service providers, that is, 
both the municipal services managers and councillors. The aim of the chapter 
is to provide a discussion that reflects on methods that the municipality uses 
in service identification and the municipality’s perception of the application 
and enforcement of service quality management standards. Findings from 
interviews with persons knowledgeable about service provision in Soweto 
during the period 2002-2004 are also used here to confirm or repudiate the 
applicability of the proxy findings to Soweto. 
 
Chapter seven, which is the Conclusion, provides concluding remarks firstly 
on the specific research questions and secondly on the general state of local 
government in Johannesburg. The chapter achieves this by drawing on the 
two data sources from the empirical research data of chapters five and six. 
The second section of the chapter makes recommendations. Three types of 
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recommendations are made, firstly, on possible intervention in the local 
government systems for the improvement of services delivery and 
participation, secondly on policy requirements and thirdly on further 
research. 
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Chapter Two 
 
THEORY AND INTRODUCTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss theories on local government and 
contemporary local government literature. There is a vast amount of 
literature and many theories covering the importance and relevance of 
municipal government in present-day democracies, and South Africa in 
particular as a bearer of basic municipal services. It is necessary to foster this 
understanding because general local government inefficiencies throughout 
the world, including South Africa, have been noted, which leads to a belief 
that the state delivery of basic services is either irrelevant or unnecessary 
and that privatisation of basic services is the best alternative. In some cities 
and in Johannesburg partially, through the Igoli 2002 Plan, some of the basic 
services have been privatised. 
 
Various theories, international literature and human rights treaties are used 
to illustrate the importance of the central role of government delivery of the 
basic services. Discussions identify reasons for municipal delivery of basic 
services to include the state’s ability to provide stabilisation and distributive 
roles, which are not guaranteed through market forces due to speculation and 
pricing. The state as the custodian of social good/public goods and individuals 
as judges of what constitutes an equitable share of these goods through the 
political processes collectively allocate public goods. Pure state delivery, 
however, leads to dependency since individuals are unwilling to reveal their 
preferences and hence ability to pay. Due to the problems of non-exclusion 
and free-riding, the best solution is that public goods purchasing should be a 
joint responsibility between the state and individuals. Other humanitarian 
arguments that include United Nation (UN) treaties ask all governments to 
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provide these basic necessities to the impoverished through alternative 
models to direct payments. The changing local government focus due to 
changing operational landscape requirements such as the Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) Strategy requires prudence and 
efficiency in revenue collection and services delivery. Municipalities should 
now have visions and objectives to attain, and they should identify and 
provide high quality services to the satisfaction of their customer base, that 
is, be accountable. Methods to institute efficiency and accountability in 
delivery caution against profit maximisation as an agenda of local 
government, but recognise the strengthening of local government’s 
redistributive and participative efforts as central to its roles. 
 
Box 1: Central purpose of the second chapter 
Over and above discussing theories and contemporary local government 
literature, this chapter seeks to identify the right possible questions which 
should be posed to the service consumers and service providers. 
 
2.2 Reasons for municipal governments 
Since local government is defined to be a sphere of government closest to the 
people, this state department is in the best position to identify, communicate 
and provide basic public services. The existence of local government, 
according to Leach and Davis (1996:27-28), can be justified in three ways: 
 
a. Political or legal justification – local government is perceived to be a 
political institution that enables the diffusion of power. The state 
allows for political participation without which any form of 
representative and democratic politics may wither. 
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b. Economic justification - the economic role of local government is to 
stabilise and distribute. The allocative role stems from the ideology 
that local government services are public goods and that private 
provision for these types of goods leads to market failure and 
insufficiency. This ideology also states that government involvement in 
the resource allocation process is necessary because the market can 
only produce the socially optimal amounts of goods and services at 
prevailing prices when it is possible to exclude from the benefits of 
consumption those who are unable and unwilling to pay. On the 
contrary, the purpose of local governments is to optimally allocate 
without exclusions (Petersen and Strachota, 1997:10). 
 
c. Socio-geographical justification - the defining characteristic of this 
philosophy is the localness of local authorities to their constituents 
expressed in participation by local communities and their articulation 
of the public services of their choices through the democratisation 
process. 
 
Numerous authors perceive the function of local government to have 
traditionally been classified as line functioning (Bekker and Humphries, 
1985, and Craythorne, 1990). The line function of local government is 
essentially service supply, also referred to as the utilitarian (Ismail et al., 
1997:3). Local government exists to supply inhabitants with those services 
that private enterprises are either unwilling or unable to provide because the 
services may have to be delivered at a non-profit or breakeven basis point. 
The distribution function relates to the influence of government on the 
distribution of income and wealth among individuals. Local government has 
played a role in ensuring that the poor have a place to sleep and food to eat 
since the early days of the Industrial Revolution. As a practical matter, it is 
generally agreed that only the national government is in a position to design 
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its monetary and fiscal policies with explicit attention to the general health of 
economy and security. Other forms of stabilisation such as the policing 
services are, however, decentralised to local governments. 
 
There is consensus on what public goods and services constitute (Stoker, 
1999:146). The provision of services, however, varies by country and 
municipalities but generally includes water services, electricity supply, 
sewerage, garbage collection and maintenance of streets. These goods and 
services, called public goods, are defined by the economic legends Samuelson 
and Nordhaus (1995:387) as goods that in common, all people enjoy, in the 
sense that each individual's consumption of such goods leads to no 
subtraction from any other individual's consumption of the same goods. 
 
Box 2: First research question 
Given the various municipal services defined above, what does the Soweto 
community perceive to be the important basic services that the municipality 
should render to them? 
 
The study of public goods and their provision emanated from Aristotle, who 
observed the Greeks in the fourth century BC. He thought that man's natural 
proclivities were towards discourse and political activities. Adam Smith, 
observing the Scots in the 18th century, saw instead a propensity to engage 
in economic exchange (Mueller, 1989:1). From these two different 
observations two separate fields developed, namely political and economic 
fields. The two have been separated by the assumptions they make about 
individual motivation and about their employed methodologies. The political 
field assumes that people pursue the public interest, whereas the economic 
field assumes that people pursue their private interest. The common ground 
of the two fields is found in public choice, often referred to as collective choice 
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or social choice, where the agreement is that both the political and economic 
man could be the same. Mueller (1989:5) defines public choice as the 
economic study of non-market decision-making or simply the application of 
economics to politics. Public choice shares the same subject matter with 
politics, namely the theory of state, bureaucracy, government, voting rules 
and party politics to name a few. The point of departure in the public choice 
theory is that individuals are the best judges of their own welfare and have 
their own views as to what constitutes the best or most equitable distribution 
of utilities. Rules of collective decision-making are needed to provide a 
mechanism for aggregating the social welfare functions of individuals. 
Collective decision-making rules are used at some stage to decide which 
goods are to be provided. While the sustenance of all goods and services 
provision is partially based on the pricing mechanism, taxes, often referred to 
as rates, are levied. Government is considered contrivance of human wisdom 
to the provision for human wants. 
 
When a country or a government provides public goods to its community, the 
principle of pareto optimality is applied. This principle assumes that 
individuals, the sum of which makes a community, are judges of their own 
welfare. It is therefore possible to increase the provision of these resources, 
the utility of one individual, without decreasing the utility of any other 
individual, which in allocative terms raises the welfare of societies (Cullis 
and Jones, 1998:1). Public goods are characterised by non-rival consumption, 
which means that one individual’s consumption does not reduce the benefits 
derived by all other individuals. The second characteristic is that of non-
excludability, that is, consumers cannot be excluded from the consumption 
benefits. If a good is provided, one individual cannot deny another’s 
consumption. The absence of excludability almost inevitably appears to cause 
a problem of pricing and preference revelation. How, then, does the local 
government get to reveal community preferences? Why would people want to 
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pay if they cannot be excluded from this good’s consumption and how will 
local government enforce payment? 
 
Box 3: Second research question 
Since individuals are the best judges of their welfare, how do the Soweto 
communities participate in the identification and prioritisation of the basic 
municipal services? Considering that historically these communities were 
excluded from participation and the relatively new municipal systems and 
structures, one can only wonder how participation happens. 
 
2.2.1 The provision and consumption problems 
The main problem with public services is that individuals may consume 
without paying in the hope that others will bear the provision costs. For 
example, how a household benefits from a streetlight cannot easily be linked 
to an individual consumer. These goods therefore cannot easily be charged to 
personal consumption, posing a problem of 'free-riding'. Whereas these goods 
are provided at a certain cost, free-riding makes it difficult to sustain the 
provision. It is therefore arguable that payment of government taxes by all is 
in the interest of all individuals who make use of these goods and services 
(Cullis and Jones, 1998:47). 
 
The ‘ability to pay’ is explained in terms of the derived utility by individual 
consumers. Whereas some public goods are referred to as ‘pure public goods’, 
the likes of parks and roads, some, which include water and electricity, derive 
private consumption and provisioning. The ability to pay for the pure public 
goods is expressed through the tax mechanism; be it proportional, regressive 
or progressive to the income that an individual earns irrespective of the 
derived utility. It is with the pure public goods that consumption cannot be 
prohibited. Private provision for public goods bears a direct relationship 
   
 
23
between payments and derived utility (Cullis and Jones, 1998:59). For goods 
such as electricity and water, non-payment can result in termination of 
consumption by the provider, namely the municipality. 
 
2.2.2 Preference revelation 
Cullis and Jones (1998:66) believe that preference revelation in group 
dynamics for public goods is a research function. The difference between 
private (private provision for public goods) and public goods lies in 
preferences. 
 
Table 2: Public goods preference revelation 
Number of 
people 
Private goods Preference 
revelation 
Public goods Preference 
revelation 
Small Demand revelation 
affects prices 
Less likely Failure to reveal 
demand reduces 
supply drastically 
Very likely 
Large Demand revelation 
doesn’t affect equilibrium 
price greatly 
Very likely Failure to reveal has 
little impact: 
therefore ‘free-ride’ 
Less likely 
Source: Cullis and Jones (1998:66) 
 
The above table shows that small group demand for private goods has a 
direct effect on the prices, in other words, the higher the demand for private 
goods, the higher the prices. With a small group, people shy away from 
revealing their demand because consumption can be charged at a 
personalised level. Non-revelation of individual demand leads to little or no 
supply. However, in large populations, the opposite is the case and supply 
often leads to free-riding. Densely populated areas such as Soweto and 
Alexandra are good examples of where free-riding can easily take place. 
There is, however, an argument against blanket termination since some 
members of the community cannot pay for these services, such as the 
unemployed and the aged, hence the need for the welfare side of the state. 
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Box 4: Third research question 
What methods of service identification and prioritisation does the city of 
Johannesburg municipality use? 
 
2.3 Consumerism and the state provision of basic services 
The hierarchy of needs presented by the humanistic psychologist Abraham 
Maslow to the world in the late 1960s suggests that basic needs should be 
satisfied first before all other less essential needs. Maslow categorised human 
needs in a hierarchical order, with humans’ pursuit being self-actualisation 
(Institute for Management Excellence, 2001). Without getting into a full 
discussion of the hierarchy of needs, suffice it to say that it refers to the 
biological and physiological requirements, including access to water, shelter, 
food and health. Consumers can interpret the terminology ‘basic needs’ and 
‘satisfaction’ subjectively to mean different things. This argument leads to a 
conclusion that individuals should be afforded an opportunity to purchase 
their own ‘basic needs’. Does this imply therefore that the purchasing of basic 
needs should be left to individuals themselves? The characteristics of public 
goods tell us that provision can at best be a joint government and individual 
purchase. It is for this reason that most nations of the world, including 
international organisations like the UN, have made meeting basic human 
needs by all nations a primary developmental objective embedded in their 
developmental plans (Streeten, Burki, ul Haq, Hicks and Stewart, 1981:8). 
 
The Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992 adopted a global sustenance plan 
called Agenda 21, whose principle was modified into Local Agenda 21 and 
implemented in 20 cities worldwide, including Johannesburg. The principle 
states that “…the struggle against poverty is a shared responsibility of all 
nations” and calls for policies that promote development, sustainable 
resource management and poverty eradication” (DEA & T, 1998:17). The 
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poor, whose basic needs should be met, are identified as those whose income 
and asset base is insufficient to meet the costs of basic needs. Governments 
are expected to play a central role in the initialisation and facilitation of the 
Agenda 21, thereby availing their power and resources towards meeting 
nations’ basic needs. The socio-political approach to the provision of these 
goods and services is that satisfaction of basic needs is a human right. 
 
Is the government approach to provision the best method or should provision 
be left to the market forces? The neo-classical assumptions are that the 
market forces through labour demand would increase productivity and 
wages, and therefore lower prices of basic goods, thereby enabling every 
individual to purchase according to their requirements. Theoretically, the 
market is the best method, but practice has taught us that because of market 
imperfections, not enough jobs will be created and as such a certain quota of 
the population will remain impoverished. It is for this reason that nations all 
over the world have adopted certain political models, which are also shaped 
around meeting people’s needs and eradicating poverty. Socialist countries 
like Cuba are good models for meeting basic needs. Without entering a socio-
political debate of the best governance models, the achievement of high 
economic growth is also necessary in sustaining service provision. 
 
2.3.1 Shortcomings in state provision of basic services 
Pure government provision alone is criticised for resulting in dependency 
syndromes. On the one hand, allocation by government alone is justified in 
situations where communities are too poor to pay for the services. It is for 
this reason that the physiological interpretation to provisioning has a strong 
moral appeal (Streeten et al., 1981:25). It somehow reminds us that the 
objective of development is to provide humans with the opportunity for a 
fulfilling life. Where government is the sole provider, however, there is 
unwillingness to pay even by those who can afford to, always leading to a 
problem of free-riding. The political interpretation to the provision is 
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perceived to be revolutionary in that it calls for radical redistribution of basic 
goods, power, income and the mobilisation for participation by the poor. At its 
worst, the approach is considered a welfare sop whose intent is to keep the 
poor quiet. Firstly, the modern-day approach calls for the mobilisation of full 
participation by the poor in designing, executing and monitoring the 
provision of these ‘anti-poverty’ projects (DEA & T, 1998). Secondly, there is a 
requirement for institutions such as the municipality to mediate between the 
supply (government) requirements and the demand (community). 
 
2.3.2 Dependency theory 
The dependency theory is portrayed as an inter-state relational system whose 
assumption is that development cannot be a sustainable activity if nations of 
the world operate on an unequal footing. The inter-state relational theoretical 
stance of development theory makes development a tug of war between the 
rich and poor nations where the developed nations (imperialists) would like 
to keep the status quo as they benefit from the impoverishment of the less 
developed nations, that is, the third world. One of the dependency theory’s 
strengths, as noted by Oakland (1998), is its recognition that from the 
beginning, capitalism developed as a multinational system. The development 
of manufacturing in England and impoverishment of Ghana or South Africa 
in the process are linked and in fact form part of the same phenomenon. The 
theory recognises that there are disadvantages of relationship evident in both 
political and economic realms between the core, that is, the developed nations 
and the periphery, that is, the less developed or underdeveloped. 
 
In actual fact, the theory assumes that, if it were not for the exploitative 
nature of this relationship, the core would not have developed to their current 
status and the underdeveloped would also not have suffered the 
impoverishment they currently experience. This exploitation started with 
labour pouching, that is, slave trading, and continued with the extraction of 
raw materials and extortion through structural adjustment reform 
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programmes that were advanced through the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank. Structural adjustment programmes and aid by 
the western world did not aid economies to develop but deformed their 
economies to suit their imperialistic dominated world market. As noted by 
Green (1997), imperialism did not vanish with the liberation of the colonies 
as the Marxist-Leninist party thought. This extends further to economic and 
political emancipation, which is a little difficult to attain given the new 
‘global village’ and new world trade patterns. When defined, dependency 
theory falls short of new focus by perceiving capitalism and imperialism as a 
world system and not taking ‘modern capitalism’ as the new defining force in 
world systems. 
 
There are very few instances where dependency theory has been 
operationalised at a lower level, for example its effect on the bourgeois status 
of different classes within a country. Perceived as alternative explanations in 
the shift of the wealth of nations, dependency theory in the newly 
industrialised economies (NICs) is seen to have effected private individual 
enrichment through development programmes and state wealth transfer to 
the bourgeois. In Africa, the move away from aid and the cancellation of debt 
is at the height of these discussions. The argument that is fostered through 
the dependency theory is that the dependency attitude develops a 
‘dependency syndrome’. In South Africa, such dependencies have worked on 
the minds of the indigenous people to such an extent that, according to Steve 
Biko, the people could no longer think that they could do anything by 
themselves. It promoted inferiority complexes, joblessness, hopelessness 
manifesting in thuggery and vandalism of public properties in the townships 
(Stubbs, Tutu, Mpumlwana and Mpumlwana, 1996:28). 
 
The relevance of this theory to the non-payment of services is clouded by the 
‘inability to pay’, joblessness and total withdrawal from the system. While 
genuine inability to pay and joblessness exists, some of the tendencies are the 
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manifest of the dependency syndrome. There has always been continued 
service rendering, although the service standards were always in question. 
For this reason, it is likely that communities would like to continue receiving 
such services, even at lower quality levels if they continue not to pay. 
Alternatively, giving them a blanket amnesty from payment promotes the 
dependency and limits sustainability of provision. 
 
Box 5: Fourth research question 
What is the affordability level to pay for municipal services by the Soweto 
communities? With a national unemployment rate of between 35 and 40%, 
one only wonders what the socio-economic status and income levels of the 
Soweto households would be, which in turn determines if they can afford 
services payments. 
 
2.4 Sustenance of municipal service delivery 
In South Africa, Acts of Parliament or the provincial ordinances often 
prescribe sources of income of local authorities, as reflected in Cloete 
(1986:76). In some cases the levels of income derived from specific sources can 
be raised only with the approval of a Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government or a Provincial Administrator. The LGTA (1993) sets out a 
framework for the financing of local government. However, a more equitable 
basis for inter-governmental finance in the form of municipal infrastructural 
grants (MIG) is being formulated which should assist local authorities in 
financing the delivery of services. The principal sources of income of local 
authorities include the following: 
 
a. Rates and taxes 
 
b. Tariff services: Water, sewerage, electricity, refuse removals and bus 
service 
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c. Subsidies: Motor vehicle licences, health services, ambulance services 
and fire services 
 
d. Miscellaneous: Traffic fines, halls charges, swimming bath charges, the 
introduction of a fuel levy for the maintenance of roads by 
municipalities, which  should have a further favourable impact on local 
government finance 
 
Local authorities spend money that they generate from the above sources 
mainly on the employment of personnel, purchase of machinery, materials 
and the maintenance of streets, electricity and water reticulation systems. 
 
2.4.1 Divisions in society 
Any form of changes, especially political, takes time to effect, which is why 
Reddy (1994:39) believes that even at present, the apartheid structures are 
still in place, with local government subjected to the same divisions that once 
characterised all aspects of South African life. This will indeed take long for 
South Africa to overcome since population groups are still divided, although 
not through legislation. The divisions, which were formerly racial, seem to 
manifest in class as the bourgeois blacks move to the affluent suburbs, which 
were earlier reserved for whites. Municipalities in these affluent areas have 
always been self-sufficient and this movement therefore dashes the hope that 
black townships could develop to the status of the ‘white suburbs’, rendering 
townships less self-sufficient. Where local government systems are not well 
developed, as in the rural areas of mainly the former homelands, the state 
assumes a greater role in financing local government expenditure through 
mainly grant systems - needless to say local autonomy is in turn sacrificed. 
This is likely to be the case the more financially dependent local authorities 
are on central government, a feature of decentralisation throughout the third 
world (Smith, 1993:64). 
   
 
30
 
According to Norton (1996:23), the director of the Free State Municipal 
Association (FRELOGA), all municipalities should be able to: 
 
a. Conduct their affairs in an effective, economical and efficient manner 
with a view to optimising the use of resources in addressing 
community needs 
 
b. Conduct their financial affairs in an accountable and transparent 
manner 
 
c. Prepare a financial plan in accordance with the integrated 
development plan in respect of all their powers, duties and objectives 
 
d. Structure and manage their administration, budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic community needs, and promote 
social, economic and provincial development within their jurisdiction 
 
e. Manage their financial resources to meet and sustain their objectives 
 
f. Regularly monitor and assess their performance against their 
integrated development plan, and 
 
g. Report annually to and receive comments from their community 
regarding the objectives set in their integrated development plan 
 
The above is difficult to achieve in poor local authorities. This therefore 
indicates that these authorities will depend largely on grants from the 
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central government as their only financial budget and hence, the controls 
that come with them. 
 
2.4.2 Revenue in former black local authorities 
In his analysis of black townships Hoosen (1999:20) realised that the root of 
the income problems was the lack of revenue-generating mechanisms, that is, 
the lack of industries and viable commercial areas or the tax base. The 
locality of major businesses was historically within the boundaries of white 
municipalities and the resultant lack of these facilities in the townships gave 
rise to the virtual absence of a tax base. Thus township municipalities 
depended largely on the rent and service charges levied on residents and 
resource transfer from the central government, which were intended for 
investment in infrastructure. Due to this dependency on rent to finance 
township development, councillors more and more frequently resorted to rent 
hikes and coercive measures against squatters. In short, they attempted to 
resolve the financial problems at the expense of their and their government’s 
political credibility, which led to major rent boycotts in the black South 
African townships. To worsen the problem, in 1963, a government circular 
required local authorities to limit a black person to own only one business 
and the formation of black companies in white areas was also banned. Black 
businesses in the townships were confined to selling only essential domestic 
necessities. Fundamentally, black local authorities (BLAs) were politically 
unacceptable to the majority of people they were meant to serve. This 
rejection rested on the unacceptability of apartheid-created structures in 
which the participation of these blacks could be secured (Hoosen, 1999:21). 
The new local government demarcations are, however, totally transformed 
and the tax base argument may no longer be applicable. 
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2.5 Contemporary local government 
It is important to understand the changes that impact local government; the 
change in its definition, obligations and responsibilities through time (Clarke, 
1996:32). The range and variety of these changes are given below to effect 
clarity that the environment within which the local authority operates is 
constantly changing. Through time, all the changes in the way of doing 
things, the basic nature and function of local government remained the same. 
Local government has always been the government of the community; it has 
remained the social, economic and political ordering of people’s activities 
(Banovetz, 1990:9). The external environment has driven policy changes and 
new patterns of service delivery. Services, above all, always respond to the 
ever-changing demands and the introduction of new problems in this setup. 
The impact of the Children’s Act on social services and, indeed, the political 
decision on ‘free basic services’, free education, the needs of the unemployed 
and the physical planning framework, for example, GEAR, are all examples 
of this (Clarke, 1996:35). 
 
Whereas constitutional and policy changes have affected the governance and 
structures of local government administration, changes within the 
communities have also affected the manner in which local governments 
conduct their businesses. The political changes have reshaped the minds of 
many South Africans in the way that they perceive representation in 
government and services delivery. In order for local governments to be 
acceptable and enjoy support, Corrigan, Hayes and Joyce (1999:7) suggest 
five most basic considerations for change which local government should 
apply: 
 
a. Local government influences local issues: councillors and top managers 
should bear in mind that they think in mostly all cases on behalf of the 
communities they represent. This should influence how they resolve 
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local problems and meet public needs by developing council policies. 
This view of the power of council to solve problems and meet needs, 
and the view of the role of council service, has a profound effect upon 
which managers are expected to carry out their duties. The 
counterargument to the expected effectiveness of councillors is that 
when they are elected through political parties, they tend to effect 
party policies than determine ongoing local expectations. 
 
b. Democracy for local government: being a new phenomenon itself in 
most countries including South Africa, democracy is a defining issue 
for local government. One of the main reasons people work in local 
government is the importance to them of ‘public service’. Corrigan et 
al. (1999:11) believe that the ‘old local government’ had a very simple 
idea, that democracy was the equivalent of elections and that once 
every few years the electorate will turn out to vote. The elected, nearly 
always part of a national political party, will form the administration 
and will ‘run’ the council over their duration without any consideration 
of whether or not services are well provided or constituents are 
satisfied. This has changed with the introduction of accountability 
measures embedded in the Systems Act. 
 
c. The delivery of services by the government: in the past, there was a 
view that local government services should be rendered through one 
method of service delivery. In most local authorities the direct service 
delivery approach was seen to be not only best, but the only way in 
which services could be delivered (Leach and Davis, 1996:72). Methods 
of service rendering are now being reconsidered and in Johannesburg 
some services are semi-privatised, the basic objective being efficiency 
and effectiveness. 
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d. The way in which local government views the public: contained within 
the change between old and new practices is the way in which the 
public is viewed by local government and vice versa. Old local 
governments worldwide were proud to see the public as citizens, 
although this can be argued to the contrary here in South Africa. Local 
government developed its relationship with local people through their 
citizenship with the state. It saw local people as ‘governing’ the local 
authority through their right to vote and through their citizenship 
rights. This formed one of the proud bedrocks of the British local 
government relationship (Corrigan et al., 1999:15). The new local 
government sees the public as its partners, as deeply and continuously 
involved in its activities, according to both the Systems and Structures 
Acts. 
 
e. Honesty and provision of information to the people: this change in local 
government is the way in which it has become more open in recent 
years. Honesty and information provision has been a constructive 
response to a real crisis in the relationship between the public and the 
government and much of the crisis stemmed from a lack of trust. 
Consequently, the public need a much clearer understanding of how 
government works and uses information. 
 
There are many theories which claim that it is difficult to speak about 
democracy in the absence of civil society. Yet, the autonomous needs of civil 
society were considered by some regimes as impediments which needed to be 
broken down [UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948, the 
International Covenants of Human Rights, Wide Declaration Convention of 
Human Rights (1953), the World-Wide Declaration of Local self-government 
of IULA, (1958)], (Reddy, 1994:106). The existence and at least relative 
independence of civil society from the state is an essential component of 
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democracy. In addition, local autonomy must be very carefully protected 
against intervention and biased influence by the state (Reddy, 1994:107). 
Democratic concepts of local government therefore require that local 
governments see their power not as end in itself, but as a resource to be 
shared and used in conjunction with groups and social movements in civil 
society. To this end, Todaro’s definition of development, “a multi-dimensional 
process involving changes in structures, attitudes and institution as well as 
the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and 
eradication of absolute poverty” becomes relevant (Todaro, 1992:36). 
 
2.5.1 What are the new ways of service delivery? 
Any local government must have a clear vision, a purpose and objectives that 
it should strive to attain. The general goal of modern local governments can 
be none other than to create circumstances within their municipality and 
their legal jurisdiction for the attainment of a satisfactory quality of life for 
their citizens. Local governments cannot by themselves create a satisfactory 
quality of life, but they can create favourable circumstances to allow such 
personal development (Corrigan et al., 1999:8). Liberal political theory 
proposes that, for local government to be efficient in providing services, it 
should be answerable to the local interests (Leach and Davis, 1996:72). As 
articulated in the Constitution, a municipal council is responsible for the 
improvement and maintenance of the well being of the people in its area of 
jurisdiction. The Systems and Structures Acts require accountability of the 
municipal councils both to the constituents and to the other spheres of 
government. To be accountable means to answer on a conferred 
responsibility, this includes spending and services delivery standards. In 
order to subject municipal councils to account for their performance Corrigan 
et al. (1999:117) suggest objective services delivery guidelines: 
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a. Services should be delivered with sensitivity and courtesy. This 
involves the identification and understanding of the needs of clients, 
review of clients’ needs over time, an in-group dynamic activity, which 
Cullis and Jones (1998:66) believe requires rigorous research. The 
basis of all these activities is what is often practised by private 
enterprises and referred to as good customer care or customer 
relations. It keeps not only the customer but the supplier happy to 
know that there is mutual happiness. 
 
b. Services should be delivered at high and improving quality levels. This 
suggests that service standards should be identified and defined and 
levels of delivery according to these standards should be assessed. To 
continuously improve on a given set of levels, assessment should be 
carried out from time to time. 
 
c. The first two considerations precede service efficiency and provision 
effectiveness. Where customers’ needs are identified, good customer 
care fostered, with services standards in place, efficiency and 
effectiveness prevail. 
 
As a basic principle, local governments should provide sufficient and 
indispensable municipal infrastructure, services and amenities of optimum 
quality. These new ways of service delivery require that customers be the 
determinants of what is provided, the quantity and quality thereof. Services 
delivery should therefore be customer focused. 
 
2.5.2 Service user focus and performance accountability 
Service user focus means that questions have been asked, and taken 
seriously about who the service users need. The answers to these questions 
can best be found by consulting the public and involving them in evaluating 
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the services they are receiving (Stoker, 1991:5). Local government is a local 
democracy in the sense of participatory democracy, the best possible system 
for encouraging popular participation. Although local government by its very 
nature provides the opportunity for local people to be directly involved, it 
remains difficult to generate popular participation (Conyers and Hills, 
1984:114). Moreover, local authorities do not tend to be very effective 
planning institutions because many of them do little more than provide basic 
services and act as a forum for the discussion of local political issues. 
 
The democratisation of the local government processes, the election of 
representatives and participation by the public in services delivery cannot be 
equated to efficiency, effectiveness and accountability. These are the main 
cornerstones through which local government performance can be measured. 
In recent years, as concern for accountability took centre stage, dozens of 
local governments responded by bolstering their ability to assess the services 
they provide. However, Ammons (1995:1) sees greater accountability as just 
one of the rewards that come with systematic performance monitoring. In the 
United States of America, it was an agreed performance monitoring and 
accountability system, a resolution adopted by public organisations - National 
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) on 8 November 1991. The NAPA 
strongly recommends that units of municipalities make a concerted effort to: 
 
…monitor quality and outcomes as part of their overall system in order 
to improve performance and credibility of public programs while 
legislators, chief executives, and relevant professional groups are 
encouraged to obtain agreement between policy-making and operating 
levels, and where appropriate, between levels of government, on 
appropriate indicators of program costs, quantity and quality of services, 
and important program outcomes. When feasible, involve citizens or 
their representatives in setting goals for progress, outcomes and in 
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monitoring results. Regularly collect information on program 
performance in terms of the agreed-on performance indicators. Develop 
procedures for establishing realistic performance expectations that take 
into account the influence of client characteristics, local conditions, and 
other factors beyond the control of program staff. Use information on 
program performance, changes in program performance, and differences 
between actual and expected performance to improve program 
performance; and regularly report to elected officials and the public on 
program performance, results achieved in different geographic areas, 
and differences between actual and expected performance… 
NAPA resolution, Nov 1991 (in Ammons, 1995:2-3) 
 
It is acknowledged that the initial groundwork of establishing performance 
indicators and monitoring systems can often be superficial. However, as the 
experience is gained with performance monitoring and reporting and as 
performance trends become clear, realistic performance targets in terms of 
programme goals and agreed programme quality and outcome indicators 
should be put in place, followed by monitoring and reporting targets 
(Ammons, 1995:3). When one starts asking questions such as, how am I 
doing, which is cited to have become the trademark question of Ed Koch, 
mayor of New York City from 1978 to 1989, one clearly understands his 
purpose (Ammons, 1996:1). This is not only a reassurance seeking statement 
regarding the depth of one’s political base, but gathers the much-needed 
feedback on one’s stewardship and obligation to one’s constituencies. 
 
Surveys of local government officials in the US indicate a broad awareness of 
the importance of performance measurement and monitoring. More than half 
of the US cities collect performance measures of some type. In most cases, the 
vast majority of the measures collected by a given municipality merely reflect 
workload, for example the number of applications processed, arrests made, 
recreation class participants, or inspections completed (Ammons, 1996:2). In 
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essence, workload measures are a form of ‘bean counting’, but it is important 
to know the ‘quality’ of the beans and the ‘efficiency’ with which they are 
grown and harvested. Measures of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity 
have been developed for local government services that reveal much more 
about municipal operations than simple workload. Efficiency measures are 
often expressed as unit costs or units of production per employee-hour, which 
depicts the relationship between services or products and the resources 
required in production. The relationship between these concepts is discussed 
in Cockayen, Rassol and Van Donk (1999). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Effectiveness assessment in municipal services delivery 
 
Source: Adapted from Cockayen et al. (1999) 
 
Whereas the economy is concerned with the internal and external costs to the 
production process, for example staffing and raw materials, efficiency regards 
the quantity and quality of the products or outputs. Effectiveness looks at the 
final outcome and not just the output. Outputs are tangibles but with 
outcomes; the concern is more on the ultimate value or benefit of such a 
service. Effectiveness measures depict the quality of municipal performance 
or indicate the extent to which a department’s objectives are achieved. 
Measures of timeliness and citizen satisfaction are among the common forms 
of effectiveness measures. Productivity measures, although extremely rare in 
municipal performance monitoring systems, combine efficiency and 
effectiveness components in a single indicator. In South African black 
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townships, the need to monitor performance was never there since local 
authorities were not democratic and the outcomes of such assessments would 
have been marred by political agendas. The new system encourages 
performance monitoring and accountability embedded in the Constitution, 
the Systems Act and Batho Pele Principles (MPS & A, 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Municipal service delivery and improvement cycle 
 
Source: Adapted from Cockayen et al. (1999) 
 
The cycle reflected in the figure not only culminates in the monitoring of 
services against the set standards, but also encompasses reports on the 
effectiveness of the standards and regular assessment reports of the 
outcomes. The argument throughout is that a performance measure is 
virtually valueless if it appears in isolation, as an abstract number. 
Performance values should therefore be seen against relevant pegs, for 
example a benchmark target. The benchmarking process enables current 
performance marks to be compared with established targets or existing 
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standards, thereby gauging a single municipal performance against its own 
pervious standards or other jurisdictions on a quarterly or annually basis 
(Ammons, 1996:3). 
 
Box 6: Fifth research question 
What does the city of Johannesburg municipality perceive as its application 
and enforcement of services quality management standards? Local 
government legislation (cf. chapter three) also requires municipalities to 
develop performance management systems.  
 
There are numerous reasons for measuring performance. When properly 
developed and administered, performance measurements and monitoring 
systems can offer important support to a host of management functions, 
which has important ramifications for cities that aspire to excellence. The 
measurement of municipal performance informs: 
 
a. Accountability: performance measures document what each unit or 
department has achieved, how well it was done and the difference that 
it has made. 
 
b. Planning and budgeting: provides a clear sense of service preferences 
among citizens and knowledge of the cost of providing a unit of service 
at a given level, which in turn allows for planning and budgeting. 
 
c. Operational improvements: without the continuous assessment of 
performance, performance anomalies cannot be identified and 
consequently performance cannot be improved. 
 
d. Reallocation of resources: failure and problems in most operations are 
brought about by inefficiency of resource allocation, as depicted in 
figure 1. Often, resources are too little or too much to enable the 
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success of projects. Continuous performance management will in these 
cases identify the overutilised and less utilised resources to enable 
resource reallocation (Ammons, 1996:11). 
 
New thinking is that service users are the final arbiters of the quality of the 
service. The main requirement for managers is therefore to ensure that the 
service users are saying that the services are very good and, in fact, just what 
they need. Whereas service providers may worry about how they are going to 
set service standards that match the public’s expectations, Corrigan et al. 
(1999:122) think that the immediate target should be to make improvements 
in services by planning a series of paced improvements, which over a period 
of time could end up creating a radical improvement in services. Secondly, it 
will be more difficult to think about how standards might live up to public 
expectations if the services are viewed in a purely traditional way. What is 
then needed is a service or customer focus. 
 
It is often much easier for municipalities to introduce customer care slogans 
and encourage staff to demonstrate customer care, but how can the efforts be 
weighted if what the customers really want is unknown? There are numerous 
attempts aimed at both measuring and managing customer care (Linton, 
1994:5). Customer care ensures that the institution guarantees future income 
and profitability. Although profit making is not necessarily the primary 
objective of a municipality, efficiency is its concern. The qualitative and 
quantitative methods for ascertaining customer needs include firstly focus or 
panel groups. Here customers are met and interviewed about their 
requirements and attitudes towards the services that are provided. Secondly, 
questionnaires are useful where customer databases are kept. Customers are 
sent questionnaires regarding the effectiveness of the services they are 
receiving. 
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These two methods are well founded, but used in attaining different 
objectives. The first method is used in establishing needs and requirements 
and mostly in cases where little or nothing is known. In businesses that have 
numerous customers, like municipalities, this method can be used as 
preparatory for the second method. Before you can improve customer service, 
you have to know what your customers need, why they use your services and 
the benefits they derive from dealing with you. This helps in improving 
service in accordance with the requirements of the customers (Linton, 
1995:7). The second method is used where needs and requirements are 
already identified, to ascertain the level of satisfaction at given intervals. A 
customer satisfaction index, which often stems from this method, is the most 
efficient method of measuring achievement and improvement. This index 
takes the results from a number of satisfaction surveys and allocates a 
numerical value to key customer satisfaction indicators. A municipality is 
then given an overall index of performance, which can be compared with 
competitors usually on a yearly basis. 
 
Box 7: Sixth research question 
How satisfied or dissatisfied are the Soweto communities with the various 
basic municipal services rendered? This question seems not to have received 
any attention, judging by recent local government literature. 
 
There is only one justification for employing all these methodologies or any 
other alternative ones, and that is that customer focus and satisfaction are 
central to payments and therefore sustainability of delivery. These 
methodologies ensure that the municipality is offering customers the 
products and services that reflect their real needs.  As suggested by Linton 
(1995:45), performance and customer focused standards should: 
 
a. Reflect the services of the municipality that customers feel are 
important 
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b. Cover routine activities such as answering the telephone or replying to 
letters, as well as specific customer requirements 
 
c. Be measurable 
 
d. Be known to every member of staff  
 
e. Encourage staff to exceed the standards, instead of just meeting them 
 
Identifying consumer needs and establishing measures requires a self-
sustaining budget, especially where local governments are expected to raise 
their own income. In order for the democratic local government to function 
fully and identify and meet residents’ needs and expectations at efficient and 
effective levels, large sums of funds are allocated for performance 
management systems. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The theories and contemporary literature discussed have identified six 
important questions that were posed to the municipal services consumers and 
service providers. The questions are reordered in table three to give a 
systematic flow in their investigation and later, in their presentation in the 
research findings chapters. The perceptions and attitudes between the 
households are divided according to the social class of the participants 
because literature suggests that perceptions towards the identified questions 
may vary according to affordability or class differentials. That is, affordability 
may be a factor that determines a person’s participation in municipal 
activities and a person’s payment of the municipal services. 
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Table 3: Research questions 
To the service consumers/communities Control factors 
q i. How affordable are the basic municipal 
services to the Soweto communities? 
q ii. What are community’s perceptions of the 
importance of the various municipal services?  
q iii. Are the communities participating in services 
identification and provision? 
q iv. How satisfied are the communities with the 
service delivery? 
It was important that 
these questions were 
posed to the whole 
sample, and to the 
split groups according 
to the well-off and 
worse-off townships 
To the service providers/municipalities 
qi. What methods does the municipality use in 
identifying and delivering service? 
qii. What does the municipality perceive to be its 
application and enforcement of service quality 
management standards? 
These questions were 
posed to the 
councillors and 
administrators/service 
managers 
 
Literature also suggests that the questions that pertain to the service 
providers be looked at from both the perspectives of the municipal councillors 
and services managers. It was important to raise these issues among these 
two groups since the current local government systems and structures are 
relatively new and there are reports of tensions between the administration 
and political offices in municipalities. Some of the tensions that exist regard 
the management of services provision, while others are seen as political 
interference in service provision by service professionals or administrators. 
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Chapter Three 
 
CONTEXT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the chapter is to provide a general understanding of the evolution 
of local government in South Africa with systematised attention on basic 
service delivery, community participation and services payment. The chapter 
achieves this by providing chronological events of local government since its 
establishment in Johannesburg in the 1880s until the democratic local 
government dispensation ushered in with the first democratic elections in 
1995/6. 
 
The introductory phase of local government, which was then called the 
Sanitary Board, was characterised by the basic services concessions with the 
exception of education and the police. The exclusion of blacks from both the 
political and economic systems saw no participation in local government 
activities and during the same period, blacks were evicted from city centres 
into the townships. Basic service delivery was meagre and erratic even in the 
‘white areas’. However, non-payment of services was a serious violation that 
was punishable by imprisonment. 
 
In the interim phase, that is, between 1922 and 1994, black urban authorities 
consisting of unelected officials were created that presided over basic services 
delivery in the townships. BLA legislation was revised, but not much changed 
in terms of service delivery, property ownership and participation in the 
townships. Instead, the services non-payment debt grew until it was 
unbearable through rate boycotts in the 1980s, although boycotts were also 
political rather than solely service-orientated. In 1989 Soweto residents 
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commissioned a study into the effects of boycotts and found huge disparities 
in service delivery and poor allocation of funds to the townships by the 
government. 
 
Since 1995, however, legislation has been put in place to enable definition of 
new municipal structures that require community participation and 
accountability from both sides. The new demarcations and new systems are 
in place to enable proper community representation through the ward 
committee systems, the integrated development plans and through council 
meetings. There have been two successful elections held since then and the 
municipality has produced numerous by-laws, including the indigent policies 
and other tax systems. Non-payment has, however persisted and the 
municipality in 2000/1 faced a debt of R2.8 billion, unknown participation 
levels, privatisation of electricity and installation of prepaid water metres 
that were followed by community uprising. 
 
3.2 Historical overview of South African urban arrangements 
It is widely accepted that when the Dutch arrived in the Cape in the mid-
17th century, there were no formal government structures. Soon after the 
expansion of the Cape colony towards Stellenbosch, a local governor was 
appointed for Stellenbosch in 1682 to oversee matters of farm disputes and 
demarcations, and could be taken to be an equivalent of the current 
municipal mayor. The history of the early local government is briefly outlined 
in Cloete (1986), although the mandate and service delivery by the Dutch 
system is hardly documented. The little that can be gathered is that the Cape 
colony fell into British control in 1795 as a matter of requested hand-over by 
the Prince of Orange-Holland after Holland’s invasion by France. The 
Afrikaners, a new breed of Dutch South Africans, retreated to the Natal 
areas, running away from British control. However, Natal was later annexed 
into British control in 1842. The Afrikaners in turn subdued the Transvaal 
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and Free State from the native blacks in 1852 and 1854, respectively. After 
the discovery of gold in Johannesburg the British again annexed Transvaal in 
1877, leading to the first Anglo-Boer war for Afrikaner independence in 1880. 
The discovery of gold attracted overseas investors and caused thousands of 
blacks who were driven from their farms due to a combination of drought, 
overgrazing and diseases to seek employment in Johannesburg (Du Pre, 
1990:17). 
 
When closely observed, history shows that local government in South Africa 
has undergone a process of transformation that ran parallel to the political 
changes and power shifts. These shifts in political power struggles influenced 
firstly the establishment of the earliest forms of local government, from the 
Dutch (1652 – 1795), the English (1795 - 1910) to the Afrikaner apartheid 
system (1948 – 1994) and now the democratic non-racial system (1994 – to 
date). 
 
3.2.1 Earliest form of local government in Johannesburg 
Johannesburg is situated at an altitude of 1 763 m above sea level and lies 
between the Vaal River and the Magaliesberg mountain range. Without a 
local source of water, its water source is from 70 km away at the Vaal River, 
and most recently from Lesotho’s Highlands Katse Dam. In Musiker and 
Musiker (1999), Leyds (1964) and Cloete (1986), the earliest foundations of 
the city are described including where it derived its name. 
 
Some time after the establishment of Cape Town as a refreshment station, 
long before any traces of local government in South Africa were documented, 
England, in all of its colonies, employed state departments or other 
institutions to provide the essential municipal services in urban areas. Due to 
the unsatisfactory nature of these arrangements, people insisted upon the 
creation of local authorities, also known as municipal authorities, to govern 
and administer urban areas (Cloete, 1986:11). In Johannesburg, the earliest 
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traces of local government date back to 1886 with the appointment of nine 
local government members (Musiker and Musiker, 1999:170). In 1887 
Johannesburg was subdivided into twelve wards and a Sanitary Board, which 
was the equivalent of the city council, was appointed although highly 
regulated by the central government in Pretoria. The first municipal elections 
were held in 1903. Councillors objected to the scrapping of the colour bar in 
these elections, and colour restrictions were reinstated, taking away the 
voting rights of the black population. Since most governors of the Vaal Reef 
came from England and because England had just done away with both 
slavery and segregation, voting by the blacks was highly contested, but 
blacks never voted again until 1995/1996. 
 
The Sanitary Board had powers to pass plans for new buildings, which 
influenced the prevention of fires. Most services were under concession, 
which brought about uncertainty to most individuals regarding the authority 
of the Board. The concession for water services was given away in 1887, gas 
supply in 1888, electricity and the tramway in 1889, although education and 
the police services were retained. Private enterprises only showed a lack of 
interest in 1895 and the Board inherited the right to once more supply 
various services, although water supply remained in the hands of Water 
Works Company Limited (LTD) until the establishment of the Rand Water 
Board. Due to the lack of waterborne sewerage, which was made available 
only in 1904, rubbish, bath and slop water was collected on the Board’s 
prescribed fees. A reason for the absence of the waterborne sewerage was the 
lack of water in the area. Non-payment for this service was construed a 
serious violation of law, punishable by imprisonment without fine. The first 
legal action taken against residents by the Board for non-payment was 
against Mayfair residents in 1897, the year that the Board was replaced by 
the Johannesburg City Council (JCC) in 1900, for arrears of £2 350. Quite 
interestingly, during the days of the Sanitary Board, rates and tax increases 
were subject to discussion and voting in the public meetings (Leyds, 1964:29-
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33). 
 
3.2.2 Self-governance 
Because of the Anglo-Boer War, in 1900 Johannesburg gained self-
governance from Pretoria. In 1917, that is, a few years after the war, the 
Ratepayers’ Association (RA) was established and the JCC assumed control 
over planning and housing. The municipality attained greater control over 
health services in 1918 following an influenza outbreak, but inadequate 
service provision, which was due to the lack of financing, led to serious 
dissatisfaction (Musiker and Musiker, 1999). Initially, people of all races 
were housed in the same compounds in what is Braamfontein today. The 
miners administration’s inter-colonial Native Affairs Commission (NAC) of 
1902 – 1905 advised against franchise rights for Africans, perceived to have 
the potential to weaken white supremacy. In 1904, the creation and 
implementation of a policy to house urban Africans within secluded 
townships at the outskirts of ‘white cities’ was started. The first of these 
black locations were Alexandra (alleged 1904/1905) and Klipspruit (1905). 
 
3.3 The black urban areas authorities 
Events that led to the segregation of the black population date back to 1902 – 
1905 Stallard Commission that gave birth to separate residential areas for 
blacks (Welsh, 1979). After the First World War (1914 - 1918), the world was 
plunged into a recession and as a result gold prices fell drastically. 
Johannesburg mine managers in turn employed more cheap black labourers, 
leading to the Afrikaner strikes that General Smuts harshly suppressed. This 
hostility between the government and Afrikaners made Hertzog together 
with the English Labour Party win the 1932 elections. Their adopted policy 
was to alienate both blacks and the Coloured people and intensified the 
exodus of blacks to already mushrooming townships (Du Pre, 1990:25-26). 
From that time onwards, blacks never featured nor participated in the 
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politics of South Africa at any level. Historic discussion will be left here and 
focus will be given to the origins of the BLAs, their establishment and 
maintenance. The main argument presented by Cloete (1986) and Mandy 
(1984) is that the original segregation laws were meant to afford whites jobs 
and other opportunities during the depression. Segregation was perpetuated 
although repealed already in Great Britain and other European countries 
and continued in non-recessionary times. 
 
3.3.1 The black local authorities between 1922 and 1981 
In 1922, immediately after Hertzog took over from Smuts, the Blacks (Urban 
Areas) Act (Act 21 of 1923) was introduced. The Act aimed at creating Black 
Advisory Boards, which would advise white local authorities about the 
administration of the black townships. What this means is that white 
authorities continued to administer the black residential areas from afar, 
only through the advisory powers of the Boards mentioned here. 
 
In 1945, the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (Act 25 of 1945) 
repealed the Act of 1923, but still maintained the Black Advisory Boards in 
the capacity and for the same purpose as did the Act of 1923. It is self-evident 
that much did not change for the period 1922 to 1989, as stated in Du Pre 
(1990). 
 
In 1961, the Urban Black Councils Act (Act 79 of 1961) put in place Urban 
Black Councils to which white local authorities could assign powers to 
perform functions of a local authority. The law here is self-explanatory in 
that blacks could not perform any functions for themselves and, of course, 
this means that they did not participate in whatever decisions were made 
and functions were performed. 
 
In 1971, the Black Affairs Administration Act (Act 45 of 1971), later changed 
to the Black Communities Development Act (Act 4 of 1984), was introduced. 
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The Black Affairs Administration Boards were established for regions and 
there were 14 Boards in Johannesburg in total. During the period prior to 
1976, most of Soweto had been without electricity. When the Urban 
Foundation proposed a plan during 1976 to electrify Soweto, the 
Administration Board turned it down on the grounds that “Soweto residents 
would not be able to afford the costs” (Du Pre, 1990:67). 
 
In 1977, the Community Councils Act (Act 125 of 1977) was passed to repeal 
the Black Affairs Administration Act (Act 45 of 1971) and constituted 
community councils for black urban areas through Administration Boards. 
This Act represented the first attempt by the Department of Cooperation and 
Development to institute in urban areas quasi-local authority structures 
which held the promise of granting substantive rather than advisory powers 
to urban black residents. The Advisory Boards and Urban Bantu Councils 
had never had any real powers to influence decisions of the municipalities or 
the Administration Boards. 
 
3.3.2 The black local authorities between 1982 and 1991 
In 1982, the BLA Act (Act 102 of 1982) was passed and established ‘fully-
fledged’ local authorities in the urban black residential areas which, the 
apartheid government propagated, had equal status to the white urban 
authorities. As they put it, they were intended to “improve the reforms in the 
local government for the African communities”. BLAs gave rise to intensified 
defiance campaigns against the apartheid government. There was strong 
resistance by the black communities to the introduction of the BLAs because 
BLAs were introduced within the apartheid framework. Most civic 
organisations, which started as street committees, were initiated as a 
response to and to oppose the introduction of BLAs (Shubane, 1991:64). The 
reforms that came with the introduction of BLAs were not sufficient as the 
townships remained without a tax base to finance themselves. 
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The BLA councils had only one option left to them in the absence of a tax 
base, and that was to increase the rates and service charges, which later had 
serious consequences, namely boycotts and a call for the resignation of the 
BLA councillors. To some extent, BLAs, which were largely staffed by black 
councillors according to Shubane, gave townships some political bargaining 
powers, like they did the Bantustans. For argument’s sake, for the first time 
through BLAs, blacks started owning houses in the townships (Shubane, 
1991:66). The alternative argument by Shubane is that property ownership 
in general gave rise to middle-class urban blacks who were more enlightened 
and who organised for the total abolishment of BLAs. At national political 
level, considerable uncertainty surrounded the system of local authorities for 
blacks (Bekker and Humphries, 1985:116). The BLAs underwent three 
phases between 1982 and 1990/91: 
 
a. The introduction (1982 - 1984): coincided with huge resistance from 
civic associations and other community structures. Communities saw 
the so-called ‘reforms’ as falling short of their expectations and thus 
mobilised for non-participation, especially at the first BLA elections of 
1983. To make matters worse, the Tri-Cameral Parliament was 
introduced in the same period, making blacks more furious. The 
movement against these reforms led to the formation of numerous 
street committees and civic organisations that called on people not to 
participate in BLA elections. 
 
b. The intermediate phase (1985 - 1989): in 1986 the Administrative 
Boards of 1971 that became Development Boards in 1984 were 
abolished. This period saw the withdrawal by most councillors and 
appointment of white administrators by the government. Rent boycotts 
intensified and spread to more than 60 townships countrywide and 
during the same time, a state of emergency was declared. The police 
and army were deployed in the townships (Shubane, 1991:70). The 
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rent boycotts were aimed at forcing councillors to lower rent to 
‘affordable levels’. After the boycotted BLA elections of 1989, which 
received 25% participation throughout the country, the government 
stepped in through the provincial authorities to provide finance to 
boycotted councils that were on the verge of collapse. 
 
c. The final onslaught (1989 - 1991): the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) 
at this time formed a People’s Delegation to explore possibilities of 
ending the rent boycotts. A Soweto rent boycott study that was 
commissioned by the Soweto Delegation in 1989 revealed a high degree 
of political mass mobilisation that participated in street committees, 
inadequate housing and service, and excessively high rental and 
service charges that communities could not afford (PLANACT, 
1989:25-26). By the end of 1990, rent boycott campaigns led to a 
collapse of 40% of the 262 BLAs countrywide. According to the 
Business Times of 4 December 1990 (in Shubane, 1991:72), at the 
Stellenbosch University graduation ceremony, the President 
acknowledged that BLA boycotts should be ended as they had achieved 
their purpose; that the government had conceded to community 
demands. Shubane saw this as a signal and an acceptance by the 
apartheid government that their policy of apartheid was wrong as the 
government indicated that city management was henceforth to be 
unified irrespective of race. 
 
BLAs did not bring about any significant changes to the way of life and 
services delivery in the townships, but unified and politicised township 
residents to boycott rent and service charges and to call for an end to open 
apartheid. 
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3.3.3 Rent boycotts within the BLAs - 1980s 
When the JCC introduced its economic rental policy during the 1980s, cost of 
housing provision, municipal service and administration were to be covered 
by rent. As a consequence, rents rose dramatically. Efforts to raise revenue 
from rent, however, met with a political statement, the only statement that 
communities could give, which was refusal to pay. Also, because township 
developments were dependent on rent for finance, councillors were frequently 
confronted by rent hikes and even resorted to coercive measures against 
squatters. Many households found it increasingly difficult to pay rent that 
continued to rise in real terms while incomes were eroded by inflation. At the 
same time residents were less motivated to pay rent because of the apparent 
lack of promised township development, the scale of corruption among 
councillors and councils’ illegitimacy (Moss and Obery, 1987:55). 
 
After 1984, the townships were hit by school, consumer and rent boycotts, 
which were directed against the BLAs. In June of 1986, civic associations 
throughout Soweto called for rent boycotts, which then continued for more 
than two years, leading up to the dissolution of the Soweto Council in 1987. 
By this time, many rent defaulters had been evicted from their homes. The 
price of the household rent was in question as residents pleaded for a 
reduction of service charges to R45 a month. The administrators, however, 
construed the act to be politically motivated. Moss and Obery (1987:56-67) 
note that default by some communities during the 1970s and 1980s should be 
understood in the light of the prevailing context. In some townships, for 
example Ethandukukhanya, residents were moved to a newly built area after 
the destruction of their shacks in January 1984. The Eastern Transvaal 
Development Board (ETDB) did not inform residents of their new rent. Only 
in June of the same year were residents told that rent was to be higher than 
it was in the old location and was to be determined according to the Pay as 
You Earn system. Residents initially did not consider a total boycott of rent. 
Some continued to pay the old rent, others decided to reduce their payments, 
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and others paid nothing at all. When the ETDB and the councils insisted on 
the new rentals, a total rent boycott began. Apart from the above incidents, 
Moss and Obery (1987:58) believe that the rent boycott was generally a 
response to a series of incidents in which popular frustration with the 
administration board had accumulated. After lengthy and unsuccessful 
negotiations, residents decided that they would boycott rent from 1 April 
1985 unless the Board listened to their grievances at a public meeting. The 
Board, however, cancelled the meeting and the boycott began. 
 
Rent boycotts have informed township politics and have also been shaped by 
them. The rent boycott started at a time when there was very little 
organisational presence. In Soweto, the general rent boycott that began in 
June 1985 was organised through the network of street committees and built 
up in conjunction with the 13 branches of the SCA. The committees enabled 
the boycott call to be widely relayed at a time when mass meetings were 
prohibited, and acquired strong support throughout Soweto (Moss and Obery, 
1987:58-59). Though it is difficult to distinguish the political impact of the 
boycotts themselves from related or even coincidental events, it is worth 
identifying the direct and indirect effect on township politics. 
 
In February of 1988, Soweto’s mayor (Botile) met President PW Botha to 
discuss a possible reduction in rent for Soweto. At that time, the Council was 
collecting R3m instead of R7m in monthly charges. By the end of May 1988, 
257 community and local authority councillors had resigned nationwide, 
including mayors. In July of the same year, rent boycotts were reported to 
have cost the state more than R250m nationwide at R30m per month. A total 
of 27 000 Soweto residents owed R2.5m, in Diepmeadow 20 840 owed R1.1m; 
40% of Dobsonville residents owed R0.3m (Howe et al., 1988:152). 
 
Numerous studies were commissioned on the causes of rent boycotts and 
their consequences. Researchers from the Development Bank of Southern 
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Africa (DBSA), Rand Afrikaans University and the University of the 
Witwatersrand found that although not paying their own service charges 
directly, Soweto residents, through their labour and spending power, had 
effectively been subsidising white Johannesburg. The JCC at one stage 
confirmed that it benefited from rates paid by city businesses at which 
Sowetans were supposedly spending over R1 billion annually. Because of this, 
the JCC had to offer 55% rebates to city dwellers, and no rebates for the 
Sowetans (Fine, 1989). 
 
The people of Soweto commissioned an investigation into rent boycotts in the 
Greater Soweto in 1989 and found the following three important issues: 
firstly there was a lack of forward planning and periodic shifts in state policy, 
with inconsideration for the living conditions of those who worked the wealth 
of Johannesburg. Secondly, insufficient funds were being spent 
inappropriately, with the nature of service delivery being responsive to 
political rather than social dictates and thirdly, the service provision in 
general, which included water, sewerage reticulation, road networks and 
storm water drainage systems, was below the expected standards and far 
below the standards in the white suburban areas. 
 
The survey also found that 64% of residents were threatened with evictions 
for non-payment of rent and service charges. The government was found to be 
doing very little that could be considered good for the communities, which 
Steve Biko considered “worth commenting on” (Stubbs et al., 1996). Detailed 
research on the rent boycott of the 1980s in Soweto is fully explored in 
PLANACT (1989). 
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3.4 Contemporary local government in the city of Johannesburg 
3.4.1 TLCs 
In line with the LGTA of 1993, TLCs were established, creating a framework 
for the first non-racial local government elections. The rolling out of 
transformation was a three-phased approach, briefly outlined below and fully 
explored by Reddy (1994) and in the Local Government Review - 2003/2004  
(Department of Provincial and Local Government. During the pre-interim 
phase, which started in 1993 and culminated in 1995, local government went 
through the abolishment of segregational municipalities, established local 
government negotiating forums (LGNF) that made recommendations to the 
multi-party negotiating council (MPNC) for the establishment of TLCs and 
transitional metropolitan councils (TMC/TMLCs). While TLCs were 
established in non-metropolitan areas, TMCs were established in 
metropolitan areas. The formation and duties of these councils were to 
provide, among other things, water, electricity and sewerage purification 
services (Reddy, 1996:58-62). The interim phase began in 1995 with the 
election of the democratic councils during the 1995/6 democratic local 
government elections and lasted until the local government system had been 
designed and legislated. The final phase started when a new local 
government system had been established, after the second democratic local 
government elections of 2000. At this consolidated phase, the democratic 
structures and systems were determined to be a full implementation of 
developmental local government systems and practices while giving full 
support to ensure sustainability (Local Government Review, 2003/2004:23). 
 
Different forms of municipalities were created through the Structures Act to 
provide for the division of functions and powers between the different 
categories of municipalities. Provision was made for the different categories 
of municipalities in Chapter 10 of the Constitution and Chapter 1 of the 
Structures Act augmented this by naming three categories. Category A is the 
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only one municipal council in an area and has exclusive municipal executive 
and legislative authority and is constituted only in metropolitan areas. 
Category B are municipalities that share municipal executive and legislative 
authority in their area and are referred to as local municipalities. Category C 
municipalities have municipal executive and legislative authority in an area 
that includes more than one municipality and these are known as district 
municipalities. 
 
3.4.2 Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
In August 1995, before the first democratic local government elections, the 
special electoral court ruled in favour of the demarcation of Johannesburg 
into four substructures and in August of the same year, the Greater 
Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council (GJTMC) was established. 
This new local government structure consisted of four TMLCs, which are the 
Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western Metropolitan Councils. Chief 
executive officers ran each of the TMLCs. Strategic executives were 
appointed to report to the chief executives on urbanisation and environment, 
public safety and emergency services, transport, electricity, finance and 
human resources. In 1998 there was a drastic reduction in the number of 
wards in the GJTMC as a direct result of the White Paper on Local 
Government that set an upper limit on the number of councillors in large 
councils. In 1999 the centralisation of power in the GJTMC was signed by the 
five councils, leading to central co-ordination of functions such as financial 
budgets, refuse removal, roads, libraries and parks. 
 
Until only recently the Johannesburg metropolitan area covered 
approximately 1 386 square kilometres and the inclusion of Midrand, 
Modderfontein and Edenvale into Johannesburg saw an increase in the 
geographic area. The new city of Johannesburg came into being through the 
abolishment of the Eastern, Northern and Southern and Western 
Johannesburg MLC; a portion of the Gatsrand TLC, Kempton Part/Thembisa 
   
 
60
MLC, Midrand/Rabie and a portion of Ridge/Ivory Park. 
 
The Constitution, section 155(1), promotes local government category A for 
large metropolitan areas, and the city of Johannesburg became one among six 
in the entire country. The previous 843 municipalities were disestablished 
and 284 new municipal boundaries were created for the whole of South 
Africa. The city of Johannesburg became a type A municipality after the 2000 
local government elections (Structures Act, Chapter 4, Part 56). The city is 
now characterised by a mayoral executive system combined with a ward 
participatory system with 11 regions, 109 wards and 145 councillors. After 
the 2000 local government elections, representation in the council was 129 
ANC, 9 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 3 Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and 1 
each for the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO), Christian Democratic Party (CDP) and United 
Democratic Movement (UDM). Amos Masondo became the first Johannesburg 
Mayoral elect and was inaugurated on 5 December 2000. In terms of the 
Structures Act (Part 56), the Executive Mayor is expected to, among other 
things, identify the needs of the municipality, and review and evaluate those 
needs in order to prioritise them for the purposes of budgeting and delivery. 
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Map 1: City of Johannesburg new municipal regions 
 
 Source: City of Johannesburg 
 
3.4.3 South Western Townships (Soweto) 
The area of this study is what is currently known as the Greater Soweto, 
which consists of 29 townships and is marked as regions 6 and 10 on the 
map, that is, Diepmeadow and part of the original Soweto. Diepmeadow, 
which encompasses Meadowlands and Diepkloof, was built in 1957 and 1959 
to accommodated evictees from Sophiatown and Alexandra under the Group 
Areas Act of 1950 (Mashabela, 1988). In the foreword to the book Soweto: A 
history, Walter Sisulu remarked that, “not much has been written about 
Soweto, yet it is known the world over as a symbol of apartheid terror and as 
a symbol of the heroic struggles of its people against terror” (Bonner and 
Segal, 1998:7). 
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…it has been said that the path through Africa runs through Soweto; 
that Soweto is a microcosm, or the soul of South Africa; that Soweto is a 
shining example of neglect and exploitation: that Soweto means many 
things to many people… 
Louis Rive (1980) 
 
Bonner and Segal (1998:10) have written interesting history about Soweto, 
answering questions such as: When was it constructed? Why was it built? 
Where did its residents come from? Why did people flock in vast numbers to 
such an inhospitable setting? Earlier traces of the origin of Soweto date back 
to 1905 to Klipspruit, which was renamed Pimville in 1931, and Orlando, 
named after the chairman of the NAC, Councillor Edwin Orlando Leake. 
Soweto, which is a composite of a few townships, was given its name only in 
1963. All the houses in Diepmeadow had electricity in 1987, running water 
and some had outside toilets. Only 60% had rubbish bins and the 
Witwatersrand Regional Services Council (WRSC) had in 1987 just allocated 
R33 429 000 for upgrades of roads, water and refuse dumps (Mashabela, 
1988:55-58). Without getting into a detailed discussion of the history of 
Soweto, it suffices to mention that the mushrooming of Soweto and other 
black townships in Johannesburg was largely caused by the discovery of gold. 
 
3.4.4 New legislative guidance to municipal services delivery 
Following the LGTA, in 1998 a White Paper on Local Government (MPA & 
CD, 1998) was released that provided a framework for developmental local 
government. The local government legislation that followed, which includes 
the Structures, Systems and Municipal Infrastructural Bills, all revolved 
around making municipalities sustainable by emphasising consultations on 
service provision, setting up service standards, incremental access by the 
poor, openness and transparency and enhanced accountability (Local 
Government Review, 2003/2004:25). In this section, aspects of service 
provision and community participation that emanate from the new 
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framework are reviewed. 
 
3.4.4.1 Municipal services provision and affordability 
The primary purpose of the Systems Act is to “…provide the core principle, 
mechanisms and processes necessary to enable municipalities to move 
progressively towards the social and economic upliftment of local 
communities, and ensure universal access to essential services” (South 
Africa, 2000). Central to this Act is the establishment of frameworks for 
planning, people participation, service delivery agreements and payment, 
performance management, resource mobilisation and effective use and 
organisational change which underpin developmental local government. 
Arising from this, the city of Johannesburg was required to have a strategic 
plan for effective service delivery by March 2001. Parliament also showed 
commitment by tabling an incremental Medium-term Budget Policy, which 
reflected increased public services spending to R7.8 billion in 2001/02 and 
R13.2 billion in 2002/03 (Local Government, 2002). In the long run, however, 
municipalities are expected to be self-sustaining. It is for this reason that the 
current grants are cited to be once off, to be incorporated into the equitable 
share from 2003/2004 and whose objective is to facilitate smooth transition to 
new structures. 
 
Two important things should be considered when looking at municipal 
service identification and provision and these are the backlog carried over 
from the old dispensation and the cities’ population growth. The backlog in 
terms of putting in place the service delivery infrastructure such as water 
taps and sewerage systems, which is also compounded by lack of sound 
municipal billing systems, has culminated into a huge municipal debt during 
the late 1990s to early 2000s. To put the backlog into perspective, one has to 
understand that the demand for houses in the urban areas has increased 
since 1994 by 1.5 million and the increase has specifically been higher within 
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the city of Johannesburg (The official gateway, 2002).2 The growth of the city 
to both the north and the south has put enormous strain on its water and 
sewer systems, which were designed for a much smaller population. The 
challenge for JW is therefore to upgrade its infrastructure and also to 
minimise incidents of burst pipes and blocked sewers. Because of leaks, burst 
pipe blockages and other forms of wastage, the city of Johannesburg is losing 
about R178 million per year (Dawn, 2003; Sindane, 2004). 
 
In terms of the Structures Act (Part 56) the Executive Mayor is expected to 
identify and develop criteria in terms of which progress in the 
implementation of strategies and services can be evaluated, including key 
performance indicators (KPIs). The establishment of performance 
management systems requires firstly the development of municipal 
integrated plans that outline priorities, objectives, indicators and targets. 
These systems should have key indicators as yardsticks for the measurement 
to indicate outcomes and impact with set performance targets. KPIs and 
targets are to be made available to the public and all interested parties. 
Central and paramount to the establishment of targets is that mechanisms 
should be established to allow for measure, review and monitoring at least 
once a year. Performance reports are also expected to be availed to the 
council, the political parties, municipal officers and the public. In these 
reports, unmet targets are supposed to be indicated, with an indication of 
strategies to improve (Systems Act, ss38-49). 
 
The expectation goes further into evaluating progress against key 
performance indicators with a view to improving economic efficiency and 
effectiveness of the municipality, credit control and debt collection services. 
Although the municipality is expected to make sure that the local community 
has access to at least the minimum level of basic municipal services, it is 
                                                
2 The official gateway - success stories: Living standards – surprise. 17 May 2002. Available 
at: http://www.safari.info/doing_business/economy/success/livingstandards.htm 
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expected to be self-sustaining. Self-sustenance has huge implications for 
service charges collection and the enforcement of payments. It only makes 
sense that if services are equitable and accessible with improvement of 
standards over time, service charges should be enforced to enable financial 
sustenance (Systems Act, Chapter 8). Financial sustenance also requires that 
a municipality establish a tariff or levy system on its services reflecting the 
amount that users pay, which should be in proportion to their use of services. 
The service tariff, in terms of the Systems Act, should treat all users 
equitably, and is fostered through proportional tariffs based on individual 
service use. 
 
Although the language is of proportional payments, poor households are 
expected to pay tariffs that at least cover operating and maintenance costs, 
special or life line tariffs for low levels of consumption or for their tariffs to be 
directly or indirectly subsidised. A tariff policy may differentiate between 
categories of users, service standards and geographic areas as long as it does 
not amount to unfair discrimination (Mogale, 2001:9). The biggest challenge 
is the definition and description of the poor. Taking into account the erratic 
differences in livelihoods and the cost of living, there will never be a generally 
applicable definition of ‘a poor household’. To give effect to the 
implementation and enforcement of a tariff system, a municipality may adopt 
by-laws as expected by the Systems Act (Part 1) and some municipalities 
have thus developed indigent policies. 
 
There are numerous ways of establishing who the poor are, although there is 
no international consensus on the establishment of the poverty line. 
According to the South African Human Development Report of 2003 by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), US$2 a day constitutes a 
poverty line and, according to their estimates, 14.5% of South Africans live 
below the poverty line. Other studies suggest that official annual poverty 
lines for 2001 were at US$9 039 for an individual, US$11 569 for a married 
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couple, US$14 128 for a family of three and US$18 104 for a family of four 
(World Fact Book, 2003, and UNDP, 2003). Living standard measures (LSMs) 
or indices have been used successfully as an alternative to growth domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, to give a different view of the economic gap 
between the richer and poor households (Summers and Heston, 1995). The 
LSM studies were first established by the World Bank in 1980 to explore 
ways of improving the types and quality of household data collected by 
government statistical offices in developing countries to monitor levels of 
living (Grosh and Glewwe, 1996). The South African Advertising Research 
Foundation (SAARF) LSM has been modified four times, although the 
universal SAARF LSM collects 29 variables that range from hot running 
water to the presence of a television set in a household (SAARF, 2001)3.  The 
LSM ranks households in terms of incomes and other possessions from LSM1 
(the poorest) to LSM8 (the wealthy). Since 1994, according to the All Media 
Product Survey (AMPS), the LSM1 class in South Africa dropped 
significantly from 20% in 1994 to 5% in 2001. In 1994, 74% of all households 
had a monthly income of less than R2 499 compared with 62% in 2001, 
higher-income earnings of between R2 500 and R5 999 were up from 16% to 
20% and a monthly income of over R6 000 was at 18% from 10% (AMPS, 
2002). 
 
According to Mawson (2004), there are still nearly 10.6 million people in 
South Africa who do not have access to water to the Reconstruction and 
Development Plan (RDP) standards, that is, within 200 m away from the 
dwelling. At the current rate of government spending, it is estimated that a 
further 7 million will have access by 2011/12. Lack of access to electricity on 
the other hand is up to 3.65 million households nationally. 
 
                                                
3 The SAARF introduced the LSMs in South Africa in the late 1980s. The description of the 
South African LSMs by SAARF is available on the Internet at: 
http:///www.saarf.co.za/1sms.htm 
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Table 4: Access to services in the city of Johannesburg 
Basic household services Percentage  
Running tap water in dwelling/on site (as % of total formal 
dwellings: 1995) 
95.9% 
Refuse removed by Local Authority (as % of total formal dwellings: 
1995) 
86.8% 
Refuse disposal (as % of total formal dwellings: 1995) 2.8% 
Telephone in dwelling (as % of total formal dwellings: 1995) 45.8% 
Access to telephone (as % of total formal dwellings: 1995) 15.6% 
Source: City of Johannesburg (2003) 
 
The given statistics refer only to formal dwellings where local government 
activities are better managed and co-ordinated. The situation is believed to be 
even worse in the informal settlements. The Systems Act, section 74(c)(iii), 
calls for direct or indirect methods of subsidisation of tariffs for poor 
households. The subsidisation methods or by-laws, in terms of section 71(i), 
should be fully disclosed to the public. The Systems Act also provides for the 
adoption of a credit control policy by which municipalities can terminate 
services in the event of non-payment. At the same time, it is stressed that all 
citizens should, as part of their basic rights, have access to local government 
services. The two expectations have conflicting articulation and are not 
necessarily complementary, unless termination of services is executed in 
cases where non-payment is determined not to be a factor of inability to pay. 
 
The current financial crisis is characterised by fragmented revenue and 
expenditure arrangements, consistent overspending, low payment levels and 
growing arrears and negligible capital expenditure. The new Council cites the 
improvement of city infrastructure as its priority and had invested R829 
million in the year 2000 in the sewerage system, new electricity connections, 
water connections and road improvements to help ensure a better life for all 
communities. In 1997 the JCC was plunged into a financial crisis, partly due 
to non-payment of rates for services such as water and electricity in most 
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areas. The city also has a dysfunctional billing system, which has received 
enormous criticism even from the ANC. Over time, the billing system has cost 
the city billions of rands in revenue as residents, including those who reside 
in rich areas, continue to receive incorrectly estimated service costs, either 
overbilled or underbilled for essential services such as water and electricity 
(Gumbo, Juizo and Van der Zaag, 2002). As a result, some residents from rich 
suburban areas like Sandton receive free water and electricity because their 
details are incorrectly reflected on the City Power database. The huge 
municipal debt of the late 1990s is one of the reasons for the privatisation of 
municipal services. 
 
When the Igoli 2002 vision was first introduced in the late 1990s, 
Johannesburg had accumulated a huge debt amounting to nearly R2.8 billion 
in service arrears. The city outlined the overall objectives of Igoli 2002 as to 
transform the Johannesburg region by “enhancing service delivery, 
promoting accessibility, encouraging and facilitating community participation 
and promoting political involvement and policy making” (Kongwa, undated). 
The Igoli Plan was seen as a vehicle through which service delivery could be 
improved and debt, including rental collection, enhanced. The Plan, however, 
received popular contestation from the public, labour unions and some 
political parties who believed that the absence of the welfare state could 
jeopardise the welfare of the unemployed and those poor citizens who cannot 
afford to pay (Haffajee, 2000, and Khan 2000). A mixture of both the private 
sector and welfare state supply of services was, however, envisaged and the 
establishment of corporatised agencies or utilities followed this. The utilities 
are registered under the Companies Act and their responsibility is includes 
service delivery and customer care improvement. Igoli was premised on 
section 152 of the Constitution, which mandates local government to, among 
other things, ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable 
manner and to promote social and economic development. Moosa (1998:17), 
the former South African Minister of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional 
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Development, indicated that “…it is not for local government to run 
businesses and to buy and sell goods. Local government should look at 
outsourcing non-core functions to concentrate on its core functions of 
governing, regulating and setting frameworks”. 
 
All the South African municipalities were reported in September of 2002 as 
owing R24.3billion in outstanding tariffs. One-third of the country’s 
municipalities’ service debt was at the time growing at a rate of 20% and a 
further 37% at 10% per year. The highest level of service debt was among the 
Gauteng municipalities at R12.2 billion, which is about half of the national 
debt4. The outstanding water and sanitation debt by March 2003 for Soweto, 
Alexandra and Ivory Park alone was at R878 million. The city of 
Johannesburg thus introduced ‘innovative measures’ in tackling the water 
service debt by installing prepaid meters in these three townships. The 
prepaid services system has, however, received criticism from the Anti 
Privatisation Forum (APF) and its affiliate, the Soweto Electricity Crisis 
Committee. Community resistance against installations of prepaid meters led 
to the JW lodging an interdict and the arrest of some community members. 
The APF argued that the government’s and ANC’s adoption of its neo-liberal 
policies shows that it does not care for the majority of the poor communities, 
specifically considering the high unemployment rate (APF, 2003; Sindane, 
undated). 
 
The disconnection of poor people’s electricity, also referred to as ‘brownouts’, 
incorrect and inflated billing and privatisation seem to be all intertwined and 
responsible for the misery of thousands of black working and unemployed 
families in Soweto. Electricity in the city of Johannesburg is provided by two 
                                                
4 The outline of the city of Johannesburg services debt is discussed in an article called ‘SA 
municipal debt R24bn’, which is available on the Internet at: 
http://www.news24.com/news24/South_Africa/news/0,,2-71442_1328319,00.html; also ‘SA 
municipal debt R24bn’, 04/03/2003, South African Press Association (SAPA), available at: 
http://www.news24.com/news24/South_Africa/news/0,,2-71442_1328319,00.html 
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different entities, Eskom for Soweto and City Power for all other suburban 
areas. According to Sindane (undated), thus far City Power supplies 278 000 
customers, 45 000 of whom are using prepaids, and Eskom supplies 600 000 
customers, 300 000 of whom are using prepaids. “Cut-offs, enforced by cable 
removals and the deactivation of meter under armed guards, are a daily 
occurrence in the township”5. The current cut-off strategy, according to 
Eskom, dictates that the whole street, payers and defaulters must be 
punished. In order to overcome the problems associated with estimations, 
City Power announced the dates on which electricity meters around 
Johannesburg would be read for 2004, including the names of the four 
contractors hired for the task, which were ADD X, African Meter Reading 
Tech, Rubby Tad, and Global Meter Reading. "We have grouped the suburbs 
and each contractor is responsible for specific suburbs," said City Power's 
meter-reading supervisor. A code of conduct was also issued for the meter 
readers. The code says meter readers should be clearly identifiable, dress in a 
uniform that has their company's logo on the front, City Power's logo on the 
back and should produce identity cards displaying the company's contact 
number. Customers need to call the contractor responsible for their areas and 
make another arrangement if they will not be in their households on specified 
dates. This suggests a move towards overcoming the estimation problems, 
although there are no visible plans for Soweto as yet.6 
 
Although privatisation plans or concessions for services are not new to 
Johannesburg, as they started with the Sanitary Board in the 1890s, 
experience teaches that privatisation of services was not favourable to the 
communities. 
                                                
5 The Anti Privatisation Forum calls for halting of electric cut-offs. SAPA 30 March 2001. 
Available at: http://ww.queensu.ca/msp/pages/in_The_News/2001/March/eskom.htm 
6 The discussion by Van der Walt points to the rejection of the ANC’s privatisation plan by 
township communities. Available at: http://www.greenlfet.org.au 
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3.4.4.2 Community participation and satisfaction 
A new culture of participatory municipal governance is expected to be the 
norm for the first time. There are numerous ways of participating in a 
democratic system of governance, chief among these being the regular voting 
system through which communities elect their ward councillors every five 
years. Voting alone, however, does not facilitate communication between the 
political structures and the communities. To bridge a possible communication 
gap, ward committee structures are established, which the elected ward 
councillors chair. In terms of sections 72-78 of the Structures Act, ward 
committees are non-political structures whose focus is service delivery and 
through which communities can make recommendations to the municipal 
council via the ward councillor. The question that this raises is whether or 
not communities have the required professional capacity to participate and to 
add value to the municipal processes. According to Smith and Vawda (2003), 
the historical exclusion of the majority of residents from decision-making and 
from participation in municipalities demands a different institutional 
framework. The developmental local government therefore has to invest in 
the historically disenfranchised communities in a strategy that builds 
citizenship first before treating communities as customers in order to instil 
the sense of ownership and belonging. The community’s capacity to 
participate has to be built because this in turn influences effective and 
efficient municipal service delivery. 
 
The ward committee system enables communities to best articulate their 
interests to the municipality, bringing together not the majority interests, 
but the diversity of community interests. The purpose of the ward committee 
is to enable people to be part of the decision-making processes. According to 
Bhabha, the Eastern Cape MEC for local government, the functionality of the 
ward committee system is, however, still a key area of contention between 
the political and administrative functions. The biggest contention is the lack 
of role and function clarity of some of these structures, which are relatively 
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new.7 What compounds the problem is that in some municipalities, ward 
committees are not yet established or their establishment remains unknown 
to communities, leaving political parties to be more active and visible during 
elections. Haffajee (2000) cites the interaction with communities by political 
parties to be on the basis of promises, some of which are impossible to attain. 
 
Since perception rather than reality determines public reaction, one crucial 
aspect of delivery is good communication. Surveys have persistently found a 
strong correlation between familiarity with an institution and favourability 
towards it. The frequency of contact with communities therefore enhances the 
municipal image (Gosschalk, undated). There are numerous factors that 
researchers cite as reasons for community participation or disengagement in 
municipalities (Daniel and De Vos, 2002; Rautenbach and Malherbe, 1998; 
Smith and Vawda, 2003, and Szeftel, 1994). Among these is the accessibility 
of the municipality and the trust that communities have in the municipal 
system. According to Sekhonyane and Louw (2002), people’s participation in 
structural arrangements is influenced by vested trust in such structures. The 
Social Attitudinal Survey (SASAS) of the Human Science Research Council 
(HSRC), which compares trust in numerous public and civil society 
institutions found that on average, one in two South Africans (51.5%) had 
strong trust in the national government and trust in local government was 
lower, at 37.5% (Daniel and De Vos, 2002:21). 
 
A factor influencing participation is accessibility of the municipality. 
Accessibility can be measured through factors like distance of institution 
from communities and the language of communication used by the 
institution. When municipalities were created, the argument was that they 
were the most accessible level of government to the communities 
(Rautenbach and Malherbe, 1998). The language of communication that the 
                                                
7 This is an extract from the speech that the MEC gave at the National Conference on Ward 
Committees: A review, which was held on 24 June 2003. 
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municipality uses is of importance, taking into account that the apartheid 
system divided residents geographically according to their ethnic groupings. 
Although the new Constitution has tried to bridge the gap by pronouncing 11 
languages as official, the remnants of ethnic divisions still exist (Szeftel, 
1994). Amongst some of these residents, such divisions are seen to be 
perpetually fostered through the new political systems, thereby providing 
unlegislated privileges to particular ethnic groups and making municipalities 
less accessible to others. 
 
The achievements of a developmental local government seem not to be 
thoroughly and systematically evaluated. Most of the government assessment 
programmes such as the 10 Year of Democracy Review only quantify the 
number of electricity connections and number of households now receiving 
water (The Presidency, 2003). Other important aspects of a viable 
developmental local government such as participation in ward committees 
and people’s perceptions of the delivered services seem not to take centre 
stage in government evaluations. 
 
It is important for South Africans to transcend a community’s perceptions of 
community exclusion or ‘victims of the state’ to effective citizen participatory 
governance within the municipalities (Smith and Vawda, 2003: part 2: 2.1). 
Building citizenship means going beyond political elections to designing 
instruments of service delivery that meet the agenda for redistribution, 
capacity building for purposive community participation, decision-making 
and responsible citizenship. Myers and Lacey (1996:3) see the 
commercialisation and cost recovery of core services at the expense of greater 
public participation to have side effects, creating passive customers who 
relate to the municipality only in terms of their problems. The municipality’s 
narrow definition of efficiency as a cost-recovery principle therefore 
commodifies the relationship. 
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Harvey (2002) presents an argument about the possible incapacity of citizens 
to fully engage in monitoring their elected representatives or the general 
municipal performance due to, among other things, possible disinterest, 
ineffectiveness or absence of rules to monitor or ensure accountability of 
politicians and civil servants and possible inadequacies in getting effective 
participation by highly qualified community members. To what extent do 
people associate in order to influence government? How independent are the 
civil society associations from the government? Communities are reported to 
be more engaging when they have compelling interests, and specifically when 
they have service delivery problems. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
It is evident from the discussion in this chapter that local government in 
South Africa and particularly in Johannesburg is relatively young compared 
to other countries, in that it was established during the 1880s. Local 
government and participation in municipal governance is even younger 
within the black communities, that is, not older than 11 years. Although 
black communities did participate during the earlier stages of municipal 
establishment in Johannesburg when it was called the Sanitary Board, 
participation was limited to voting, which was scrapped a few years 
thereafter. 
 
Municipal services were largely privatised during the days of the Sanitary 
Board with the exception of education and policing, although during 
apartheid, they were once more brought back under the municipal umbrella. 
With the introduction of apartheid, the establishment of separate residential 
areas for black communities was intensified, through the establishment of 
townships, homelands and self-governing territories. The South African 
government continued to take responsibility for municipal service provision 
in the townships although there was no attempt to involve communities in 
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aspects of municipal activities other than voting for mayors. The voting 
processes were also marred by boycotts and conflicts. During this period, 
township residents developed a system of rebellion against the municipalities 
and the central government by boycotting services payment. 
 
The municipal reforms that came with the new democratic dispensation have 
introduced new ways of municipal governance. Starting with the 
Constitution, Structures, Systems and Finance Management Acts, 
municipalities are encouraged to involve communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government. The Structures Act sets up 
ward committees to represent and consult with various sectors of the 
community, the Systems Act created conditions for community participation 
in IDPs and performance management, amongst other things, while the 
Finance Management Act encourages communities to be involved in the 
finances of municipalities including the preparation of budgets. Although it is 
too early to tell the progress made in terms of implementing these systems by 
municipalities in general, evidence suggests looming problems and 
confrontation with communities. In the city of Johannesburg specifically, 
there are numerous reports of community disenchantment with the 
privatisation of services and problems relating to the municipal services 
billing systems. There is currently very little empirical research that 
evaluates the current systems. This research will in part fulfil this void, 
although to a lesser extent due to its limited scope and area coverage. 
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Chapter Four 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of the research methodology chapter is to outline the research 
processes that were followed in executing the research. The selection of 
research participants from both the municipal services consumer side and 
from the municipal services provider side forms the first section of the 
chapter. From the consumer side, the research indicates the number of 
Soweto townships and households that were sampled, followed by the 
number of community focus groups, the townships where these were held and 
the number of participants in each group. From the service provider side, 
municipal services managers in the city of Johannesburg were interviewed. 
The initial intent of the research was to interview councillors and senior 
municipal administrators from the city of Johannesburg. However, interviews 
could not be secured due to the lack of permission from either the MEC or the 
municipal mayor. The probable reasons for refusal of access relate to turmoil 
in Soweto regarding the introduction of prepaid service meters. Accordingly, 
both councillors and managers at Johannesburg were weary of speaking 
about service delivery matters to outsiders. Councillors and senior officials 
from municipalities outside of Johannesburg were instead interviewed as 
proxy and the chapter gives the rationale for their inclusion in the research. 
Later, interviews to confirm these proxy results were conducted (cf. 4.2.4.4). 
The second section of the chapter outlines technical adherence to 
methodological rigor in sampling, developing survey questionnaires and 
conducting focus groups, etc. 
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4.2 Research participants 
 
4.2.1 Community - consumer survey 
A fieldwork survey was conducted by the researcher with the help of two 
fieldworkers and took place between the 3rd and 28th of March 2003. A total of 
200 questionnaires were administered in the two regions of Soweto (regions 6 
and 10). Four townships were randomly selected from each of the two regions 
and within each selected township, participating households were selected 
using random systematic sampling methods. A total of 25 households were 
interviewed in each township, making the total survey sample from the 8 
selected townships 200 as follows: 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of the survey participants 
Average respondent 
age 
Respondent gender 
 
Interviewed 
townships 
Number of 
interviews per 
township 
N (%) 
Mean age Q1-q3 Male 
N (%) 
Female 
N (%) 
Region 6 100 (50)     
Chiawelo 25 (12.5) 52.4 46-53 14 (7.04) 11 (5.53) 
Naledi 25 (12.5) 57.56 52-66 8 (4.02) 17 (8.54) 
Jabulani 25 (12.5) 56.4 48-65 10 (5.03) 15 (7.54) 
Dobsonville 25 (12.5) 58.68 51-69 10 (5.03) 15 (7.54) 
Region 10 100 (50)     
Dube 25 (12.5) 63.64 49-75 8 (4.02) 17 (8.54) 
Diepkloof 25 (12.5) 60.24 53-73 10 (5.03) 15 (7.54) 
Meadowlands 25 (12.5) 57.84 50-67 7 (3.52) 17 (8.54) 
Orlando West 25 (12.5) 61.56 53-70 15 (7.54) 10 (5.03) 
Total 200 (100) 58.54  82 (41.21) 117 (58.79) 
 
Participation in the survey was asked of each household head or 
breadwinner. In the absence of this head or breadwinner, any responsible 
adult within the household, that is, over the age of 16 years, was interviewed. 
Participants’ ages ranged from 27 to 91 years, with a mean age of 58.54, and 
the majority being female participants. 
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4.2.2 Community focus group meetings 
A total of four focus group meetings were held in four townships between 
July 2003 and February 2004. During the survey interviews, a telephone list 
of participating households was compiled from which a few households were 
selected and recruited by telephone to participate in follow-up focus group 
discussions. A single household head or breadwinner in each case was 
requested to make arrangements for using their house for the meeting in 
each of the four townships and to purchase the refreshments. Households 
were reimbursed for the refreshment costs on the day of the meeting. 
 
Table 6: Community focus group participants 
Number of participants Focus groups Township Date of the 
meeting Males  Females Total 
Focus group 1 Dobsonville 19 July 2003 1 4 5 
Focus group 2 Dube 26 July 2003 6 5 11 
Focus group 3 Chiawelo 7 February 2004 3 5 8 
Focus group 4 Meadowlands 24 January 2004 2 3 5 
Total   12 17 29 
 
 
4.2.3 Reliability of the survey data 
Self-reported income and employment data which are collected through 
surveys are always suspect of inaccuracies or misleading. The closest 
measure of well being, according to Meyer and Sullivan (2003), is the use of 
consumption and self-reported income. Misleading reports are often the case 
where such data is used as a measure of affordability to pay as was the case 
in this research and as revealed in the public choice theory (cf. chapter two). 
Although income is used in the analysis, the findings relating to the income 
should be treated with caution. 
 
As a check and balance mechanism, the income data was also tested against 
the household possessions of consumer durables, which are also referred to as 
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the LSM data (cf. chapter three). Other than these concerns, the survey 
fieldwork interviews can be reported to have been conducted reasonably 
reliably by the fieldworkers and the researcher. 
 
4.2.4 Interviews with services managers and councillors  
 
Box 8: Original methodological intent of research 
The original plan was to interview councillors and senior municipal officials 
in the city of Johannesburg. It proved impossible, however, to obtain the 
permission of the MEC or the mayor. Since councillors could not be 
interviewed in Soweto and in view of similar work that was being done in 
Mpumalanga, permission was therefore obtained to interview councillors and 
senior officials in Mpumalanga instead. The use of these councillors and 
senior officials’ perceptions is proxy for the perceptions of councillors in 
Johannesburg. Although these are different provinces and municipalities, the 
perceptions relate to the application and implementation of the countrywide 
local government systems, which are discussed in chapter three, and the 
perceptions are therefore applicable to the Soweto context as well. 
 
Service providers that were interviewed include services managers and 
councillors from the city of Johannesburg, Mpumalanga municipalities 
(Govan Mbeki and Emalahleni local municipalities) and KwaZulu-Natal 
(Emnambithi local municipality). 
 
4.2.4.1 Service providers in the city of Johannesburg 
Initial communication with the city of Johannesburg about possible 
interviews pointed at the Contract Management Unit (CMU) to be the most 
relevant unit that should be interviewed about service delivery and the 
performance of the utility companies. 
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i. The CMU 
A single in-depth interview meeting that lasted nearly three hours 
was held with the director of the CMU on the 20th of February 2004. 
The CMU is responsible for, among other things, setting up and 
managing service delivery standards for the utilities, which are 
Pikitup, Johannesburg Water and City Power. From this meeting, 
it was pointed out that further interviews with the service utilities 
may help identify their own delivery experiences and problems. 
 
ii. Johannesburg Utilities 
Two meetings were held, each with a single senior services 
manager from the service utilities JW and Pikitup in order to 
understand their service identification, delivery perceptions and 
understanding of the non-payment problems in regions 6 and 10. 
Such meetings were also held in February 2004 on the 26th and 
27th, respectively. 
 
4.2.4.2 Mpumalanga municipalities 
Discussions with the CMU and with the Institute of Democracy’s (IDASA) 
Local Government Centre (LGC) revealed that certain municipalities had a 
good grip on issues that the research was trying to investigate, specifically 
attaining popular community participation and turning the non-payment 
municipal deficit problem into positive municipal budgets. IDASA had in 
some instances worked and in other instances continued to work with some of 
the interviewed municipalities in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
In order to complement interviews from the Johannesburg CMU, the 
identified municipalities in both Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal that were 
perceived to have positive lessons for this study and for attaining high service 
delivery standards were interviewed as follows: 
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i. Mpumalanga MEC for Local Government and Traffic Safety 
A discussion took place with Mr Baba Mohammed, the former MEC 
of the Local Government and Traffic Safety Department in 
Mpumalanga to help understand his experiences of service delivery 
within the Mpumalanga municipalities, especially regarding the 
prevalent service delivery gaps and community participation. 
 
ii. Govan Mbeki local municipality 
A total of 18 senior municipal officials and councillors at the Govan 
Mbeki municipality in Secunda were interviewed individually in 
order to understand their perceptions of the internal municipal 
processes that have an effect on service delivery. The findings from 
these interviews also formed part of the discussion with the MEC. 
 
iii. Emalahleni case study municipality (Witbank) 
The municipality of Emalahleni is a good case study on community 
engagement that yielded positive service payment solutions. A 
discussion with the municipal speaker in June of 2004 revealed how 
the municipality attained its financial turnaround from a huge debt 
and poor community participation to good profits and better 
participation levels. 
 
4.2.4.3 KwaZulu-Natal municipality 
i. Emnambithi case study municipality 
The Emnambithi local municipality in KwaZulu-Natal is another 
good case study on service delivery turnaround that was brought 
about by community initiative, that is, through training offered to a 
group of local church-based women. This group of women was 
trained on the functions of the municipality, their rights as citizens, 
on communication, assertiveness and negotiation skills. A 
discussion with the group trainer revealed how the entire process 
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unfolded and the effect it had on community participation and 
service delivery. 
 
Table 7: Sampled service providers 
Number of participants Municipalities Participants Date of the 
meeting Males  Female
s 
Total
City of Johannesburg    
1. Johannesburg CMU Dr Laila Smith (Director) February 
2004 
 1 1 
2. Johannesburg Water 1 anonymous service 
manager 
February 
2004 
1  1 
3. Pikitup 1 anonymous service 
manager 
February 
2004 
1  1 
 
Mpumalanga municipalities 
  
4. Mpumalanga 
provincial 
department of Local 
Government & Traffic 
Safety 
Mr. Baba Mohammed 
(Former MEC) 
June 2003 1  1 
5. Govan Mbeki 
municipalities 
11 senior managers 
7 municipal councillors 
May – June 
2003 
10 
5 
1 
2 
 
18 
6. Emalahleni 
municipality 
Lesley Ntuli (municipal 
speaker) 
June 2004 1  1 
 
KwaZulu-Natal municipality 
  
7. Emnambithi 
municipality  
Terrance Jacobs (Church-
based Community 
Organisation) 
June 2004 1  1 
Total   20 4 24 
 
4.2.4.4 Supplementary interviews about service provision in Soweto 
Supplementary interviews were held in order to confirm the relevance and 
applicability to Soweto of the proxy findings from service providers in both 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal. Individuals who were deemed well versed 
in service provision in Soweto for the period 2002 to 2005 were requested to 
confirm or refute the applicability of proxy interviews to Soweto, as well as 
add new perspectives on service delivery pertinent to Soweto. Supplementary 
interview request letters (Appendix 5) and the following three questions were 
emailed to identified experts: (a) Did local government in Johannesburg have 
policies or guidelines on service delivery quality during 2002-2005? What 
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quality standards were put in place? (b) Was there a municipal policy 
regarding community participation in service delivery during 2002-2005? If 
so, as a result of this policy, which services were prioritised? (c) Do you think 
service provision challenges (affordability to pay and community 
participation) in Soweto are similar to those of proxy municipalities 
(Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal)? A total of four proxy interviews were 
conducted by telephone with experts that were identified through 
snowballing methodology (Welman and Kruger, 2001). The names, affiliation 
and dates of these telephone interviews are reflected in the table below. 
 
Table 8: Supplementary interviews about service provision in Soweto 
Interviewee’s Designation Affiliation Responsibility Date of the 
meeting 
1. Project Manager Development Bank 
of Southern Africa 
(DBSA) 
National Project 
Consolidate 
Facilitator 
18 October 2005 
2. Service delivery 
facilitator (seconded to 
the city of Jhb) 
Seconded to the city 
of Johannesburg 
Project Consolidate 
Service Delivery 
Facilitator 
19 October 2005 
3. Performance 
Management Specialist 
City of 
Johannesburg 
Performance 
Management 
Specialist: Office of 
the City Manager 
07 November 2005 
4. Service delivery 
specialist 
City of 
Johannesburg 
Project Consolidate: 
People participation
03 November 2005 
 
 
4.3 Research methodology 
Empirical research methodologies or research processes that were followed in 
identifying the research population, the sample, conducting fieldwork, ethical 
considerations, data capturing, coding and analysis belong to both the 
qualitative and quantitative research frameworks (Mouton, 2001:143-180, 
and Babbie and Mouton, 2001:74). The chosen methods ensured proper 
exploration and understanding of human behaviour and experiences 
following a series of steps that are detailed in Mouton (1996:130), Morse 
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(1991:283), Babbie (1995:84) and Myburgh and Poggenpoel (1995:5), which 
are briefly discussed below. 
 
4.3.1 Population and sampling 
In order to give responses to the raised research questions (cf. chapter one), 
two population categories from where possible answers are likely to be found 
were immediately identified. These categories are firstly the municipal 
services consumers and secondly, the service providers or municipalities. The 
respective sample units identified were households and municipal services 
managers. With the focus of the study being the city of Johannesburg, the 
underdeveloped communities within Soweto were randomly selected, that is, 
eight townships, four each in of regions 6 and 10. A total of three service 
managers were purposefully selected for participation from the city of 
Johannesburg. In order to gain more perspectives, an additional 21 service 
providers were interviewed as reflected in the above table. The study 
included a sample of 200 households that were random systematically 
sampled and 24 municipal or municipal linked personnel, that is, councillors 
and senior officials that were purposefully sampled. Four (4) individuals 
deemed to be well versed in service provision in Johannesburg were 
purposefully sampled for supplementary interviews to either confirm or 
refute findings from proxy municipalities. 
 
Social sciences methodological experts argue that studying limited contexts 
and sample sizes does not guarantee generalisations (Botes, 1995:5; Burns 
and Grove, 1993:65, and Mouton, 2001:56). The expanded interviews with 
service providers and case study discussions from Mpumalanga and 
KwaZulu-Natal municipalities are partly aimed at overcoming this obstacle. 
The inclusion of other provinces does not, however, guarantee full 
generalisation but gives possible trends and optimises learning from some of 
the possible best practices (Polit and Hungler, 1991:254). 
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4.3.2 The survey questionnaire 
A survey questionnaire was drafted using, among other things, the amassed 
literature, which is documented in both chapters two and three, and 
incorporating some aspects of the HSRC’s SASAS. The questionnaire was 
drafted with sections that collect household information (income, 
expenditure, number of occupants), respondent demographic information, 
understanding of local government issues/functions, participation in local 
government activities, perceptions of service delivery and payment or non-
payment of municipal services (Appendix 1). 
 
• Pilot and field survey 
The developed questionnaire was piloted among ten households8 in 
Chiawelo township to test for clear understanding of questions, 
overcoming ambiguity and bias, etc. (Fink, 1995:41, and Rubin and Rubin, 
1995:57). Minor adaptations were made to the final questionnaire from 
the pilot lessons. The final questionnaire was administered to a total 
population of 190 respondents. The researcher, with the assistance of two 
freelance fieldworkers with the Community Agency for Social Enquiry 
(CASE) and the HSRC, did the administration of the questionnaires, 
including the pilot. Fieldworkers were given an introductory letter 
(Appendix 2). 
 
4.3.3 Focus groups 
Four focus group discussion meetings were held, each meeting in a single 
township with Soweto residents as follows: Region 6: Chiawelo and 
Dobsonville and Region 10: Dube and Meadowlands. The focus group 
meetings consisted of between five and eleven participants, which is cited to 
                                                
8  Household: A person or group of persons who live together and provide themselves jointly 
with food and/or other essentials for living. The definition of household used here is in line 
with the Stats SA definition which includes the four-night rule, according to which a 
person is a member of a household if he/she spends an average of four nights a week in 
that household (STATS SA, 2001). 
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be marginally good to control and facilitate (Marshall and Rossman, 1995:59; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1995:38-39; Kvale, 1996:173, and Seidman, 1998:68-
69). While focus groups were being conducted, a tape recorder was used in 
capturing the discussions. At the same time, notes were also taken to capture 
important non-audio aspects, such as facial gestures and emotional 
expressions that would otherwise not be recorded (Morse and Field, 1996:80). 
 
4.3.4 Individual interviews 
Both in Mpumalanga, either with the MEC or within Govan Mbeki and 
Emalahleni municipalities and in KwaZulu-Natal at Emnambithi, with 
councillors and senior officials, discussions took place in the form of 
individual face-to-face interviews. Individual interviews were conducted with 
the four service delivery experts in Soweto/Johannesburg City. Rather than 
conducting face-to-face interviews for the supplementary interviews, 
telephone discussions were held. The general use of individual interviews is 
recommended for less bias since the research participants do not hear the 
answers of others.9 
 
4.3.5 Ethical considerations 
Both the service consumers and service providers were asked permission to 
conduct the survey, focus groups and individual interviews. In all cases, no 
interview refusals were encountered. Focus group interviews with households 
were arranged by telephone from the list of telephones numbers of the 
households that participated in the survey, which preceded focus group 
interviews. In Meadowlands, a single survey participant helped arrange the 
focus group participants as a research informant (Babbie, 1995:285 & 445). 
Discussions involving the dates and times of meetings were also arranged 
with service providers by telephone. In order to gain their trust, participants 
                                                
9  Barrier Analysis: A tool for improving behavior change communication in child survival  
and community development programs. Available at: 
http://barrieranalysis.fhi.net/how_to/how_to_conduct_barrier_analysis.htm 
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were assured anonymity regarding their identities or linking their names to 
the type of information that was used (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:94). Some 
participants, however, such as the MEC and the director opted to reveal their 
identities. 
 
4.3.6 Data coding and capturing 
Quantitative data was captured into the Statistical Package for Social 
Sciences (SPSS). Non-precoded responses were post coded into numeric 
values for possible statistical analysis (Fowler 1993:125, and Babbie, 
1995:369). 
 
Qualitative interviews, that is, both the focus group and individual 
interviews, which were tape recorded, were later transcribed (Appendix 3). 
The transcripts are simple narratives from the discussions and are also seen 
to be the best qualitative raw data sources that capture all the aspects of the 
discussions (Welman and Kruger, 2001:189). 
 
4.3.7 Data analysis 
Survey data was analysed using SPSS for Windows version 12.0 in 
computing descriptive, that is, central tendencies (frequencies and cross-
tabulations) and inferential statistical, which is trend analysis and 
hypothesis testing [t-test and analysis of variance (ANOVA)] (Norusis, 1993). 
 
Focus group and individual discussion transcripts were analysed using Tech’s 
methods of qualitative transcribed data following eight steps, which are 
(Creswell, 1994:155): 
 
i. Reading through all the transcripts carefully with a purpose of getting 
a general sense of the whole and underlying meaning of the transcripts 
ii. Picking a single shortest or most interesting transcript and going 
through it once again 
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iii. Making a list of topics or clusters to get similar topics 
iv. Going back to original data and abbreviating the topics as quotes and 
writing quotes next to the appropriate segments of the text 
v. Developing the most descriptive wording for the topics and converting 
them into categories by grouping related topics 
vi. Making final decisions on abbreviations for each category and 
alphabetising existing data 
vii. Assembling the data material belonging to each category in one place 
and performing a preliminary analysis 
viii. Recoding the existing data 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter was to discuss the procedures that were 
followed in collecting empirical research data. It can be concluded that the 
methodologies followed in terms of the identification and sampling of the 
households were appropriate given the limited financial resources. The 
sampled service providers in the city of Johannesburg alone, which include 
the CMU, JW and Pikitup, did not provide sufficient information and 
experiences. Due to the reluctance of utilities to provide services non-
payment and default data, and the inability to secure councillor interviews in 
Johannesburg, proxy municipalities were included. The inclusion of the 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal municipal case studies therefore positively 
added to the wealth of information that otherwise would be missing. 
Supplementary interviews with service delivery experts in Soweto helped to 
confirm the interviews from proxy municipalities and also added new 
perspective on service provision in the city of Johannesburg. It can be 
concluded that the chapter provided justification for all the pertinent 
decisions that were taken and processes that were carried out. 
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Chapter Five 
 
CONSUMERS’ PERCEPTION OF MUNICIPAL SERVICE 
DELIVERY IN SOWETO 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research findings from both the household survey 
data and focus group discussions with the sampled Soweto communities. The 
chapter provides answers to the four research questions that were raised for 
the municipal services consumers (cf. chapter two), which cover ability to pay 
for municipal services measured through household socio-economic status, 
the community’s perception of the importance of the various municipal 
services rendered, their participation in the identification and prioritisation 
of these services and lastly the community’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the various services. 
 
The presentation of the findings is made systematically in line with these 
questions. Community ability to pay for municipal services was measured 
using, among other things, household income, employment status and living 
standard measurements. Community perception of the importance of the 
various municipal services to their households was assessed using variables 
like preference and importance of the various services and perception of the 
privatisation of basic services. Participation in municipal activities such as 
voting and ward committees was assessed by including the possible reasons 
for non-participation as well. Lastly, to determine community satisfaction 
with municipal provision of basic services, satisfaction with municipal 
performance since the 2000 local government elections, satisfaction with 
service charges and the possible causes and effects of dissatisfaction, etc., 
formed part of the discussion. 
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Box 9: Municipal services consumer data presentation 
The survey data used in this chapter is representative of household 
heads in eight Soweto townships. In terms of mean stated household 
income, these townships have been classified into four well-off and 
four worse-off areas. 
 
5.2 Demographics of the service consumers 
Demographic characteristics of the households from which data was collected 
include home language and respondents’ highest educational level. 
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Figure 3: Respondents’ home language10  (N=200) 
 
Just less than half of the surveyed respondents (41%) were Zulu-speaking, 
followed at a distant second by Sotho (17%) and Tswana (16.5%). Most 
township residents, however, use languages interchangeably, for example the 
Basotho group, that is, Pendi, Tswana and Sotho, easily communicate in any 
of those languages and so do the Nguni group, that is, Zulu, Swati and Xhosa. 
 
                                                
10  Home language: Instead of the term ‘mother tongue’, ‘home language’ was used in this 
survey and it refers to the language spoken most often in the household, which may not 
necessarily be the person's mother tongue. 
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Table 9: Respondents’ highest educational level (N=173) 
Educational levels N (%) Educational levels  N (%) 
Primary 
Sub B/Grade 2 
 
2 (1.1) 
Secondary 
Grade 8/Standard 6 
 
27 (14.8) 
Grade 3/Standard 1 1 (0.5) Grade 9/Standard 7/Form 2 12 (6.6) 
Grade 4/Standard 2 9 (4.9) Grade 10/Standard 8/Form 3 28 (15.3) 
Grade 5/Standard 3 9 (4.9) Grade 11/Standard 9/Form 4 21 (11.5) 
Grade 6/Standard 4 13 (7.1) Grade 12/Standard 10/Matric 37 (20.2) 
Grade 7/Standard 5 17 (9.3) Subtotal 125 (68.4) 
Higher 
Diploma/Certificate with Grade 
12/Std 10 
5 (2.7) 
Degree 2 (1.1) 
Subtotal 41 (27.8) 
Subtotal 7 (3.8) 
 
The majority of respondents (81.5%) had completed post-primary studies, 
that is, academic levels above Grade 7, and only 3.8% had post Grade 
12/matriculation qualifications. 
 
5.3 Ability to pay for the municipal services 
As a measure of ability to pay for the municipal services, some aspects of the 
LSM data were collected. These data types included employment status of the 
head of the household, monthly respondent and household incomes, monthly 
household expenditure and ownership of a series of LSM household utilities. 
The collected data types were aimed at distinguishing the well-off households 
from the worse-off ones, in order to compare behavioural tendencies between 
those that can afford to pay for municipal services and those that cannot. 
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Table 10: Respondents’ current employment status (N=198) 
Unemployed N (%) Employed N (%) 
Unemployed, not looking for 
work 
4 (2) Self-employed (full time) 7 (3.5) 
Unemployed, looking for work 76 (38.4) Self-employed (part 
time) 
10 (5.1) 
Pensioner (aged or retired) 63 (31.8) Employed (full time) 15 (7.6) 
Housewife, not working 6 (3) Employed (part time) 9 (4.5) 
Student 8 (4) Other (specify)……… --- 
Total unemployed 157 (79.3) Total employed 42 (20.7) 
 
 
A total of 79.3% of the respondents were unemployed11. Amongst these were 
students and pensioners. This 79.3% unemployment from this survey is, 
however, much higher than the 28.2% official unemployment estimates by 
Statistics South Africa (STATS SA, 2001). Forty-two respondents were 
employed and in addition, 76 households had a second member of the 
household employed. When all the households are aggregated, 118 out of 200 
households, which accounts for 58.5%, had an employed household member 
earning an income on a full-time or part-time basis, which included the 
respondent or another household member. 
 
                                                
11  According to the official or strict definition, the unemployed are those people within the 
economically active population who (a) did not work in the seven days prior to census 
night, (b) wanted to work and were available to start work within a week of census night, 
and (c) had taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in 
the four weeks prior to census night. The unemployment rate therefore refers to the 
percentage unemployed economically active population (STATS SA, 2001). 
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Figure 4: Personal/respondent and household monthly income (N=200) 
 
In households where no one is employed, the estimated monthly income 
accounts for pension, remittances and other grants such as government child 
grants. More than half of the households (54.5%) earned between R500 and 
R5 000. In accordance with the UNDP definition of US$2 a day as a poverty 
line measure, an average of +30% households from this survey at an average 
of four occupants each lived below the poverty line. 
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Figure 5: Amount in general estimates that goes into household monthly 
expenditure (N=200) 
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Households’ monthly income and expected minimum monthly survival 
income related closely between R500 and R2 000 for the majority of 
households. Household monthly expenditure on three main accounts included 
furniture accounts (41.2%), university or student fees (23.5%) and clothing 
accounts (16.2%) [N=68]. Other household accounts of less significance 
include bank loans (1%), monthly burial society fees (1.5%), car instalments 
(2.9%) and personal insurance (3%). Not a single household was, however, 
found to be paying a house bond. 
 
Table 11: LSM utilities owned by the household (N=200) 
Household LSM items N (%) Household LSM items N (%) 
Household amenities (N=200) 
Refrigerators 170 (85) Microwave 65 (32.5) 
Vacuum cleaner 12 (6) Washing machine 43 (21.5) 
Television 171 (85.5) Coal stove 98 (49) 
Hi-fi or music centre 94 (47) Electric stove 190 (95) 
Radio 135 (67.5) Computer 7 (3.5) 
Geyser 29 (14.5) Heater/air conditioner 168 (84) 
Water supply (N=200) 
Piped water tap inside 
household 
75 (37.9) Piped water tap in yard 123 (62.1) 
Toilet & ablution facilities (N=199) 
Flush toilet outside the 
house 
152 (76.4) Flush toilet inside house 47 (23.6) 
Communication facilities (N=199) 
Cell phone 34 (17.1) Both land line & cell 
phone 
21 (10.6) 
Land line 54 (27.1) No phone in household 90 (45.2) 
 
 
The majority of these households are high electricity consumers, which is 
reflected in their ownership of electronic utilities such as refrigerators, 
televisions and heaters, etc. In addition to the household items, 55% of 
households had four-roomed, 12% five-roomed, 11.5% three-roomed, 11% 
seven-roomed, 7.5% six-roomed, 2.5% eight-roomed and 0.5% nine-roomed 
families including the backroom shacks, which are often used to generate 
extra income or accommodate extended family members [N=200]. 
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To determine behaviour with regard to the perceived importance of service, 
payment tendencies, participation in municipal service provision activities 
and satisfaction levels, an average township income was computed to classify 
the well-off and worse-off townships. The findings of this ANOVA are 
reflected in the table below. 
 
Table 12: ANOVA of average household income per township (N=200) 
Analysis of variance 
Townships N obs N Mean income Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Chiawelo 25 16 2167.50 2493.74 625.0000000 8750.00
Naledi 25 15 1641.67 2307.73 250.0000000 8750.00
Jabulani 25 17 794.1176471 915.3008988 250.0000000 400.00
Dobsonville 25 20 593.7500000 397.1009251 0 1750.00
Dube 25 16 1851.56 2233.37 625.0000000 6250.00
Diepkloof 25 15 2658.33 7572.49 250.0000000 30000.00
Meadowlands 25 14 696.4285714 349.1551813 250.0000000 1250.00
Orlando West 25 17 823.5294118 870.5902536 250.0000000 4000.00
 
The four highest income averages are R2 658,33 in Diepkloof, R1 851,56 in 
Dube (region 10), R2 167,50 in Chiawelo and R1 641,67 in Naledi (region 6). 
These four townships are therefore classified as well-off and the rest as 
worse-off for analytical comparisons. 
 
Table 13: Classification of sampled townships 
Well-off townships Worse-off townships 
Diepkloof 
Chiawelo 
Dube 
Naledi 
Orlando West 
Jabulani 
Meadowlands 
Dobsonville 
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Table 14: Affordability of municipal services to household (N=200) 
 Water supply 
N (%) 
Electricity 
N (%) 
Refuse removal 
N (%) 
Sewerage system 
N (%) 
Very affordable  20 (10)    2 (1) 13 (6.5)   14 (7) 
Affordable  79 (39.5)  31 (15.5) 99 (49.5) 100 (50) 
Neither    4 (2)    3 (1.5)   6 (3)     5 (2.5) 
Expensive  37 (18.5)  50 (25) 29 (14.5)   28 (14) 
Very expensive 60 (30) 114 (57) 53 (26.5)   53 (26.5) 
 
 
More than half of the survey respondents (50.5%) believed that water 
services, refuse removal (56%) and sewerage system charges (57%) were 
affordable. Electricity charges according to 82%, however, were more 
expensive. 
 
The following shows a trend analysis of the affordability of the four basic 
household services by the well-off and worse-off townships (condition: ignore 
the undecided responses). 
 
Table 15: Trend analysis of affordability of various basic household services 
by well-off and worse-off townships (N=200 in each case) 
Institution  
Townships 
Unaffordable Neither Affordable Total 
N (%) 
Prob 
Water supply Well-off 
Worse-off 
56.70 
43.30 
25 
75 
44.44 
55.56 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.0873
Electricity Well-off 
Worse-off 
50.61 
49.39 
66.6 
33.33 
45.45 
54.55 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.6362
Refuse removal Well-off 
Worse-off 
53.66 
46.34 
83.33 
16.67 
45.54 
54.46 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.2463
Sewerage 
system 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
53.09 
46.91 
80 
20 
46.49 
53.51 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.2632
 
Focus group discussions, however, revealed service charges to have increased 
with the awarding of title deeds. Whereas the municipality used to take 
responsibility for repairing broken windows, unblocking toilets and sewerage 
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pipes, after awarding title deeds, households have to constantly pay to 
unblock sewerage and toilet pipes as reflected in this quote: “…Ok, right I 
will tell you. Service delivery is very-very poor. First point, if the window 
breaks now you have to pay or once there is blocked sewerage, you go to the 
municipality, they appoint a contractor and he only unblock it after you have 
paid him R150 or R200. We used to enjoy these free of charge; we did not to 
buy doors or taps… We only used to pay rent like those who live in flats and 
the landlord fixed all the problems.” 
(Focus group 1) 
 
5.3.1 Community perception of the municipal measurement of affordability 
Although focus group participants indicated their willingness to pay for all 
the services, their unhappiness was with the non-reading of service meters. 
Residents believed that estimations that are based on payments suggest 
affordability. Some residents insisted on proving through their services 
statements that because of their continuous payments, their service charges 
had been steadily increasing. “…People are paying, but most cannot afford. 
One will pay that R100 and next month it will be R200 and it continues to 
grow. Yes, you can afford. I have seen it many times. I have seen people 
charged R1 500 and it goes up to R2 000. Let’s assume it is R150 this month 
and I don’t pay, what will likely happen next month is that it will likely be 
R100 or remain the same. If you pay, you can afford and you pay for those 
who cannot. So people stop paying. If you stop paying, it goes down. You pay 
R150 next month is R300 and you pay, it goes to R500. It will never go 
down…” 
(Focus groups 1 and 3) 
 
5.3.2 Municipal exemption of households from services payment 
Certain community members are exempt from paying for their municipal 
services consumption. Such groups of individuals, in terms of the Systems Act 
section 74(c), are supposed to be defined by the municipality in its indigent 
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policy (cf. chapter three). Exempt groups and methods of subsidisation of 
tariffs for poor households are also supposed to be communicated to the 
public. Focus groups participants, however, seemed not to have this 
knowledge: “…They do not know who is employed and unemployed here. 
They only check this through payments or non-payments of services. They 
evaluate through the statements. If you pay, it means you can afford and 
then you pay for those who can’t. Even though local government said it will 
provide free water services, no one gets free water. No one gets free water 
everybody has to pay even though they said 600 free litres. You still end up 
paying a lot and there is no difference. There is nothing new despite promises 
of free this and free that…” 
 
“…It would really help to pay a flat rate but even when they do that, they 
should investigate households wherein no one works because it will come 
back to affordability once more. Some people can’t pay electricity, water and 
pay school fees, transport etc. A flat rate may be just right…” 
(Focus groups 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
 
It is evident from the findings of this section that ability to pay for municipal 
services is relatively low since the average household income per month per 
township is less than R2 000, with the exception of Chiawelo and Diepkloof. 
Both Chiawelo (Protea) and Diepkloof (Diepkloof Extension) seem at face 
value to be upmarket suburbs or to have higher levels of income. Other 
findings of importance include an assumption that payment of services could 
reflect household ability to pay for of municipal services and a lack of 
information on the indigent policy reflects poor contact between the 
municipality and communities. 
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5.4 Importance of the various municipal services 
In order for community members to indicate their perceived importance of 
the various municipal services, an assumption was made here that 
households should have knowledge of their municipality and the different 
functions that it performs. 
 
5.4.1 Knowledge of the municipality 
 
1.30%
6.00%
49%
97.0%
51.0%
98.5%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
Municipal name
Municipal region
Ward/representative councillor
Unknown
Known
 
Figure 6: Name of municipality, municipal region and representative 
councillors (N=200) 
 
An overwhelming majority of the survey respondents, that is, 98.5% and 97%, 
did not know the names of their municipality and municipal region, 
respectively. Nearly half (49%), however, knew their ward councillor [N=199]. 
Focus group participants blamed this lack of knowledge on their ward 
councillors “…I just heard that our ward councillor is a lady down there, but I 
do not know her. Maybe only people very close to her house may know her, 
the rest, I don’t think so…” “…That person does not know the problems here. 
I also have not heard of a meeting called in this area. They don’t talk to us, so 
we have no information about the municipality and its intentions…” “…We 
remain fully uninformed…” “…There was one person who used to drive 
around here but he does not come anymore. It is long time ago, around 1996 
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or so. He used to go around with a loud speaker or even drop papers from 
house to house. We don’t know if he is still working here or not…” 
(Focus groups 1, 2, 3 & 4) 
 
Table 16: Three main functions of the municipality according to respondents 
(N=200 in each case) 
The delivery of and/or maintenance of… Function 1 
N (%) 
Function 2 
N (%) 
Function 3 
N (%) 
Water 157 (79.3) 1 (0.5) - 
Electricity 18 (9.1) 80 (43) - 
Refuse removal  13 (6.6) 39 (21.3) 110 (75.9) 
Sanitation/sewerage 6 (3) 59 (32.5) 13 (9) 
Parks - 2 (1) 14 (9.7) 
Health - 1 (0.5) 7 (4.8) 
Do not know 4 (2) 1 (0.5) 1 (0.5) 
 
 
The majority of the survey respondents (78.5%) perceived the municipality to 
be in charge of the delivery of or maintenance of water services. From the 
focus groups, however, housing, specifically the transfer of title deeds, 
seemed to be even more important “…I have respectively been here since 
1966 and 1969. During the initial period of stay, all the families rented these 
houses, which belonged to the municipality. We were renting because we had 
not received title deeds by then. The house belonged to my mother…” “…Most 
of us in this area got our title deeds in 1999, but some are still waiting even 
today…” “…They will not change the names until the rental debt is fully 
paid. If you can’t pay the debt, the house will remain in the names of your 
parents, dead or alive, so where else can we go…?” 
(Focus group 2) 
 
The community’s perceived main functions of the municipality, namely water 
and electricity provision, seemed to vary greatly from what communities saw 
as priority issues or activities on which the municipality should be focusing 
its attention. The community’s perceived priority activities in their areas are 
reflected in the table below. 
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Table 17: Activities on which municipality should be focusing most of its 
attention (N=200) 
Activities Priority 1 N 
(%) 
Priority 2 N (%) Total N (%) 
Creating employment 67 (33.5) 43 (21.5) 110 (55.0) 
Improving service quality 62 (31) 44 (22) 106 (53) 
Providing free services 23 (11.5) 29 (14.5) 52 (26) 
Combating crime 17 (8.5) 28 (14) 45 (18.9) 
Meeting community expectations 16 (8) 41 (20.5) 57 (28.5) 
Consulting communities 10 (5) 11 (5.5 ) 21 (10.1) 
Dealing with corrupt officials 5 (2.5) 4 (2) 9 (4.2) 
 
 
5.4.2 Privatisation of basic services and preferred provider 
When the Igoli 2000 vision was introduced, the aim was to partially privatise 
the basic municipal services, increase service payment collection and reverse 
the huge municipal debt that was accumulated during the mid-1990s to early 
2000s. Since then, the city of Johannesburg has set up utilities to provide 
these services, and residents have been contesting against the installation of 
prepaid service meters (cf. chapter three). Asked if households were afforded 
an opportunity to choose service provision by either the corporatised utilities 
or directly through the municipality, households responded as follows: 
 
5.5%
5.5%
6.0%
5.0%
5.0%
92.0%
92.5%
92.0%
93.0%
92.5%
2.5%
2.0%
2.0%
2.0%
2.5%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Water supply
Electricity
Refuse removal
Sewerage system
Combating crime
Not sure
Government sector
Private sector
 
Figure 7: Preference for provision of certain basic services by the government 
and private sector (N=200) 
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Overwhelmingly, the majority of respondents were in favour of government 
supply of all the given services. There are, however, significant Pearson chi-
square differences in the preference of provider between the well-off and 
worse-off townships at 0.020 (water supply), 0.035 (electricity), 0.023 (refuse 
removal), 0.051 (sewerage system) and 0.030 (combating crime), which 
indicate the well-off townships’ preference for private sector delivery. 
 
This preference for local government as a service provider is despite the 
perceived improvement in the delivery of water services and garbage 
collection that has been brought about by the JW and Pikitup utilities, 
respectively, as indicated in the focus group discussions: “…The 
Johannesburg water are the ones who come here to fix some of these 
problems. Even here in our house, they came in 2002. The Johannesburg 
Water people, if you phone them, they come. I remember even there, they 
were phoned and they did not take more than 3 hours to arrive…” “… These 
guys work very hard and things are not like before…” 
(Focus group 4) 
 
The findings of this section make it clear that there is very poor community 
knowledge of the basic municipal information, which is reflected in a lack of 
knowledge of municipal name, the region and, to some extent, ward 
representative councillors. Households, however, seem to highly value all 
three basic household services, that is, water, electricity and refuse removal. 
The value placed on these services is reflected in the communities’ reluctance 
to see these basic services privatised and in their perceptions of the 
municipality’s three main functions as being the provider of these services, 
although the municipality’s creation of employment and improvement of 
service quality is among their main wishes as well. 
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5.5 Community participation in service provision 
There are numerous ways to participate in a democratic system of 
governance. Chief among these is the regular voting system through which 
communities elect their political representation (councillors) to the municipal 
council every five years. Participation is also informed by the community’s 
level of trust in municipal structures and processes and the accessibility of 
such structures in terms of communication and visibility. 
 
5.5.1 Participation through the voting system 
Asked if they would be voting in the upcoming local government elections in 
2005, 37% of the surveyed respondents indicated a definite yes, 31% possibly 
yes, 4% possibly no, 9.5% definitely not and 18.5% were undecided [N=200]. 
The focus group discussion participants indicated that they had lost faith in 
the electoral system, believing that the government only delivers certain 
services upon elections as a ploy for attracting voters: “…They only do one 
street when there are elections, ‘but you will pay’. They say Soweto will be 
like Johannesburg, no it won’t happen. There is no monitoring. You see, there 
is where the problem lies. If they were going to evaluate the performance of 
all ministers, they say we take 10-50% of your salary away. No, they do 
nothing like that, instead they say thank you and change your office to 
another portfolio. RDP houses have been built, but they have no value. If 
there are big storms or earthquakes, many people would die, because it is one 
layer. No house can stand with one brick, they must be doubled…” 
(Focus groups 1, 3 and 4) 
 
Factors that influence the decision not to vote in the 2005 local government 
elections vary from being too young to vote (87%), disillusionment with 
politics (4.3%), to others (8.7%) [N=23]. Factors that may, however, most 
likely motivate the non-voters to continuously participate in municipal 
activities included loyalty to a political party (27.1%), a sense of duty or 
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obligation (30.7%), a visible improvement in the delivery of services (30.7%), 
more honesty amongst politicians (6.5%), more visible evidence of 
commitment by the municipality to their areas (4.5%) and an increase in 
employment (0.5%) [N=199]. 
 
5.5.2 Participation through the ward committee system 
Total attendance of ward committee meetings by surveyed respondents was 
at 55%. A 52% non-attendance was found in region 10. There are significant 
differences in ward committee meeting attendance between townships, with 
more attendance in region 6 and lower attendance in region 10 at Pearson 
chi-square value of 0.049. The differences suggest high attendance rates in 
Dube and Meadowlands and lower attendances in Naledi and Dobsonville. 
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Attend ward meetings Do not attend ward meetings
 
Figure 8: Attendance of ward committee meetings (N=200) 
 
Although the comparisons of attendance between the well-off and worse-off 
townships yield no significant differences, trends suggest that the worse-off 
townships (attend 54.6% and not attend 44.44%) are more likely to attend 
ward committee meetings than the well-off townships (attend 45.4% and not 
attend 55.6%). 
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Of the respondents who attend ward committee meetings in either areas, 
46% attend every time meetings are held, 38% only once in a while, 14.8% on 
a need basis, that is when they require certain information from the ward 
committee meetings, and 0.9% could not remember when they had last 
attended [N=108]. Focus groups suggest that attendance of ward committee 
meetings is an indication of confidence that the municipality will act on 
participants’ suggestions from these meetings, that government or politicians 
will keep their promises and that they can influence municipal decisions: 
“…That now, people go if they feel like because there is no gain. They only 
preach what they don’t deliver. We will do this and that for you and then they 
don’t deliver. They do their braai and from there it is over. You see now, they 
preach, but there is no delivery…”. “… It is not that people do not attend 
meetings, they do go but people are confused. It is not that people do not 
want to attend, it is because they do not know what is good now - the old 
government or the new government. The old government built free houses, 
not these low cost houses. Whereas the new government has promised free 
services, you still have to pay for it. They promised they will give you free 
service. It is because they are no longer involved, they are contracting these 
companies, what do you call it…” 
(Focus groups 2 and 4) 
 
Given the argument that participation and attendance of ward committee 
meetings is directly related to the influence exerted on the given structural 
decisions, survey respondents were asked if they thought it was easy or 
difficult to influence municipal decisions (cf. chapter three). More than half of 
the respondents (55.3%) indicated that it was difficult for them to influence 
municipal decisions, 28.6% thought that it was easy, 4.5% thought that it was 
neither easy nor difficult and 11.6% did not know [N=199]. Some focus group 
participants discredited policies on popular community participation, 
believing that such policies are not put into practice: “…The whole thing 
about all those policies is often meant to brainwash you. The government 
   
 
106
creates all those policies, nice policies but after that, what they say in 
parliament is not implemented. They don’t make follow up on what they say 
in parliament. They don’t go down and check if their policies are being 
implemented, they just take their cars and go home after creating policies…” 
(Focus group 1) 
 
5.5.3 Participation as a factor of institutional trust 
Community participation in structural arrangements or institutions is a 
reflection of the level of trust that communities put in such institutions. In 
the survey, households were asked to indicate the level of trust that they 
place in different institutions, which indirectly could measure or give reasons 
for their level of involvement and support of such institutions. 
 
Table 18: Amount of trust participants have in the following institutions in 
their area (N=200) 
Institution Strong 
trust 
N (%) 
Trust 
N (%) 
Neithe
r 
N (%) 
Distrust 
N (%) 
Strong 
distrust 
N (%) 
Don’t 
know 
N (%) 
The police 39 (19.5) 86 (43) 11 
(5.5) 
45 (22.5) 16 (8) 3 (1.5) 
Municipal councillors 9 (4.5) 77 (38.5) 17 
(8.5) 
57 (28.5) 31 (15.5) 9 (4.5) 
The media (newspaper, 
radio & TV) 
56 (28) 102 (51) 13 
(6.5) 
20 (10) 4 (2) 5 (2.5) 
Businesses 10 (7.1) 104 
(52.8) 
19 
(9.6) 
13 (6.6) 8 (4.1) 39 (19.8) 
Municipality/local 
government 
15 (7.5) 102 (51) 22 (11) 29 (14.5) 27 (13.5) 5 (2.5) 
Political parties 15 (7.5) 76 (38) 14 (7) 51 (25.5) 38 (19) 6 (3) 
The church 91 (45.5) 82 (41) 12 (6) 12 (6) 3 (1.5) - 
Other community 
members 
41 (20.5) 88 (44) 25 
(12.5) 
38 (19) 7 (3.5) 1 (0.5) 
 
 
With the exception of the municipality, trusted by 57.6%, there is a general 
lack of trust in the political institutions such as political parties and ward 
councillors, distrusted by 44.5% and 44% of the total surveyed respondents, 
respectively. The highest level of trust from this survey is in the religious 
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institution/church (86.5%). There are significant differences in trust of the 
given institutions between townships (0.014 Pearson chi-square differences) 
with high trust levels in Dobsonville and Meadowlands and distrust in Dube 
and Orlando. 
 
Table 19: Chi-square test of level of trust in various institutions by townships 
 
Townships 
Trust 
N (%) 
Distrust 
N (%) 
 
Statistics 
Value df Asymp. Sig 
(2-Sided) 
Zone 6 
Dobsonville 
 
17 (73.9) 
 
6 (26) 
Dube 6 (28.6) 15 (71.3) 
Zone 10 
Meadowlands 
 
16 (72.7) 
 
6 (27.3) 
Orlando 11 (46) 13 (54) 
Pearson chi square
Likelihood ratio 
Linear-by-linear 
Association 
N of valid cases 
56.014a
55.952
.488
200 
35 
35 
 
1 
0.014
0.014
0.485
 
Trend tests suggest opposing trust direction between the well-off and worse-
off townships with strong distrust by the well-off and strong trust trends 
among the worse-off townships. 
 
Table 20: Trend analysis of level of institutional trust by well-off and worse-
off townships 
Institution  
Townships 
Distrust  Neither Trust Total 
N (%) 
Prob 
The police Well-off 
Worse-off 
59.02 
40.98 
54.55 
45.45 
45.60 
54.40 
99 (50.25) 
98 (49.75) 
0.0832
Municipal councillors Well-off 
Worse-off 
53.41 
46.59 
47.06 
52.94 
46.51 
53.49 
95 (49.74) 
96 (50.26) 
0.3638
Businesses Well-off 
Worse-off 
61.90 
38.10 
47.37 
52.63 
46.61 
53.39 
77 (48.73) 
81 (51.27) 
0.2382
Municipality/local 
government 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
53.93 
41.07 
45.45 
54.55 
47.86 
52.14 
99 (50.77) 
96 (49.23) 
0.2000
Political parties Well-off 
Worse-off 
57.30 
42.70 
64.29 
35.71 
41.76 
58.24 
98 (50.52) 
96 (49.24) 
0.0372
The church Well-off 
Worse-off 
60.00 
40.00 
58.33 
41.67 
48.55 
51.45 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.3154
 
Although there are high levels of distrust by the well-off townships in local 
councillors, the municipality and political parties, the distinction between 
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government at the local municipal level and the national spheres seems to be 
non-existent among all residents, as reflected in focus group discussions: 
“…Ja, let us look at what you said, people’s attendance of municipal meetings 
since 1994 - Promises, promises, but they were not there. Mandela used to 
speak reality. But when the government pulled out, and you have the new 
government, people saw that now there is nothing here. They went and vote 
again. That is why we had historically in our voting campaigns, two voting 
days. This was done to increase the numbers. Can you see now, people are 
getting sick and tired. These kids are clever they can’t take it…”. “…You see 
now, when Mandela came, things were great because the old man meant 
business and everybody understood him, everybody could listen, but now with 
this government, they don’t know what they are doing. You can see how 
much they blame each other on TV - the Hyfer Commission. If Mandela was 
there this would not happen. He once said you do not wash your dirty linen in 
the public. They are just blaming each other instead of sitting down and solve 
the problems…” 
(Focus groups 1 and 3) 
 
The level of distrust in one government sphere seems to affect the other 
sphere, which is why the ANC was reported to be unhappy and highly 
embarrassed by the city of Johannesburg’s inefficiencies with the billing 
system. 
 
5.5.4 Participation as a factor of accessibility 
When the sphere of local government was created, the argument for it was 
that it would be the most accessible sphere of government to the local 
communities (Rautenbach and Malherbe, 1998, and Khan, 2000). To give 
effect to accessibility, a ward committee system that would facilitate 
community interests and a community link with the municipal council was 
established (cf. chapter three). However, being a sphere closest to the people 
does not necessarily guarantee sufficient participation and efficiency of the 
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system. Other important aspects of accessibility include the language of 
communication, location of the municipal offices and timely availability of 
municipal information. 
 
Table 21: Main method of communication by municipality (N=200) 
Through…. N (%) Language of communication N (%) 
Regular mass meetings     9 (4.5) My mother tongue   37 (18.5) 
Committee meetings     74 (37) My second language that I clearly 
understand 
140 (70) 
Newsletters 113 (56.5) A third language that I hardly 
understand 
   8 (4) 
They do not communicate 
with me at all 
    3 (1.5) A language I do not understand at all   11 (5.5) 
Other …     1 (0.5) Unspecified …4 (2) 
 
 
Although most residents use language interchangeably, some of these 
residents see the use of one language to be perpetuating ethnic divisions and 
thereby affording unlegislated privileges to particular ethnic groups and 
making municipalities less accessible to others, as revealed in the focus group 
discussions: “…You see things are not the same. This area is full of Vendas 
and Shangans but in other areas like Zone 2 the municipal workers cut grass 
there and do other things but not here. Where the Vendas and Shangans live, 
there is a big difference. Like last week, I went to the branch meeting of the 
ANC and when you speak in Shangan, they say they don’t understand; they 
want you to speak Zulu or Xhosa. When I go to the meeting and talk in 
Shangan about my problems, they don’t listen. When you try and speak in 
English they say most people are illiterate and don’t hear what you are 
saying. Most of the municipal officials and councillors are Zulus here… yes, 
yes, there is no one speaking or representing us here in the municipality. 
Even if there was, I don’t think they would listen to him…” 
(Focus groups 2, 3 and 4) 
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Although the municipality is reflected to be effective in terms of its 
communication strategies and language of communication, respondents in 
focus group interviews believed that there is not enough consultation when 
pricing of services is determined: “…they just put increments from nowhere 
forgetting that 95% of the people are unemployed. Even if they are employed, 
most of them are paid low wages, poor salaries whatever it is… whereby you 
can’t be able to supporting their children, paying for water and house 
renovations. And their increments you know, they just come from nowhere, 
whereby. From the blue they just say that now we are going to increase 
prices of water and electricity...” 
(Focus groups 1, 2 and 3) 
 
The efficiency and effectiveness of most organisations and to a large extent 
the municipality as well is now measured in terms of their responsiveness to 
clients’ needs, queries and problems. It for this reason that the city of 
Johannesburg has also put in place the customer services centres where 
communities can walk in or phone to report their problems or verify any 
municipal information. Asked on how well they thought the municipality was 
responsive, survey respondents indicated marginally poor municipal 
responsiveness. 
 
Table 22: Consultation by and responsiveness of municipality (N=200) 
 
How well does 
municipality… 
Very 
well 
N (%) 
Quite 
well 
N (%) 
Neither well 
nor badly 
N (%) 
Quite 
badly 
N (%) 
Very 
badly 
N (%) 
Do not 
know 
N (%) 
… respond to your 
needs 
  7 (3.5) 64 (32) 18 (9) 46 (23) 46 (23) 19 (9.5) 
…respond to enquiries 4 (2) 75 (37.5) 14 (7) 41 (20.5) 43 (21.5) 23 (11.5) 
…consult on matters 
affecting communities 
  2 (1) 63 (31.5)   12 (6) 46 (23) 50 (25) 27 (13.5) 
…respond to 
community feedback 
  8 (0.4) 63 (31.5)   7 (3.5) 44 (22) 52 (26) 26 (13) 
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Lack of efficiency and effectiveness by the municipality in dealing with the 
reported problems is of serious concern to residents. Prior to the 
establishment of the regional administrative centres and call centres, the 
inability of the municipality in receiving residents’ complaints and dealing 
with problems was to some residents even more serious: “…You phone 
someone in town, in the city and report the case. Sometimes they come and 
sometimes they do not come. You can report a several times. We once had a 
problem when our taps were leaking, we phone a lot and those meter readers 
are way too old now and needs to be changed. In my household too, the meter 
is leaking even now. We ended up asking some private plumbers to come and 
fix it for R175. Things are hard and difficult in this area…” 
(Focus group 2) 
 
Consultations and feedback are not necessarily one-way traffic. There is an 
expectation as well that even outside the ward committees, community 
members will continuously engage the municipality formally or informally 
through visiting the municipal offices, communicating with ward councillors, 
paying municipal services and attending ward committee meetings. The 
findings reveal the community’s own responsiveness to these factors to be 
very poor. 
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Table 23: Respondents’ payment of levies and communication with the 
municipality (N=200) 
 
When last did you… 
 
In the last 
3 weeks 
N (%) 
In the 
last 3 
months 
N (%) 
In the 
last 5 
months 
N (%) 
In 6 
months 
+ 
N (%) 
I have 
never 
N (%) 
I cannot 
remembe
r 
N (%) 
…visit municipal 
offices 
49 (24.5) 28 (14) 16 (8) 32 (16) 40 (20) 35 (17.5) 
…communicate with 
ward councillor/s 
16 (8) 15 (7.5) 10 (5) 45 (22.5) 77 (38.5) 37 (18.5) 
…pay your municipal 
levy 
67 (33.8) 53 (26.8)   9 (4.5) 21 (10.6) 21 (10.6) 27 (13.6) 
…attend a ward 
committee meeting 
17 (8.5) 23 (11.5) 15 (7.5) 35 (17.5) 63 (31.5) 47 (23.5) 
 
Trends reveal more participation by the well-off townships in terms of 
municipal visitations, communication with ward councillors and payment of 
municipal services in comparison to the worse-off townships. 
 
Table 24: Trends on when last households paid their levies and 
communicated with the municipality 
 
When last 
did you… 
 
Townships 
In the last 
3 weeks 
N (%) 
In the last 
3 months 
N (%) 
In the last 
5 months 
N (%) 
In 6 
months 
+ 
N (%) 
Never 
N (%) 
 
Prob 
…visit municipal 
offices 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
55.10 
44.90 
41.67 
58.33 
50 
50 
75.86 
24.14 
45 
55 
0.0395
…communicate 
with ward 
councillor/s 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
68.75 
31.25 
40 
60 
90 
10 
58.14 
41.86 
41.56 
58.44 
0.0233
…pay your 
municipal levy 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
50 
50 
49.25 
50.75 
41.18 
58.82 
66.67 
33.33 
80.95 
19.05 
0.0184
…attend a ward 
committee meeting 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
41.18 
58.82 
61.11 
38.89 
66.67 
33.33 
65.63 
34.38 
46.03 
55.32 
0.1026
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The general accessibility of the municipality, which is indicated in the figure 
below, reveals that the municipal councillors are the most accessible (38%) of 
all the municipal structures, followed by municipal information. Municipal 
offices are inaccessible according to 83% of the total survey respondents. 
 
7.50%
13.50%
1.0%
46.50%
34% 33%
16.0%
8.5%
50.0%
15%
8%
3%
24.5%
5.0%
15.5%
4.5%
1.5%
13%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Municipal information Municipal councillors Municipal offices
Very accessible Accessible Neither Inaccessible Very inaccessible Don't know
 
Figure 9: Accessibility of municipal information, councillors and offices 
(N=200) 
 
There are significant differences in the level of accessibility of municipal 
information, councillors and municipal offices between the townships at 
Pearson chi square of 0.002, 0.001 and 0.001, respectively. 
 
Table 25: Chi-square test of accessibility of municipality by townships 
Dobsonville 
 
Diepkloof Orlando Jabulani P-
Value 
 
How accessible 
is/are… Inaccess
ible 
N (%) 
Accessible 
N (%) 
Inaccess
ible 
N (%) 
Accessible 
N (%) 
Inacces
sible 
N (%) 
Accessibl
e 
N (%) 
Inacces
sible 
N (%) 
Accessible 
N (%) 
 
Municipal 
information 
2 (2.4) 23 (27.1) 2 (2.4) 16 (18.8) 7 (8.2) 13 (15.3) 4 (4.7) 18 (21.2) 0.002
municipal 
councillors 
8 (9.5) 17 (20.2) 9 (10.7) 9 (10.7) 13 
(15.5) 
6 (7.1) 11 
(13.1) 
11 (13.1) 0.001
municipal offices 1 (1.1) 24 (26.1) --- 21 (22.8) 5 (5.4) 17 (18.5) --- 24 (26.1) 0.001
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Significant levels of inaccessibility of municipal councillors are found at 
Orlando township, there is total accessibility of municipal offices in Diepkloof 
and Jabulani and some levels of inaccessibility of municipal information in 
Orlando in comparison with other townships. Trend analysis of municipal 
accessibility between the well-off and worse-off townships reveals some 
perceived level of accessibility by the well-off and inaccessibility by the worse-
off townships of the information, councillors and municipal offices. 
 
Table 26: Trend test of accessibility of municipality by well-off and worse-off 
townships 
  
Townships 
Inaccessibl
e 
Neithe
r 
Accessibl
e 
Total 
N (%) 
 
Prob 
Municipal 
information 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
44.90 
55.10 
83.33 
16.67 
50.67 
49.33 
87 (48.60) 
92 (51.40) 
0.1683
Municipal 
councillors 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
46.15 
53.85 
85.7 
14.29 
47.06 
52.94 
72 (48.32) 
77 (51.68) 
0.1272
Municipal offices Well-off 
Worse-off 
46.60 
53.40 
66.67 
33.33 
51.21 
48.15 
96 (49.74) 
97 (50.26) 
0.4535
 
The general impression from the findings of this section is that community 
participation in municipal activities through the voting system has not 
withered. There is poor participation, however, in ward committee activities 
and poor attendance trends by the well-off townships and better attendance 
by the worse-off townships of the ward committee meetings. Other indicators 
of non-participation are poor visitation to the municipal offices and the 
general lack of consultation by the ward councillors. The inaccessibility of the 
municipal offices, councillors and municipal information is, however, high 
among the worse-off townships. 
 
Poor participation in municipal activities may be influenced by perceptions 
that communities cannot easily exert influence on the municipal decisions or 
   
 
115
processes. In general terms, there are trends of distrust in all municipal 
structures by the well-off and trust by the worse-off townships, although the 
well-off perceive the municipality to be responsive to their needs. 
 
5.6 Satisfaction with the provision of municipal services 
Community satisfaction with municipal service provision is presented using 
measures such as satisfaction with municipal service performance levels and 
happiness or satisfaction with service charges. Other causes of dissatisfaction 
or possible outcomes of unhappiness with either or both municipal services 
performance and service charges are presented. 
 
5.6.1 Municipal performance in service delivery 
Performance in service delivery after the 2000 municipal elections has been 
rated to be generally good by the majority of surveyed respondents for the 
most basic household services as reflected in the figure below. 
 
54.3%
43.5%
22.0%
4.5%
2.0%
6.5%
26.0%
10.5%
18.0%
2.0% 1.0% 2.0%
6.0%
33.5%
55.0%
36.7%
40.0% 42.0%
46.0%
34.0%
1.5%
1.0%
6.0%
2.0%
1.5%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Water supply Electricity Refuse removal Sewerage systems Health services
Very well Well Neither Badly Very badly Don't know
 
Figure 10: Performance of municipality in handling basic service matters 
(N=200) 
 
Most of the government measures of performance are the actual number of 
households with access to these services and not what the households think 
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about service delivery. The general level of service delivery over time is 
perceived by the focus group participants to have improved, specifically in 
terms of garbage collection, and the efficiency with which the water problems 
are fixed: “…There is only one service that I think has improved drastically, 
the garbage collection. They have given us big free garbage bins and the 
yards, streets, including the communal dumping area is now clean. There 
was a big movable garbage cargo out there, which was always full, and 
garbage was all over the place, now it is clean. The tractor used to come and 
collect it once in a while and now it is no longer there. Now in a month they 
collect four times on Thursdays that means every Thursday they are here. 
Then, they didn’t come that often. People had small bins in their houses and 
they collected rarely from the municipality and that is why people dumped all 
the rubbish in the communal dumping area. They collect from the houses now 
and not from the communal dumping area, but even then, there were no 
rubbish around because there was an old white guy who came around with a 
sjambok telling people to pick up litter in their yards and he tells you to put 
all those in cargo over there. But people know these days that the collectors 
will come on Thursday and they find everything waiting. I think the big bins 
are the only biggest improvement and this weekly collection as well.” 
(Focus groups 3 and 4) 
 
Table 27: Trend test on how well municipality is handling basic service 
matters 
  
Township
s 
Good 
perfor-
mance 
Neithe
r 
Poor 
performan
ce 
Total 
N (%) 
 
Prob 
Water supply Well-off 
Worse-off 
48.1 
51.9 
100 
0 
45.4 
54.5 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.008
Electricity Well-off 
Worse-off 
46.6 
53.4 
100 
0 
50 
50 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.001
Refuse removal Well-off 
Worse-off 
48.9 
51.1 
25 
75 
100 
0 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.040
Sewerage 
system 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
46.7 
53.3 
0 
100 
73 
27 
100 (50) 
100 (50) 
0.026
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With democratic governance put in place only a decade ago, much of the poor 
service delivery as discussed in the focus groups is blamed on inexperience 
and to some extent a lack of interest and understanding of municipal 
activities by councillors: “…Those councillors, most of them were previously 
without jobs. And most of them said they will stand and talk for the people 
but when they get there, and they get these big salaries, they forget their 
people. People are run by lying councillors, they can lie to their own people. 
They know the problems that their mothers have got and they still do not do 
anything. The government does not know that women and grown ups are 
signed papers of eviction from their homes…” 
(Focus groups 2, 3 and 4) 
 
Satisfaction with the municipality’s performance in service delivery, with 
specific reference to community needs, enquiries, consultations and 
responding to community feedback reveals significant differences between 
townships. These highly significant Pearson chi-square values reveal the 
municipality to be irresponsive in all four areas in Naledi and Orlando. To 
the contrary, in Meadowlands, the municipality is seen to be very responsive 
only to the first two aspects, which are community needs and enquiries, and 
in Dobsonville, to all aspects but community needs. 
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Table 28: Responsiveness of municipality to community needs 
Naledi 
 
Dobsonville Meadowlands Orlando P-
Value
 
The municipality… 
Well 
(%) 
Poorly 
(%) 
Well (%) Poorly 
(%) 
Well 
(%) 
Poorly 
(%) 
Well 
(%) 
Poorly 
(%) 
 
responds to our needs 5 (2.5) 15 (7.5) --- --- 13 
(6.5) 
8 (4) 5 (2.5) 17 (8.5) 0.028
responds to enquiries 5 (2.5) 15 (7.5) 18 (9) 5 (2.5) 12 
(6) 
7 (3.5) 4 (2) 18 (9) 0.027
consults on matters 
affecting communities 
5 (2.5) 14 (7) 19 (9.5) 6 (3) --- --- 3 (2) 19 (9.5) 0.005
responds to 
community feedback 
6 (3) 16 (8) 15 (9) 6 (3) --- --- 4 (2) 19 (9.5) 0.000
 
 
The focus group discussions suggest that non-responsiveness to matters that 
affect communities is due to councillors’ and senior officials’ lack of concern 
for the needs of the historically black townships, as most of them are now 
residing in the historically white suburbs: “…Ja, what happens is that they 
have less concern with where they come from. They are very happy now that 
they live next to Helen Suzman, etc. Let me tell you, I have friends who tell 
me that Soweto is very dangerous.  Where he grew up, you know that 
shocked me, I could not believe. They say no… Sam, you will never see me 
there anymore. They say there is very high crime. They say boys will blow 
you up. What is amazing is that it seems like they didn’t see it before they 
left the township and the big question is what are they going to do about it 
because they are in positions of power? They just talk about these problems 
but no action – and they should be the ones doing the most because they have 
the experiences and relatives here…” 
(Focus groups 1 and 2) 
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The municipality is perceived to be paying more attention to affluent suburbs 
and therefore not responding to the pressing needs of the poorer communities 
in the townships. This behaviour is attributed to a perceived lack of interest 
by councillors in dealing with township problems since most of them have 
moved out of the townships to the former white suburbs: “…If we compare 
townships and suburbs, there is a big difference. In the suburbs, if a drain 
blocks today, by the evening it will be fixed. But here in the townships, it will 
take three to four weeks. After a lot of paper work, that is when it gets fixed 
because service is highly poor. You can write all, the blockages and traffic 
lights among other things. All those services, blockages of sewerage, it can be 
blocked and by 6pm, they won’t sleep until the white area is back to normal 
again, but never, it can’t happen here in Soweto, the lights must function. 
The problem is that most of our administrators, including politicians stay in 
the suburbs. There is no one who stays here. These people are dangerous. 
When they travel, they use the main roads, they don’t get into the 
townships…” 
(Focus groups 3 and 4) 
 
Trend analysis reveals a marginally poor municipal responsiveness to 
community needs by the worse-off townships. 
 
Table 29: Trend test on how well municipality consults on and responds to 
community matters of importance 
  
Townships 
Good 
response 
Neithe
r 
Poor 
response 
Total 
N (%) 
Prob 
Respond to needs Well-off 
Worse-off 
47.83 
52.17 
61.11 
38.89 
49.30 
50.70 
90 (49.72) 
91 (50.28) 
0.5853
Respond to enquiries Well-off 
Worse-off 
53.57 
46.43 
50 
50 
45.57 
54.43 
88 (49.72) 
89 (50.28) 
0.5936
Consult on matters 
affecting communities 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
51.04 
48.96 
75 
25 
41.54 
58.46 
85 (49.13) 
88 (50.87) 
0.0884
Respond to 
community feedback 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
51.04 
48.96 
85.71 
14.29 
42.25 
57.75 
85 (48.85) 
89 (51.15) 
0.0732
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Local government policies call for community participation in the 
development of the IDP and in assessing municipal performance. Survey 
findings on the one hand reveal little participation in municipal activities 
where communities can effect these influences. Focus group discussions on 
the other hand reveal dissatisfaction with erratic or no consultation of 
communities by the municipality with regard to their service needs, 
satisfaction and delivery standards. Dissatisfaction seems to be heightened 
by consultations that often coincide with elections. Ward committees were 
established to avoid consultation through elections, and non-consultation or 
even participation renders ward committees inefficient: “…Our municipality 
is failing the people. Most of the services are not up to scratch. We can say 
the government is part and parcel of the problem because they do not 
monitor. What they say, they do not do. They are less concerned and the only 
time when they come is during elections. Now they want to know what is 
happening - ‘can you tell us what your problem is?’ They go and build 10 
houses and they give them to you in the next 10 months you go and vote and 
then damn, no more movement. You will never see them again. To be honest, 
services are very poor compared with the apartheid times. Services were 
cheap. Now they said services will be better, but services are now worse 
because you will pay those thousands of Rands. R400 to R800 a month 
without improvement and within a year, you see they make increases 
forgetting that there are no improvements that they are making, you 
understand? When you take something in a company, a product, if it 
increases in value, it is because they increase its quality but here, it is 
different, the quality stays the same.” 
(Focus groups 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
 
Newly established regional offices seem to have provided relief that enables 
communities to deal with the municipality on a face-to-face basis. There is 
still, however, some level of dissatisfaction with the functionality of these 
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offices, often because they are used to record information and problems and 
make referrals rather than effecting immediate service: “…There is a 
municipal office for the whole of Meadowlands here at Zone 2. I don’t know 
what they do in that office because when I went there they told me that they 
don’t have plumbers. They say their municipal plumbers were in town…” “… 
They sent someone, a private person who charged me R175. The problem is 
not really fixed because I am still experiencing leaks. And is a lot of water 
wastage right now. The municipality came into some areas to change all the 
toilet utilities but they did not come into our area. Like in Zone 9, they have 
beautiful toilets and we didn’t get them. Those people did not pay a cent; our 
toilets are too old…” 
(Focus groups 1 and 3) 
 
5.6.2 Satisfaction with the municipal service charges 
There are three aspects that were revealed through the focus group 
discussions that seem to determine satisfaction with municipal service 
charges. These aspects are a link between ability to pay and consultation, 
variations and disparities in service payments and unjustified service 
charges. 
 
5.6.2.1 A link between ability to pay and consultation 
Participants talked about their confusion about a change in the payment 
system that was not communicated. Before they did not pay for getting 
broken taps fixed, but in the current system they are expected to pay for 
maintenance services: “...They just put increments from nowhere 
forgetting that 95% of the people are unemployed. Even if they are 
employed, most of them are paid low wages, poor salaries whatever it 
is… whereby you can’t be able to supporting their children, paying for 
water and house renovations…” 
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“…We used to pay but we don’t pay any more. In fact they didn’t come; it 
is only recently that they come to fix our broken taps. We had a similar 
problem and ended up getting someone to fix it and we paid him from 
our pockets. There is Mr X; he does it for all these families in this area. 
It is also because it may take weeks if you report and wait on the 
municipality, it is better you do it yourself and pay for it. Also because 
he is cheap, but the municipality does not charge for fixing burst 
sewers…” 
(Focus groups 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
 
5.6.2.2 Variations and disparities in service payments 
Huge and unjustifiable variations in the service charges between 
residents are of serious concern. A simple example is the service charges 
of a single person that are higher than those of a family with extended 
family members. Finding out these disparities seems to be simple as 
neighbours indicated that they compare their municipal charges at all 
times. Section 74(b) of the Systems Act, however, calls for service 
charges that are proportional to the individual use of that service as was 
also reflected in focus group discussions: “…We don’t pay the same now 
irrespective of our consumption. Others pay R100 and some R1 000 even 
if we use the same rate. How can a businessperson pay R65 using all the 
services, water and electricity and an ordinary household pay R500? A 
flat rate is better. A flat rate still may have to be set at different levels 
for pensioners at lower rate compared with those who work…” 
(Focus groups 1 and 3) 
 
5.6.2.3 Unjustified service charges 
Focus group participants were not happy about the inability of the 
municipal officials to read service meters monthly in their houses. 
Unread service meters present baseless or even falsified charge 
statements: “…Ja on these matters I am not sure because these people 
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don’t enter every house to read every month. They just estimate because 
sometimes there is no one in the house. Like in my household, I got an 
electricity statement of R350 for only this month, can you believe it? The 
only thing that we are using often is the TV and we only cook in the 
evenings. And they had promised to lower the electricity rates, yes they 
really said they will - no they won’t ever do that, they are lying. They 
once said they will cut even the old electricity debt as well. There are 
two kinds of debt, the rental and the electricity debt. My electricity debt 
amount to R11 000 but they also differ from household to another. Some 
have been paying and their debt is lower compared to those who have 
not been paying at all…” 
(Focus groups 1, 2 and 4) 
 
5.6.3 Possible causes and effects of dissatisfaction with services 
There are numerous writings on non-payment of local government services 
and their consequences. Among the reasons for non-payment is the inability 
to pay due to high unemployment and low income levels. In this case, the 
average household income, which was inclusive of respondents’ own income, 
was the same as individual income at R1 500, with the majority (30.5%) of 
households earning between R500 and R750. Such households are advised to 
apply for free basic services to the municipality as indigent. Other writings, 
however, suggest historical non-payment to be a cohesive and collective 
behaviour (Hoosen, 1999, and Moss and Obery, 1987). This research reveals 
the following factors about payment and non-payment perceptions: 
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Table 30: Agreement and disagreement with service payment and delivery 
statements (N=200) 
 
Statement 
Strongly 
disagree 
N (%) 
Disagree 
N (%) 
Neither 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Strongly 
agree 
N (%) 
Don’t 
know 
N (%) 
I am not prepared to pay for 
municipal services 
101 (50.5) 72 (36) 1 (0.5) 9 (4.5) 17 (8.5) - 
I am too poor to pay for 
municipal services 
17 (8.5) 53 (26.5) 6 (3) 50 (25) 73 (36.5) 1 (0.5) 
Where people do not pay, 
nothing happens to them 
7 (3.5) 30 (15) 3 (1.5) 49 (24.5) 44 (22) 67 (33.5) 
Government has promised 
us free services 
1 (0.5) 7 (3.5) 4 (2) 60 (30.3) 97 (49) 29 (14.6) 
Everyone should pay for his 
service consumption 
irrespective of poverty level 
13 (6.5) 29 (14.6) 8 (4) 96 (48.2) 46 (23.1) 7 (3.5) 
Government should not 
render free services to all 
64 (32) 87 (43.5) 5 (2.5) 13 (6.5) 8 (4) 23 (11.5) 
A standard fee on services 
should be levied to all people 
5 (2.5) 9 (4.5) 3 (1.5) 66 (33) 113 
(56.5) 
4 (2) 
Only the rich should pay 
municipal services 
45 (22.5) 67 (33.5) 5 (2.5) 14 (7) 32 (16) 37 (18.5) 
 
 
Although the majority of respondents (86.5%) were prepared to pay for their 
services, many saw themselves as poor (61.5%). More than two-thirds (79.3%) 
expected free services as promised by government, 75.5% believed 
government should render free services and 89.5% preferred a standard fee 
for services for all people. There was also no significance difference between 
the non-income-earning households, the single-person income earner in a 
household and households where there was more than one income earner 
regarding their opinions of whether or not to pay for municipal services. 
 
Trends analysis by the well-off and worse-off townships of the statements 
reflected in the table above reveals opposing trends and some marginal 
differences between the two groups only in two statements. The trend reveals 
an expectation of free services and an expectation that government should 
render free services to all by the worse-off townships. 
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Table 31: Trend test on agreement or disagreement with payment and non-
payment statements 
 
Statement 
Townships Disagr
ee 
 
Neither 
 
Agree 
 
Total 
respondents 
N (%) 
Prob 
Government has 
promised us free 
services 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
75 
25 
50 
50 
47.13 
52.87 
82 (48.52) 
87 (51.48) 
0.1395
Government should not 
render free services to 
all 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
46.36 
53.64 
60 
40 
66.67 
33.33 
87 (49.15) 
90 (50.85) 
0.0717
 
Free service delivery expectations reflected in the table above were also 
confirmed in focus groups, where it became evident that participants were 
highly dissatisfied with unmet service delivery expectations that were raised 
by politicians during the election campaigns. “…They should better those 
services. It is every simple, you do what you said you will do and come back to 
the people to ask, ‘are you happy, are you satisfied?’ Yes or no? They promise 
us streets but go and look. The old government made this road here, up to 
today, nothing has happened to it. They tell us we will plan, after elections 
they get R4 billion, they come and give you the figures but they don’t do 
anything. The government comes after 5 years…” “…We have paid R200 
billion in service and tax and some people are giving business to their 
brothers-in-law. They only go to government to enrich themselves. We have 
now seen it; most people who go into political parties are just enriching 
themselves, not to work for you and me. Forget about it. Never, it is like in 
the taxi industry, the driver does not wait to be paid by his boss; he steals 
R20 every day for the whole month…” 
(Focus groups 1 and 2) 
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Figure 11: Action taken to express dissatisfaction with the municipality 
(N=200) 
 
The possible actions that may result from dissatisfaction with the municipal 
actions that relate to service delivery yield significant differences between the 
townships Chiawelo, Naledi, Diepkloof, Meadowlands and Dube at the 
Pearson chi square of 0.001. Whereas the first four townships all view 
demonstrative actions against the municipality as unnecessary, Dube 
residents deem actions like strikes, referral of maters to courts, boycotts of 
service payments and meetings or sending matters to the public protector 
necessary in order to register dissatisfaction. 
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Table 32: Action taken to express dissatisfaction with municipal actions 
Chiawelo Naledi Dube Diepkloof Meadowlands P-
Value 
 
Agree 
N (%) 
Disagre
e 
N (%) 
Agree 
 N (%) 
Disagre
e 
N (%) 
Agree 
N (%) 
Disagre
e 
 N (%) 
Agree  
N (%) 
Disagre
e 
 N (%) 
Agree  
N (%) 
Disagree 
 N (%) 
 
Strike action 2 
(1%) 
17 (8.5) 4 (2) 16 (8) 21 
(10.5) 
2 (1) 17 
(8.5) 
2 (1) 20 (10) 3 (2) 0.0001
Refer matter 
to the courts 
3 
(1.5) 
9 (4.5) --- --- 16 (8) 7 (3.5) 17 
(8.5) 
2 (1) 16 (8) 5 (2.5) 0.0001
Boycott 
payment of 
services 
4 (2) 16 (8) --- --- 18 (9) 6 (3) 18 (9) 5 (2.5) 17 (8.5) 6 (3.5) 0.0001
Boycott 
municipal 
meetings 
--- --- 14 (7) 8 (4) 21 
(10.5) 
3 (1.5) 22 
(11) 
1 (0.5) 23 
(11.5) 
1 (0.5) 0.0001
Refer matters 
to public 
protector 
--- --- 4 (2) 7 (3.5) 14 (7) 8 (4) 17 
(8.5) 
3 (1.5) 16 (8) 5 (2.5) 0.0001
 
8.50%
21.50%
8.5% 7.50%
20.50%
40.5%
32.5%
30.0%
0.5% 3.0%
5.0%
2.0%
20.5%
14.0%
32.5%
37.0%
49%
19% 21%
23%
0.5%0.5%2.0%1.0%
0%
10%
20%
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40%
50%
60%
When and if levies are too high If other community members
are not paying
When the quality of service is
too low
If delivery is frequently
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Strongly disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly agree Don't know
 
Figure 12: Conditions under which residents are not prepared to pay for 
municipal services (N=200) 
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Pricing of the municipal services is the biggest determinant for non-payment 
behaviour of 69.5% of respondents. The second most important determinant 
of non-payment behaviour of 60% of respondents is the lack of efficiency in 
delivery, represented by frequency of interruption of service delivery. 
 
Table 33: Trend analysis of conditions under which residents are not 
prepared to pay municipal services 
 
Statement 
Township
s 
Won’t 
pay 
 (%) 
Neithe
r 
 (%) 
Will 
pay 
 (%) 
Total 
respondents 
N (%) 
Prob 
When and if the levies 
are too high 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
51.72 
48.28 
100 
- 
48.92 
51.08 
99 (50) 
99 (50) 
0.6968
If other community 
members are not 
paying 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
51.61 
48.39 
83.33 
16.67 
45.45 
54.55 
99 (50.51) 
97 (49.49) 
0.4753
When the quality of 
services rendered is 
too low 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
42.68 
57.32 
80 
20 
53.27 
46.73 
100 (50.25) 
99 (49.75) 
0.0548
If delivery is 
frequently interrupted 
Well-off 
Worse-off 
46.67 
53.33 
50 
50 
52.50 
47.50 
100 (50.25) 
99 (49.75) 
0.4292
 
The general impression from this section is that the well-off townships are 
concerned with municipal services pricing and the worse-off ones are 
concerned with the quality and efficiency in delivery. The section reveals very 
positive household perceptions about municipal delivery of the basic 
household services after the 2000 local government elections. Comparisons of 
perceptions between the well-off and worse-off townships reveal a lack of 
responsiveness of the municipality to community needs by the well-off 
townships, whereas the worse-off townships are discontent with municipal 
consultations and response to feedback and queries. Non-assessment of 
household affordability to pay by the municipality, which is also linked to a 
household’s lack of information on the indigent policy, has led to 
dissatisfaction with service charges and charge variations between 
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households. While households express the general willingness to pay for 
municipal services, many see themselves as poor and the worse-off townships 
expect delivery of the promised free services. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the findings of this chapter that the ability to pay 
for municipal services by the researched community is very low. More than 
two-thirds of the households are unemployed and the average household 
incomes are below R1 500 for nearly two-thirds of all sample households. To 
the contrary, more than half of all households seem to be well-off as 
measured by possessions of the LSM utilities such as ownership of 
refrigerators, televisions, heaters and electric stoves, etc., which suggest 
higher electricity consumption. Interestingly, for the Soweto townships, 
electricity is the only basic service that is offered by a utility outside the city 
of Johannesburg’s control and that is Eskom. The well-off townships, 
however, perceive the basic municipal services to be unaffordable compared 
to the worse-off townships. Although communities perceive the basic 
municipal services to be the most important services for their households, 
that is, water and electricity, communities also believe that the municipality 
should, above all things, focus more of its attention on job creation, which 
highlights the enormity of the unemployment problem. Nearly all households 
prefer provision of basic services by government rather than the private 
sector. There is a general poor participation rate by the sampled communities 
in municipal activities such as ward committees and some of the reasons for 
non-participation include feelings of distrust of both municipal councillors 
and the municipality itself as an institution, although the highest levels of 
distrust prevail among the well-off townships. There is average satisfaction 
with the municipal provision of basic services, mainly water, sewerage and 
refuse removal, although the highest levels of satisfaction are among the 
worse-off townships. Although the well-off townships are dissatisfied with 
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service provision, they are satisfied with accessibility, consultation and 
communications between them and the municipality. Areas of concern and 
dissatisfaction by the worse-off townships include the perceived non-
fulfilment of the free basic service provision, and perpetual dissatisfaction 
may lead to boycotting of payments, followed by possible strike action.  
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Chapter Six 
 
SERVICE PROVIDERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SERVICE 
DELIVERY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The chapter presents findings from interviews with the service providers, 
that is, both the municipal services managers and councillors. The aim of the 
chapter is to provide a discussion that reflects on methods that the 
municipality uses in service identification, provision and its perception of the 
application and enforcement of quality management standards, including 
perceptions of the payment problems. Theory suggests that it is important 
that the identified questions (cf. chapter two) be looked at from the 
perspectives of both the municipal councillors and services 
managers/administrators. The service provision and payment section 
explores the possible entitlement culture and how it can be overcome. The 
internal municipal politics that sometimes cloud administrative activities, 
often with devastating effects, like staff retrenchments and infighting 
between municipal managers and mayors, its causes and effects to service 
delivery is explored. Proxy municipalities where the political versus the 
administrative portfolio problems and community proactiveness in engaging 
municipalities had positive spin-offs on service delivery are discussed. 
 
Systematically throughout this chapter, the proxy interviews from the 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal municipalities are supported or even 
refuted by findings from the supplementary interviews on Soweto. The 
supplementary interviews were held with persons knowledgeable about 
service provision between 2002 and 2005 in Soweto (cf. 4.2.4.4). 
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Box 10: Service provider data presentation 
Interview materials used in this chapter were obtained from three service 
managers in Johannesburg. Since councillors would not be interviewed in 
Soweto, the perceptions of councillors from Mpumalanga have been used as a 
proxy. Since the perceptions relate to the countrywide systems of local 
government, perceptual data is relevant in the case of Soweto. 
 
6.2 Method of service identification and prioritisation 
 
Discussions with the CMU revealed addressing of backlogs as the main 
service identification methodology. Although community structures such as 
ward committees have a significant role to play in services identification and 
prioritisation, the functionality of these institutions throughout the country 
is in question. Supplementary interviews with Project Consolidate officials 
revealed that service prioritisation though the ward committees may forever 
be deemed ineffective as individual ward committee priorities differ from 
municipal-wide priorities. “…there are conditions where there are conflict of 
priorities of the ward and those of council. When you prioritise as a ward you 
are thinking about yourself alone and the council prioritises when it thinks 
about the entire municipality. This is a natural conflict and the municipality 
will often prevail for political reasons. That is why we always have politics of 
water delivery and prepaid services from lobby groups and opposition 
parties…”  
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
6.2.1 Need to address service delivery backlog 
The city of Johannesburg, according to the CMU, is confronted with a huge 
service delivery backlog, which was carried over from the various TMLCs 
that now make up the city of Johannesburg. The municipality’s main aim is 
therefore to reduce the backlog and at the same time address new demands, 
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although the accumulated municipal debt makes it difficult to achieve this 
objective. “…It takes a long time to get things right. I think service levels 
have deteriorated a little bit in general. This happens in all transitional 
phases of service delivery in all cities, service levels goes down before they 
pick up because you had a lot of people moving into the city and you also get 
a level of VIPs moving out of the townships and therefore a growing demand 
and a shrinking revenue base at the same time. We have more waterborne 
sewerage connections, an upward shift from communal taps to water taps 
inside the stands although the density of people and number of households 
has also increased throughout the city. We have achieved a lot as far as 
service delivery is concerned in actual numbers but not as much as we would 
like…” 
(Individual interview, CMU, JW) 
 
Supplementary interviews confirmed findings from CMU and JW that the 
amalgamation of the various TMLCs had an impact on service delivery 
efficiency in the short to medium term. “…Perhaps in the medium to long 
term, regions need to be given more powers to handle service activities. You 
see, when you integrate the institutions you need to take control. Before 
integration, they all made their decisions, which was quicker and now 
everything is congested in Braamfontein. Centralisation was necessary 
because you need to deal with cross-subsidisation of poorer regions. Now 
people in Midrand feel a bit deprived because things take longer than before, 
but at the same time, Soweto is getting a better deal because it is highly 
subsidised by other regions. There is bound to be frustrations from those 
municipalities or regions that functioned well and are now realising service 
quality lowering. As institutions mature over time you will realise a need for 
decentralisation once more. It is the same throughout the country; districts 
too are given water distribution powers to cater for cross-subsidisation of 
local municipalities…” 
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
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While numerous families have received title deeds of their old ‘matchbox 
houses’, many more are still waiting and most receive title deeds directly in 
new housing developments. Besides the RDP houses, other new housing 
developments are built by the section 21 companies that have development 
agreements with the municipality. Families have to make arrangements for 
finances with the banking institutions to finance their house bonds.12 
 
Although families who still await allocation of their title deeds are unhappy 
at being treated as title deed holders, the CMU believes that households need 
to be educated in their responsibilities as homeowners and about the backlog 
involved in addressing housing allocation. “…I think that communities need 
to know that as soon as you get title deeds, the houses belong to you and like 
any owner, they assume all the responsibility of the property including fixing 
broken windows, etc. Even if you were renting a flat, you need to fix broken 
windows, you can’t run to the owner every time and tell him that I have 
broken a window, it is your duty. I do not know how the arrangements were 
like during the previous government, but I doubt that they would fix broken 
windows and doors, it encourages a tendency of dependency and low level of 
responsibility…” 
(Individual interview, CMU) 
 
6.2.2 Need to improve the revenue management systems 
From interviews with Project Consolidate officials, the general municipal 
management systems and not revenue systems per se are seen to be in 
question for most municipalities. Johannesburg, however, is seen to be highly 
progressive in its management systems. “…the problem often is not money or 
the lack of it, but wishing that problems will go away and not talk about 
                                                
12 The discussion was presented on the city of Johannesburg website by Sindane, Lucky – 
‘City hands over title deeds in Soweto’, Johannesburg News Agency. Available at: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/2004/april/april15_deeds.stm 
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them. Johannesburg has highly qualified officials and management rarely 
interferes with administrative management, which direct opposite of many 
other municipalities. The main problem is infrastructure management and 
non-upgrading of these. The chief financial officer in Johannesburg is one of 
the best in the country, so is the municipal manager. They both have been 
there for some time now and understand the institution and its problems…”  
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
According to the interviews with the CMU, the quantity and quality of 
service rendering is directly related to the finances in municipal coffers. All 
the South African municipalities were reported in September of 2002 to be 
highly indebted, which impacted on their ability to deliver on growing service 
requirements. The city of Johannesburg thus introduced ‘innovative 
measures’ in tackling the debt problem by installing prepaid meters, which 
also led to anti-privatisation demonstrations. Without community knowledge 
of the indigent by-laws, many households who qualify did not apply and 
many of them had their services cut off. The CMU argues that the 
municipality cares for all community members, rich and poor, and that the 
households that cannot afford their monthly service charges should make 
payment arrangements with the municipality. “…If people cannot afford to 
pay off their debts, they can come into the municipality to make 
arrangements. I think the problem at this stage is that it is still difficult for 
the city to determine the ability and inability to pay by residents…” 
(Individual interview: CMU) 
 
Supplementary interviews refute suggestions that service provision is 
directly related to the availability of municipal finances. The political will 
instead, as well as expertise of municipal officials, is perceived to be the main 
determinant of service delivery. “…It is not only financial capability that 
delivers basic goods, cost is therefore not the only factor but the political 
aspirations of the people need to be addressed, which is why the national 
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government has to transfer funds to municipalities. Provinces too do not rely 
on their own fiscal capacity. You have to maximise your fiscal but where 
indigents are 100% you can’t expect financial viability. But even in cases 
where you are getting transfers from national government, you are still 
required to show proper management and the problems with most of our 
municipalities are about poor financial management and not lack of funds...” 
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
Another important problem confronting the city of Johannesburg is its 
dysfunctional billing system, which has received enormous criticism even 
from the ANC for inefficient revenue collection and therefore hampered 
service delivery. Over time, the billing system has cost the city billions of 
rands in revenue as residents, including those who reside in affluent suburbs, 
continue to receive incorrectly estimated service charges, either overbilled or 
underbilled for essential services such as water. Interviews with the CMU 
revealed that the municipality is taking action towards solving this problem. 
“…In a normal sense, people are billed according to how much they have 
consumed and where there are no meters in place, it is problematic to bill 
people. Where there are no meters, often the area average is used in billing 
on estimates those households that have no meters. The reason why we are 
putting meters everywhere is to avoid this problem; otherwise, the municipal 
charges are based on meter readings…” 
(Individual interview, CMU) 
 
Supplementary interviews revealed that the above challenges are not only 
peculiar to Johannesburg. The only difference between these municipalities is 
how they handle publicity and criticism and how open they are about the 
state of municipal affairs. “…the challenges of municipalities are more or less 
the same. All municipalities have similar challenges but one of the reasons 
that Johannesburg is used often as an example is that it often comes out with 
its problems. In 2002 they ran a road show to let people what their problems 
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are – water problems, meter reading, data cleansing and billing systems 
among others. By doing so, they get support from financial and other 
institutions, which differentiate it from other municipalities…” 
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
Despite the installation of prepaid meters and options for indigent 
applications, service charges are reported to be highly unreasonable and 
families receive basic free water at lower consumption levels. Although all 
the three utilities in the city of Johannesburg are providing services directly 
to the households, the municipality is paying these utilities and is responsible 
for collecting service charges. Standard service tariffs for water and 
electricity are made public on the city of Johannesburg’s Internet website and 
through the service centres. Such rates as at June 2004 were: 
 
Table 34: City of Johannesburg municipal service tariffs 
Water Charges Refuse Charges 
Informal settlements Free Informal settlements R5,00 per month 
First 6 000 litres Free Erf up to 300 m2 R21,60 per month 
7-10 000 litres R3,30 per kl 301-1 000 m2 R38,20 per month 
11-15 000 litres R4,40 per kl 1 001-2 000 m2 R53,35 per month 
16-20 000 litres R5,50 per kl Greater than 2 000 m2 R70,65 per month 
20-40 000 litres R6,60 per kl Flats/townhouses R38,20 per month 
More than 40 000 
litres 
R7,80 per kl Garden refuse (contained) R150,00 per cubic 
meter maximum 
Institutions R5,72 per kl Builder refuse (contained) R150,00 per cubic 
meter maximum 
Non-domestic R7,80 per kl   
Source: City of Johannesburg (2003) 
 
A case study discussion with the Speaker of the Emalahleni municipality on 
ward participatory approaches and community inducement of payment for 
services revealed a positive initiative that overcame the municipal debt and 
created a self-sufficient municipality with the highest services payment 
system in the country. 
 
   
 
138
…This happened between the years 1999 and 2000 at the area that 
covers Witbank. Before 2000 we had a summit and at that time I was 
the director of the local municipality. I was asked to convey a meeting of 
all citizens on the electricity cut-offs and to address the payment of 
services problems. Many people attended, including the local business. 
The city and townships were in a state of decay. The garbage trucks in 
use were bought in the 1970s and were breaking down daily. Many 
houses did not have electricity and water reading meters. 
We agreed that there will be a committee to report to council, 
although our work was partially interrupted by the municipal 2000 
elections. We firstly established a committee, a section 12 notice. We 
resolved to write letters to the ward committees and organise 
communities and had strategic workshops facilitated by Idasa. We got 
to understand that three-quarters of the electricity and water meters 
did not work. We were using various debt collection policies from the 
previous transitional local councils. Only two out of ten of all the 
households were paying for services uninterruptedly for 12 months. 
After we had a cut-off committee – we studied if it was only the people 
who were not paying whose electricity was cut-off. 
We reached a new agreement with the municipal council that if 
people were unable to pay, they should approach the council or 
councillors to get registered under our indigent policy. All the people 
who were not registered and at the same time not paying, would be 
treated as defaulters and were to receive added penalties to the cut-offs. 
Communities were told that not a single household will be left out in 
this new process. Councillors asked for print outs from the databases of 
who will be cut-off and to check the level of payments within their 
wards. Between 2001 and 2002 we realised an improved payment from 
20% to 85%. In 2001 we held a national record of payments in the 
historically black townships of 80% payments and 87% payment in our 
historically white areas. We have now for the first time in the history of 
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our municipality reached new payment levels of 90%. Now we have 
replaced all our old garbage trucks, we bought new trucks and we don’t 
have problems of truck breakdowns any more. The streets are thus 
clean at all times and the street lights are on. Our huge debt is reversed 
and we are realising surplus. 
We have also realised that we had to engage ward committees that 
we required a municipal wide policy that people know and that is 
municipal wide communication policy. Because of this engagement with 
other organs of civil society, we have improved payment of services 
through the participation of all the citizens. Before January of this year 
(2004), we had outreach programme. The mayor went to the 
communities to discuss budgets, although people continued to raise 
other problems. We see now that if we needed to improve and get the 
support, ideas should come from the communities. Citizen participation 
is necessary and must be taken into consideration. Hence the non-
payment of series is a thing of the past in our municipality… 
(Municipal speaker: Emalahleni municipality) 
 
6.2.3 Establishment of service level agreement contracts 
Central to the service delivery mechanisms are the contractual agreements 
into which the municipality enters with the service utilities. The municipality 
has to ensure that the delivery of services by utilities is fair, equitable, 
transparent, cost-effective and competitive, etc. To ensure competitiveness of 
the utilities, the CMU is in the process of setting up and refining service level 
agreements that pinpoint delivery targets and the performance monitoring 
processes. The utilities prepare annual business plans, which outline the 
KPIs. The CMU then evaluates the company's performance against the 
agreed KPIs. The CMU, however, expressed concerns over the backlog in 
terms of compiling the accurate KPIs and their implementation, which is an 
enormous task. Part of the evaluation will also include customer complaints 
and queries since the CMU will be able to track these from the call connect 
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service. According to the interviews with both the CMU and utilities, these 
agreements should ideally spell out the quantity and quality of services to be 
delivered. The CMU, which is responsible for developing these agreements 
and targets, defines the task as challenging. “…There are over 500 service 
performance indicators that we have to develop and perfect for monitoring 
and evaluation. Putting these targets in place for each utility is not a simple 
task and it takes too long to finalise…” “…Yes, of course targets were set 
although I have not been with the city long enough to know if they are being 
realised. Performance contracts between the city and the utilities and trying 
to implement or set penalties where there is non-delivery. The biggest 
problem is measuring targets and we are in the process of putting targets in 
place. It takes very long time to have established target measures that can be 
used consistently at all times because they should be triangulated to obtain 
feedback from all the directions – from the service deliverer like JW, from the 
councillors, administrators in departments and from the communities. This 
will enable detecting where the problems lie and if all the concerned 
stakeholders are happy or concerned with any aspects of service delivery…” 
(Individual interviews, CMU, JW and Pikitup) 
 
In the mean time, it is argued that service customers should call the 
responsible utilities for their areas and make alternative arrangements if 
they will not be in their households on specified dates when the service 
meters are being read.13 Communities are also given the dates on which 
meters will be read in all the municipal wards to overcome estimation 
problems. “…The utilities are not operating in all the areas yet, the City 
Power specifically. They are in charge of the northern suburbs and Eskom is 
still in charge of Soweto. The important move will be to have uniformity in all 
the service delivery through a single supplier to overcome the disparities in 
costs, billing systems and different service delivery levels…” 
                                                
13 Sindane, Lucky ‘Meter readers make a date with Joburg’, 9 July 2004. Available at: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/2004/july/july9_meter.stm 
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(Individual interview, CMU) 
 
6.2.4 Privatisation and its effect on delivery 
According to the CMU, the decision by the city of Johannesburg to corporatise 
municipal services is not only legal, but strategic as well, informed by section 
82 of the Systems Act. This semi-privatisation enables the municipality to 
objectively police service delivery. The CMU pleads for the distinction of 
privatisation from corporatisation, since the city of Johannesburg continues 
to have total control of the utilities and the setting of service tariffs in terms 
of section 83(a) of the Systems Act. “…Unlike conventional businesses, the 
utilities remain public services, limited by such socio-economic and 
developmental objectives as, for example, free water and electricity for the 
poor. There is a difficult balance between financial performance, public duty 
and social responsibility...”14. Whether the corporatisation-privatisation 
distinction is understood by the APF and communities is a different question. 
The disconnection of poor people’s electricity, also referred to as ‘brownouts’, 
caused by incorrect or inflated billing seems to be a consequence of 
privatisation. Disconnections continue to be a cause of misery for thousands 
of black working and unemployed families in Soweto.15 Interviews with the 
service providers revealed that the decision on prepaid meters was made by 
the municipal council and not utilities. “…The decision to put prepaid meters 
lies with the municipal council. Utilities cannot just go and put these meters 
without the knowledge of the City Council, that cannot happen. These 
decisions are taken to avoid accumulation of huge city debts like the one we 
had in 1999. I know that people don’t like it but often it is those who cannot 
afford to pay and they should apply through the municipality as indigent 
                                                
14 The Contract Management Unit (CMU). Available at: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/cmu/cmu_challenges.stm 
15 Paley, Dawn (2003) discusses the consequences of only the poor having prepaid water 
meters in Soweto. Available at: http://www.alternatives.ca/print975.html 
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because these things are meant for people who can afford to pay, people who 
are earning income…” 
(Individual interview, CMU, JW) 
 
The city of Johannesburg has chosen the corporatisation method for efficiency 
and effectiveness reasons in service delivery. Although privatisation and 
corporatisation are not synonymous to the municipal administration, Soweto 
residents are standing up against the first phase of a plan to install prepaid 
water meters by JW because they believe that prepaid meters stop all water 
supplies unless water is paid for in advance. The Freedom of Expression 
Institute has also taken JW to court in a bid to gain access to information 
about the plan to install prepaid water meters in Soweto. The Institute 
researcher, Harvey (cf. chapter three) said that there is no adequate research 
in place to assess the possible effects of the system in low-income and high-
unemployment areas. It is believed, however, that prepaid services in such 
conditions could increase hardship, ill health and poverty. The APF also 
issued a statement reflecting this concern, "We are opposed to the ANC 
government's GEAR policy (neo-liberal economic policy) that allows our water 
to be owned and run by private companies".16 “…There is no difference, no 
effect on service delivery brought about by the privatisation process. Say 
Johannesburg Water – they take orders from the municipality. The 
politicians still take decisions on how much of a service should be delivered. 
The costs or charges are decided by the municipal council and not by the 
utilities themselves. I know that the Joburg Water sits on the Water Forum 
with councillors to discuss delivery mechanisms and problems thereof…” 
(Individual interview, CMU, JW) 
 
From supplementary interviews, Project Consolidate officials acknowledge 
that corporatisation of services in the city of Johannesburg, compounded by 
                                                
16 ‘South Africa: Campaign against pre-paid meters intensifies’, 24 September 2003. 
Available at:  http://www.irc.nl/content/view/full/4140 (June 2004) 
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the amalgamation of various municipalities, has led to huge inefficiencies. It 
is hoped, however, that these will be overcome in the medium to long term. 
“…The corporatisation model is not 100% bad but it needs clear reporting 
structures. One may argue why they did not create specialised departments 
rather than ‘independent’ entities? It was not well conceptualised who will do 
the meter reading. Currently the city has nine database systems running in 
parallel of one another. The ultimate would be to have a single database that 
City Power, JW, Pikitup and all other entities utilises…” 
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
6.2.5 Problems associated with current service delivery models 
Discussions with Mr Mohammed revealed that there is a lack of direct 
contact between communities and the regional administrative centres, which 
are responsible for services delivery. The lack of provision for administrative 
centres to communicate directly with ward committees renders ward 
activities inefficient and at the same time overwhelms the office of the 
municipal manager and speaker with information from wards.17 The 
problems, which are caused by the direct reporting of ward committees to the 
speaker and the municipal manager, even on urgent service delivery matters, 
result in huge service delivery backlogs. This indecision and shifting and 
centralising of responsibility are deemed unnecessary and can easily be 
curtailed by delegating some service delivery responsibilities to the regional 
services centres and ward committees, which is suggested in the 
recommendations chapter. 
 
Challenges raised by Mr Mohammed were also echoed in the supplementary 
interviews. Accordingly, community participation is seen as lacking and 
totally absent from wards and regional services centres, respectively. Where 
                                                
17 Discussions held at Nelspruit government office between the researcher and the MEC 
during August 2003 while conducting interviews with selected Mpulmalanga 
municipalities on roles and responsibilities of government officials vis-à-vis councillors. 
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ward committees are established, they are also seen to lack understanding of 
their roles and responsibilities “…the model we have should start at ward 
level. In Johannesburg we have 100% wards but their functionality is in 
question for a number of reasons. There are party political conflicts at play in 
the ward committees although these are non political forums; there are also 
conflicts because some members see these institutions as a forum for deriving 
financial incentives. There are numerous examples of internal infighting. 
People who participate in ward committees complain of lack of funding. Often 
it is the lack of political will and not unavailability of funds. There is no 
proper funding model for the ward committees. Funding policies are being 
developed by DPLG as we speak and proper model for the administration of 
funds is also being worked on. Everything evolves around the ward councillor 
and there are disparities throughout all municipalities…” 
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
This section reveals that there are no clearly defined municipal methods of 
service identification and delivery other than addressing the delivery backlog 
that was carried over from the various TLCs. In order to meet new service 
delivery expectations a proactive strategy that addresses service charges 
collection and finalisation of service level contracts with utilities will be 
required. Without these contracts, service performance and community 
satisfaction cannot easily be assessed. 
 
6.3 Municipal service provision and the payment question 
 
6.3.1 Building a citizenship rather than an entitlement culture 
Recent literature on non-payment and participation in municipal activities is 
seen as centred on the community’s perceptions of exclusion or victims of the 
state. In order to build citizenship participatory governance within the 
municipalities that goes beyond political elections, it is important to 
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transcend these perceptions (cf. chapter three). The commercialisation and 
cost recovery of core services at the expense of greater public participation is 
seen to have side effects, creating passive customers who relate to the 
municipality only in terms of their problems. The municipality’s narrow 
definition of efficiency as a cost recovery principle therefore commodifies the 
relationship between the state and the service users and is undesirable. “…I 
think the municipality has to start treating people like customers and tell 
them that we will relate to you only if you pay for your services. Building that 
kind of relationship is important because with it comes the responsibility 
from the citizens, to pay for the services that they use, just like they relate to 
a private business…” 
(Individual interview, CMU) 
 
Non-participation by communities in monitoring their elected representatives 
is cited to be a result of possible uninterest and communities are seen to be 
active when they have compelling interests, and specifically when they have 
service delivery problems.18 In the interim, however, the municipality 
believes that through the regional centres, communities are able to express 
their problems, which are immediately picked up by the utilities and the 
CMU. “…There are customer complaints centres now in the regional centres. 
It takes long for people to recognise institutional setups and to have a good 
level of trust. These centres have been there now only for a few years and 
they are already helpful, people are phoning in daily and when they realise 
that their complaints are seriously tackled, they will start trusting this 
institution…” 
(Individual interview, CMU) 
                                                
18 Terrance Jacobs – case study presentation at an IDASA workshop on 10 years of 
democracy: Lessons from the field, 15 June 2004. Ouraadsal-Pretoria. 
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6.3.2 Politics vis-à-vis administrative service management issues 
In the supplementary interviews, service provision experts for Soweto agreed 
that municipal challenges throughout the country are generally the same and 
had the following to say about the applicability of findings from other 
provinces to Soweto: “…Yes, many challenges of local government such as the 
functionality of wards, service delivery and debt and revenue collection are 
generally the same throughout the country.” The city of Johannesburg, 
however, is perceived to have the required service delivery expertise, in 
partnership with crucial support institutions, more mature in their processes 
of handling finances, criticism and service delivery matters than the smaller 
and rural municipalities. 
 
Interviews with municipal councillors and senior administrative officials at 
Govan Mbeki local municipality suggest that efficiency in service delivery is 
dependent on, among other things, clearly defined roles and responsibilities 
of joint political-administrative municipal committees. Not so well defined 
roles, responsibilities and process maps for reporting community concerns 
and executing council resolutions lead to a dysfunctional municipal 
management structure. Supplementary interviews with Project Consolidate 
officials echoed similar sentiments. The problem is perceived to be with the 
new generation of managers who are not experienced. The problem is also 
compounded by councillors who do not understand their responsibilities and 
therefore constantly intervene in administrative processes. These problems 
are cited to be highly prevalent in many South African municipalities but to a 
lesser extent in Johannesburg. “…We have a problem with new generation of 
mangers who are not 100% sure of what they are doing. Biggest problem is 
the division of powers between officials and councillors. In practice, 
councillors want to run day-to-day activities of a municipality although it is 
different in Johannesburg. Councillors were involved in procurement until 
now that the new Municipal Finance Management has made forbidden them 
from administrative matters. Officials do their obligations and only report to 
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council. Many professionals are unhappy because they can’t easily influence 
the processes and therefore do not derive financial benefits out of the 
system…” 
(Supplementary telephone interviews) 
 
Some of the findings from the proxy municipalities are summarised in the 
table below. 
 
Table 35: Challenges facing municipal administrative and political 
committees 
 
Execution of 
resolutions 
A lack of understanding of politicians’ roles in service delivery 
and the role of the Portfolio Committees is perceived to have 
an effect on the implementation of council resolutions by the 
operational departments. “…Departments are supposed to execute 
resolutions passed on by the Portfolio Committees from the municipal 
council to avoid any confrontations. There is also frustration on the part of 
officials because they feel that they have to explain themselves at all 
times to the politicians although they do not report directly to 
politicians…” 
(Govan Mbeki Snr Admin) 
Portfolio 
Committee role 
The dominant role of the majority party in the municipality is 
perceived to have a bias effect on the execution of municipal 
resolutions and service delivery in general. “…Because Portfolio 
Committees are largely ANC, they often execute the requirements of the 
ANC and not necessarily listen to the people or concerns from other 
minority parties…” 
(Govan Mbeki councillors) 
Policy 
guidelines 
The functions of the political committees are largely 
undefined. The lack of by-laws that define roles and 
responsibilities of especially full-time councillors and the 
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unavailability of process maps that guide decision-making 
processes are perceived as serious problems.19 “…Other 
challenges include, getting all the municipal policies and by-laws approved 
in line with the legislations. We need to review our current policies, the 
ones we have are very old from the previous racially divided 
municipalities…” 
(Govan Mbeki councillors and Snr Admin) 
Communication On the one hand, councillors through the Portfolio 
Committees are seen to exert a lot of delivery pressure on 
departments and on the other hand, they are seen to have 
little understanding of how departments function. “…The major 
problem is that councillors do not understand the difficulties that we are 
experiencing. There are no funds. Our communication mechanisms are not 
functioning well and information is not well disseminated…” 
“…Communication systems are not integrated and understood, it leads to 
longer time for formal appointments to take place in the departments. 
Some departments are understaffed and some of the employees are not 
well skilled…” 
(Govan Mbeki Snr Admin) 
Resources  Finance is often the biggest impediment to the execution of 
municipal plans and council resolutions, and therefore affects 
the overall municipal performance. “…There is a big financial 
challenge. Lack of funds is always raised when resolutions are not 
undertaken…” “…The major challenge facing departments and Portfolio 
Committees is that there is enormous amount of unemployment in the 
municipality which leads to poor payment of services and therefore not 
much funds for the municipality…” 
(Govan Mbeki councillors and Snr Admin) 
Relationships Although the prevalence of good relations between councillors 
and administrative staff is perceived to be central to good 
service delivery, relations are poor due to, among other 
                                                
19 The municipality must define the specific role and responsibility of “each political 
structure and political office bearer of the municipality and of the municipal manager” 
(section 53(1) of the Municipal Systems Act). 
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things, a lack of constant communication and understanding 
of each other’s roles and responsibilities. “…Every year there is a 
joint bosberaad between full-time councillors and HoDs to improve 
relationships. The relationship is always good if you agree with whatever 
councillors tell you. But often, much interference from politicians who try 
to give directive to the administrative staff…” “…Not very good because of 
past administrative problems and accusations especially because head of 
departments seem to look down on councillors and only talk to them at 
meetings unless forced by circumstances…” “…The situation is not ideal, 
but adequate…” “…PR councillors do not have a lot of contact with staff…” 
(Govan Mbeki councillors and Snr Admin) 
 
 
6.3.3 Perceptions of the internal municipal service delivery systems 
Both the municipal councillors and senior administrators raised related 
issues of importance regarding the kind of image that the municipality 
projects to the community. Among the factors that shape community 
perceptions of the municipal image are the attitudes of municipal staff and 
the public relations or communication of municipal decisions and actions. 
 
Table 36: Factors hindering service delivery and staff performance 
 
Customer 
relations 
There is a belief that administrative staff need to be 
familiarised with the Batho Pele20 principles to foster amongst 
them a culture of good customer relations since poor relations 
often adversely inform poor perceptions of communities about 
the municipality.21 “…our frontline staff does not treat people well and 
they need training, especially on Batho Pele principles…” 
(Govan Mbeki Snr Admin) 
                                                
20 Batho Pele (“people first”) is a good customer relations policy presented to the public by the 
National Department of Public Services. 
21 Schedule 2 to the Municipal Systems Act also outlines a Code of Conduct for Municipal 
Staff Members which includes fostering “a culture of commitment to serving the public 
and a collective sense of responsibility for performance…”. 
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Other concerns by both councillors and administrators are 
about the projected municipal image. Both are concerned that 
communications need to be effective and proactive at all times 
and that frontline staff in direct contact with the community 
members should be given customer relations training. “…There 
is lack of communication on certain matters by HoDs, especially electricity 
cut-offs that are done in wrong areas or not communicated to the 
communities concerned…”22 “…Staff working directly with clients should 
improve their communication skills…” 
(Interviews, councillors and Snr Admin) 
 
Institutional 
culture 
Almost all South African municipalities came into being 
through the merger of numerous TLCs. Since staff members 
from these various municipalities have different cultures and 
norms that ultimately affect the quality of work and 
dedication etc., interviewees preferred that a systematic 
culture harmonisation process be introduced. “…The culture is 
different in the new municipality and the staff has to cope. In the long run, 
we need a single municipal culture. People have to be introduced to what is 
the ideal here in this municipality regarding work ethics, treatment of 
clients, etc…” 
(Govan Mbeki Snr Admin) 
 
Resources 
Due to the lack of service charges collection and other primary 
resources like municipal human resources, numerous work 
activities are not easy to execute. Some councillors argue that 
the municipality should be transparent and make this kind of 
information public to enable communities to hold informed 
perceptions about the municipal ineffectiveness and 
effectiveness in service delivery. “…There is lack of resources, e.g. 
cars, personnel and overalls and the problem seem to be financial in 
                                                                                                                                              
22 In the Johannesburg Unicity, such communication will be made either by regional services 
centres or the utilities rather than by the departmental heads, whereas at Emalahleni and 
Govan Mbeki, service delivery responsibility lies with the departments. 
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nature. Some employees are therefore demoralised and their ability to do 
work is affected. Addressing the problem of resource shortages, e.g. 
stationery, computers will affect the attitude change by municipal workers 
and therefore overcome a negative work performance…” “…There is a big 
backlog that hinders the delivery and will remain for a few years. In the 
mean time, communities should have a true reflection of the problems that 
we encounter here. Let them know how many staff we run short of and 
how much money in order to deliver certain goods, that way, they can’t 
easily blame…” 
(Govan Mbeki councillors and Snr Admin) 
 
Addressing the problem of staff shortages and salary 
disparities that were inherited from the previous transitional 
municipalities is perceived primary in order to effect employee 
satisfaction. “…There is a slight problem in our municipality, we have 
completed placements, but there is still staff shortage in some departments 
and most of the staff members are not happy because of low wages. 98% of 
the appointments are not suitable. This is because politicians play a big 
role in the appointments process…” 
(Govan Mbeki Snr Admin) 
Service 
delivery 
levels 
Various factors affecting service delivery levels are fostered by 
different departmental requirements such as staff 
competency, training requirements and effectiveness of 
management systems. “…Staff seems to be competent; service delivery 
can definitely be improved. It is about systems and management including 
the IT systems. We need to work on practical systems. The process has 
however started with the head of HoD of Administration, Finance, Safety 
and security, the mayor and municipal manager…” “…In general, staff is 
doing their work, although there is a need for training and skills 
development. Some staff members require improvement of literacy levels, 
including councillors. ABET classes are in place, but career-pathing is 
being developed…” 
(Govan Mbeki Snr Admin) 
 
   
 
152
The internal municipal systems for service delivery in the city of 
Johannesburg are perceived by Project Consolidate facilitators to be highly 
efficient in comparison to most municipalities, especially those interviewed in 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal. There is recognition, however, that 
although the IDP process prioritises certain services and identifies key 
performance indicators and that there is a need to assess these thorough the 
balanced scorecard, the assessment is often not carried out as planned for 
reasons that range from non-completion of key performance indicators to lack 
of capacity. 
 
6.3.4 Community-led services delivery improvement case study 
Discussions with Terrance Jacobs, an organiser for the Church-based 
Community Organisation, revealed that communities are often more 
enthusiastic about engaging with the municipality when they have 
immediate problems to resolve. Jacobs presented a case study that reflected 
on an effective municipal engagement initiated by a community in 
Emnambithi municipality in KwaZulu-Natal: 
 
…Thank you. As an organiser, I train people to approach municipal 
officials with their problems from an attitude of power. If you’ve been an 
organiser for many years, especially during the struggle, you know that 
people get organised about what they are passionate about. We are 
starting from the faith base – it’s the core for one wanting to influence 
the world. 
Two years ago I received a letter from a women’s group in Loskop 
near Drakensberg. It was handwritten and it said, ‘we have heard what 
you do from the papers in Durban. We want you to help us too. We have 
many problems and most people in urban areas don’t want to come to 
rural areas.’ Leaders of this group of women included Winne Malisela. 
One of the biggest problems was they had no water for 10 years. We 
stalled, and then went to the municipality eventually a month 
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thereafter. We had a meeting with the municipal manager. The 
manager said, ‘you don’t have water? – I didn’t know that. Someone 
should have told me.’ The next day, a truck delivered water. 
A short while later the delivery stopped again. So we arranged a 
meeting with the top municipal service officials. We picked up people 
from Loskop and travelled to Ladysmith. We arrived and we were told 
that the official could not meet with us. ‘It is a typical response from 
government officials to treat organisations like ours, with a church 
identity, as unprofessional. This is a problem with our democracy.’ The 
women were well trained and demanded a meeting with the official who 
is second in charge. 
Eventually we had the meeting, with the right people. An official 
with all his maps and designs and statistics, laid it in front of us. He 
said, ‘this is how municipal government works, this is our plan.’ Winnie 
banged the table and called him ‘little boy’ in Zulu (he was younger). 
She said, ‘I’m not worried about the rest of the municipality. We want to 
know only one thing, ‘when will we get water?’ He said, ‘are these 
church people?’ He expected church people to be less confrontational 
and less demanding. 
The ladies said, ‘we will call for a boycott’. This led to action – we 
had the chief whip on the telephone line and we asked for a meeting and 
explained why we had all these demands. Eventually, in December 
2003, the village received communal taps. By January water stopped 
again. We started engaging the municipality all over again. Now the 
water has been turned on, and it has stayed on. The municipality came 
to learn that we are close allies of theirs, that if we cooperate, they look 
good and so do we. Now the women have won and they want to take on 
others issues such as drugs abuse. This has led to a different community 
feeling that if they organise their voice, they will be heard, regardless of 
structure. They define how structures should function and how 
government should be engaged – formally or informally… 
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(Terrance Jacobs: Church-based Community Organisation) 
 
Discussions in this section show that communities feel entitled to municipal 
services and reversing that culture will require a customer approach to their 
treatment by the municipality, which was also confirmed by Nakedi (2004).23 
Interviews in Mpumalanga municipalities show that internal municipal 
processes are also central to the effective service delivery process by a 
municipality. The case study shows the developmental challenges facing 
municipalities, depicting the culture of no interest in participation by 
communities; that communities do not participate for the sake of 
participation, but participate to address problems that they feel passionate 
about and for direct benefits. The case study, however, reveals that planned 
engagement between communities and the municipality can yield positive 
results. 
 
Findings of the supplementary interviews in Soweto reveal, however, that 
ward committee participation is high, especially in areas with severe service 
delivery problems. Ward services priorities in most Soweto townships in the 
past ranged from upgrading municipal facilities, concern over opening and 
closing times of facilities, especially clinics, implementing HIV/Aids 
programmes, the need for taxi ranks and clearance of informal settlements. It 
is acknowledged that community priorities often go beyond the scope of local 
government but are generally in line with the Mayoral strategic priorities for 
2030. 
                                                
23 The paper ‘Democratic participation in local governance’ presented by Brian Nakedi 
formed part of the series of papers presented at the workshop on 10 years of democracy: 
Lessons from the field, hosted by IDASA on 15 June 2004 at Ouraadsal-Pretoria. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
It can be concluded that addressing the service backlog within the city of 
Johannesburg is the current aim and main method for identifying and 
delivering municipal services. Lack of proactiveness in service identification 
and delivery is revealed to be due to low revenue streams which are partly 
blamed on dysfunctional billing systems and huge debts that were carried 
over from the various TMLCs. The municipality is, however, in the process of 
rectifying the billing system problems, compiling and verifying the recipients 
of the indigent services and at the same time establishing service level 
agreements with the services utilities. Partial service delivery concessions 
through the various service utilities are perceived by the municipality not to 
comprise ‘privatisation’. The municipality argues that service tariffs and 
performance levels of the utilities are still managed by the municipality in its 
contact with communities through ward committee discussions at which 
community views are accommodated. Non-participation of communities in 
municipal activities like ward committees and IDPs are perceived to be a 
historical factor caused by incapacity to participate on the part of 
communities; non-payment of municipal services is also perceived to be a 
historical factor that has turned into an entitlement culture. This culture is 
caused by communities’ lack of comprehension of their responsibilities and 
how their collective efforts, that is, payments and otherwise, lead to 
dysfunctionality of the municipality, thus the need for skills and leadership 
development in these communities. Poor delivery is attributed to variations 
in work ethics and culture among staff from various TMLCs, poor skills and 
hence the need for capacity building too of the municipal officials and 
councillors on ‘people first’ principles, resources allocation and performance 
orientation, etc. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The local government events on service delivery in Soweto between 2002 and 
2004 were characterised by a mixture of services privatisation or 
corporatisation, installations of prepaid meters and ensuing protests. A brief 
chronology of these events is outlined below.  
 
Box 11: Chronology of service delivery in Soweto 
a. Local government elections 2001 
b. Acknowledgement by the municipal council that the city has accrued a 
debt of more than R7,9 billion 
c. Prepaid service meters installations continue 2001-2003 
d. Default and protests against prepaid services continue 2002-2003 
e. A measure of calmness by communities is observed 2004 
f. Municipal council through the Executive Mayor Amos Masondo 
announces that it will scrap a R1,5 billion service debt owed by the 
indigent households (4 May 2005)24 
g. Economic as well as social analysts (Kagiso Securities; Industrial 
Development Corporation; Econometrix and T-Sec) wary that amnesty 
may influence non-payment behaviour25 
h. 37 000 indigent households apply for municipal subsidy by 6 July 200526 
 
In generating the conclusions to this research, the six questions that were 
raised in the second chapter will now be individually considered. The 
                                                
24 Ndaba Dlamini. May 4, 2005. Free service for Joburg’s indigent. Available at: 
http://www.joburg.org.za/2005/may/may4_debt3.stm 
25 Thomas Thale. May 4, 2005. Welcome from economists for city’s debt write-off. Available 
at: http://www.joburg.org.za/2005/may/may4_debt1.stm 
26 Lucky Sindane. July 6, 2005. Indigent register is successful. City of Johannesburg: 
Available at http://www.joburg.org.za/2005/jul/jul6_subsidy.stm 
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conclusions on each of these questions are made from the findings presented 
in chapters five and six and, where relevant, these are also augmented by 
references to the findings by other authors. The conclusions on the raised 
questions are followed by a presentation of the general conclusions on the 
state of local government in South Africa. Here, comparisons are made about 
findings from service providers and consumers where appropriate. Some 
aspects of the research that were not explored from both sides, such as the 
ability to pay, are not compared. The comparative presentation is followed by 
a section on research conclusions and recommendations. 
 
7.1 Conclusions on municipal service consumers 
Conclusions from service provision experts in Soweto on the two questions 
about service consumers (cf. chapter 4) are that the city of Johannesburg does 
have policies on service delivery quality although much of the municipal focus 
has been service targets (quantity). Since utilities are relatively new, service 
delivery quality standards are also new and mainly being developed. The 
municipality also has policies on community participation. Ward committees 
were fully established in Johannesburg during 2002-2005, although effective 
participation did not happen for reasons other than the lack of policy and 
participative institutions. 
 
7.1.1 The importance of municipal services 
The researched communities understand the basic functions of the 
municipality, which they indicated to be, among other things, the delivery or 
maintenance of the basic services like water, electricity and refuse removal. 
Although functions of the municipality are well understood, communities 
think that the city of Johannesburg municipality should focus its attention on 
creating employment and providing houses. These are, however, the 
competencies of the private sector and the provincial department of housing, 
respectively. The findings confirm the reference by Craythorne (1990) to local 
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government as the guardian of all community needs and mainly social 
welfare in communities whose core needs are not accommodated through the 
market forces (cf. chapter two). Thus, even where there is consensus on local 
government competencies as described in Mueller (1989), and by the 
Municipal Structures and Systems Acts, the extension of local government 
functions into what may be perceived to be the ‘private domains’ of 
employment creation and housing seem inevitable especially in South Africa 
where apartheid redress remains imperative. 
 
Poor or worse-off households are revealed here to be pro-government delivery 
of basic services, whereas the well-off households support private sector 
provision. It can be concluded that the well-off suburbs think that subsidising 
the poor townships is not their responsibility; a reason for the Sandton 
residents to have originally refused having been classified under the same 
municipal region as Alexandra.27 Another reason includes the municipal use 
of aggregated rather than actual services consumption, which is generally 
higher for the well-off suburbs. For this reason too, the well-off townships 
would prefer private sector provision and private consumption of basic 
services from which they will be able to pay solely for their own household’s 
actual rather than estimated consumption. 
 
7.1.2 Community participation 
Chapter 4 of the Systems Act urges municipalities to encourage and create 
conditions for local communities to participate in activities such as 
preparation, implementation and review of IDPs, performance management 
systems budgets and provision of services. Mechanisms for participation 
include political structures, councillors and other appropriate mechanisms 
such as petitions and complaints, notification and public comments, 
                                                
27 As reported by CNN International on 31 August 2002, ‘Nearly 10,000 Alexandra residents 
marched to a Sandton Convention gathering against wealth divide’. Avalable at:  
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa 
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meetings, hearings and report back to communities. However, municipalities 
should communicate information about available mechanisms, processes and 
procedures for participation. From the findings of this research, there is 
positive community participation in municipal activities like voting and ward 
committees. Where apathy to participation exists among the researched 
communities, it is due to poorly provided services in the townships compared 
to other suburban areas, especially the white suburbs. The proxy 
municipality of Emnambithi revealed that non-participation is an outcome of 
numerous factors like the lack of competencies, skills and leadership on the 
part of communities and is not necessarily an indication of unwillingness to 
participate. The municipal councillors on the other hand are perceived by 
communities to be more visible when canvassing for elections. This finding 
correlates positively with Haffajee (2000), who cites interaction with 
communities by political parties to be on the basis of promises which are 
often never fulfilled (cf. chapter three). 
 
Although the comparisons of attendance of ward committee meetings 
between the well-off and worse-off townships yield no significant differences, 
trends suggest that the worse-off communities are more likely to attend. 
Attendance of ward committee meetings is an indication of confidence that 
communities place in the municipality regarding the influence that they can 
exert on its decisions (cf. chapter three). Whereas Daniel and De Vos (2002) 
and Smith and Vawda (2003) view community participation as an outcome of 
both trust and accessibility of the municipality, trends from this study 
suggest strong distrust of the municipality by the well-off communities but 
the well-off communities perceive the municipality to be accessible. While the 
purpose for communication and visitation of the municipality by community 
members was not fully explored, it can be concluded that the well-off 
communities have the means to both communicate with and visit municipal 
offices whereas the worse-off communities do not. For the same reason, the 
worse-off communities participate better in ward committees because of their 
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proximity. The general inaccessibility of the municipal councillors by the 
worse-off communities goes against the original intent of the Igoli 2002 plan 
for better accessibility, encouragement and facilitation of community 
participation, which were cited in Kongwa (undated). Lack of municipal 
information feeding through to the communities results in apathy and 
withdrawal from municipal activities and may also contribute to non-
payment for services. 
 
There is often short-sightedness regarding the participative ability of 
communities. Proxy interviews at Emalahleni municipality revealed that 
high participation rates could be attained through the facilitation of 
community participation workshops and through the empowerment of ward 
councillors with participative skills. A systematically fostered participative 
culture has also proven to have positive effects on the payment of the basic 
municipal services in the proxy municipality of Emalahleni, which reversed 
its books from a deficit to a surplus budget. It is safe to conclude that 
community participation and payment of services are mutual activities that 
lead to the improvement of service provision and service standards. It can 
also be concluded that the sample Soweto communities are not involved in 
municipal services identification and prioritisation other than reporting the 
service interruptions and voting at municipal elections. As Smith and Vawda 
(2003) indicate, it is important to build citizenship consciousness in 
communities through participation or risk communities’ attitudes of being 
‘victims of the state’. 
 
7.1.3 Ability to pay for municipal services 
Section 74 of the Systems Act requires a municipal tariff policy to treat 
service users equitably in its application and the amount which individuals 
pay to be proportional to their service usage. For the poor households, the 
tariff should cover only operational and maintenance costs. Other methods of 
subsidisation for the poor households should also be established. It is evident 
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from the findings of this research that communities are not aware of other 
methods of subsidisation that exist. Other methods are likely to be accessed 
by well-off communities as they are reflected on the municipal Internet 
website rather than through distributed hard copies.28 
 
The LSM data, including employment status, income and expenditure within 
sampled households, revealed that more than two-thirds of these households 
are living below the poverty line. According to the city of Johannesburg’s 
social package, most of these households would qualify for 6 kl of water free 
to all, 50 kW of electricity free to all, no assessment rates charged on 
properties valued less than R20 001 and free sanitation and refuse removal. 
Even the highest average income for the households that are classified in this 
study as well-off, which is between R1 641,67 and R2 658,33, seem to be 
relatively worse-off and this therefore leads to the conclusions that more than 
two-thirds of the surveyed communities qualify for indigent services. There 
is, however, a contrast between household incomes and ownership of LSM 
utilities by these households like refrigerators, televisions and heaters, which 
are possessions of middle-income households (SAARF, 2001). Other 
household characteristics like number of rooms, which range between three 
and seven, suggest a much higher living standard than was reported. This 
contrast confirms the low reliability associated with the self-reported income 
and employment data that are collected through surveys (Meyer and 
Sullivan, 2003). The difficulty of revealing both public goods affordability and 
preferences by households is embedded in communities’ attitudes of 
entitlement to municipal services and a lack of the sense of ‘citizenship’, 
which was raised by Smith and Vawda (2003). Reversing this culture will 
require a customer approach that engages communities in their responsibility 
                                                
28 According to the city of Johannesburg, a R355m social package was announced by the 
Executive Mayor on 30 May 2002 which includes 6 kl of water free to all, 50 kW of 
electricity free to all, no assessment rates charged on properties valued less than R20 001 
and free sanitation and refuse removal to particular vulnerable groups who register. 
Available at: http://www.joburg.org.za/help/subsidy.stm#benefit 
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and ownership of the municipality and its processes.29 Reporting high or 
actual household income may suggest ability to pay and, as demonstrated in 
the public choice theories, all persons enjoy free-riding and are therefore not 
prepared to pay for public goods since non-payment does not necessarily lead 
to exclusion from consumption (Cullis and Jones, 1998). Although the 
majority of surveyed households are revealed to be poor, they believe that 
basic services like water, refuse removal and sewerage system charges, with 
the exception of electricity, are affordable. This reported affordability of the 
service charges is regardless of the group discussion outcomes of the self-
reported non-payment for the services and knowledge of non-payment by 
most households. Whereas electricity provision by Eskom to the Soweto 
community and City Power to other suburban areas may explain perceptions 
about the unaffordability of electricity, it can be concluded that non-payment 
of the other services could be the result of an unwillingness to pay. 
 
There are contrasts in views about the payment of municipal services, the 
unwillingness expressed through the focus groups and willingness expressed 
in the survey. The expressed unwillingness is partially due to the 
unhappiness with the non-reading of service meters, which translates to 
aggregate rather than actual service consumption payments. The expressed 
willingness seems not to be followed by actions of payment. More than two-
thirds expect free services as promised by government, believe government 
should render free services and, if charged, prefer a standard fee on services 
for all. The Social Package, which is described above, stipulates the qualifiers 
of indigent services. Non-payment for services thus represents refusal to pay 
rather than inability to pay.30 The availability of the poor or indigent when 
                                                
29 Brian Nakedi made the remarks about entitlement as he presented his paper ‘Democratic 
participation in local governance’ presented at the workshop on 10 years of democracy: 
Lessons from the field, which was hosted by IDASA on 15 June 2004 at Ouraadsal-
Pretoria. Leila Smith who is the Director at CMU in the city of Johannesburg also made 
these remarks. 
30 Cf. footnote 23 for the exemption of payment of services by poor households. 
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meters are read does not provide clarification on wrongful billing of the 
wealthier suburbs like Sandton as indigent. It can be concluded here that 
central to the measure of ability to pay for municipal services is the 
communication of the Social Package and the actual classification of all 
households in order to determine the actual defaulters. 
 
7.1.4 Community satisfaction with the rendered services 
As stated by Corrigan et al. (1999), it is important to understand that 
municipalities by themselves cannot create satisfactory quality of life but 
they can create favourable circumstances for this to happen. Satisfaction with 
the municipality by the communities should therefore be viewed in this light 
and the assessment of satisfaction with the municipality should not be based 
on the outcomes of indirect circumstances. From this research, general 
satisfaction with the municipal provision since 1994 by all the researched 
communities was reported, specifically with garbage collection and the 
efficiency with which the water problems are handled. The well-off 
townships, however, perceive the water, electricity supply and refuse removal 
services to have deteriorated over time. Much of poor service provision is 
blamed by communities on councillors’ inexperience and to some extent their 
lack of interest in advancing their represented communities. The South 
African Local Government Association (SALGA) has, however, provided much 
of the required councillor training over the years although the outcomes of 
these training workshops in terms of strengthened municipal performance is 
undocumented. Dissatisfaction is higher where communities see the 
municipality to be non-responsive to the community’s immediate pressing 
needs and problems. Discussions with communities led to conclusions that 
non-responsiveness to matters that affect townships is due to councillors’ and 
senior officials’ lack of concern for the needs of the historically black 
townships as most of the municipal finances are received from the well-off 
suburban areas. 
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Where some levels of dissatisfaction are expressed, these relate to the newly 
established regional offices, which seem to have provided relief and enabling 
communities to deal with the municipality on a face-to-face basis. The 
dissatisfaction with the functionality of these offices, however, is because 
they are used in the main for recording information and problems and 
making referrals rather than taking decisions to effect immediate service 
delivery. Communities are also dissatisfied to find out that there are huge 
and inexplicable disparities in service charge statements among households 
in the same vicinity. Households easily find out these disparities when they 
do service charges comparisons, which are reported to be common. There is 
also evidence that households in well-off suburban areas like Sandton also 
receive free services and are classified as indigent or poor and such reports 
infuriate the worse-off townships. These incorrect household classifications 
suggest serious problems with the services billing system as articulated in 
Gumbo et al. (2002). 
 
The findings reveal the well-off households’ satisfaction with municipal 
services to be influenced by municipal services pricing. For the worse-off, the 
quality and efficiency of delivery is what matters. Whereas the majority of 
the worse-off believe that they were promised free services, the majority of 
the well-off believe the contrary. It can be concluded that poor communities 
literally interpret the political election campaigns about municipal services to 
mean absolute non-payment, whereas the well-off understand that 
municipalities still have to collect some funds to sustain service provision. 
The free services campaigns can therefore be deemed to have been misleading 
to the worse-off communities. Although there are disappointments about 
service delivery, the majority of the communities indicated that they may 
never resort to boycotting the payment of municipal services or municipal 
activities. Despite their sentiments, the same communities have huge 
municipal services debt. It can be concluded that although communities 
articulate a preference for payment of municipal services, their actions depict 
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both the free-riding and dependency tendencies, knowing that the 
municipality is less likely to take action against non-payment. 
 
To attain community satisfaction, proper internal and external municipal 
systems need to be in place. These systems include well documented and 
understood policies or by-laws, well motivated and happy employees and a 
good community liaison or communications strategy. On the one hand, high 
service provision standards need to be fostered, including staff competency, 
training and effective management systems, which were found lacking at the 
proxy municipality of Govan Mbeki. On the other hand, addressing the 
problem of staff shortages and salary disparities that were inherited in the 
previous TMLCs is central in effecting employee satisfaction. By the same 
token, well mobilised communities for participation in municipal activities 
create a better understanding of municipal processes and problems, and the 
outcome is a better satisfaction level. 
 
7.2 Conclusions on municipal services providers 
Whereas the service provider interviews were conducted in Mpumalanga and 
KwaZulu-Natal, additional telephone interviews with service provision 
experts for Soweto agreed that municipal challenges throughout the country 
are generally the same since they operate within relatively new policy 
frameworks. It is acknowledged, however, that metropolitan municipalities 
and specifically the city of Johannesburg face some unique challenges too. 
These municipalities are more proficient at addressing general service 
delivery problems, they have better skills, they have the capacity for delivery 
and collaborate better with private institutions for accessing funds or 
addressing their problems than do the smaller and rural municipalities. 
Sections that follow provide conclusions on the two research questions that 
pertain to the service providers. 
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7.2.1 Municipal methods of services identification and prioritisation 
Section 73 of the Systems Act requires a municipality to give priority to the 
basic needs of local communities and to ensure that all members have access 
to at least the basic municipal services. Such services should be equitable and 
accessible and provided with economic efficient and effective use of available 
resources. Cullis and Jones (1998) talk of the need to identify and understand 
the needs of communities before engaging in services delivery in order to 
attain a satisfied customer base. The attainment of this requires rigorous 
research activities, which were found lacking in both the city of 
Johannesburg and proxy municipalities. 
 
It can be concluded from the findings of this research that the city of 
Johannesburg uses the following methodology in identifying and prioritising 
the delivery of basic municipal services: 
 
a. The city is currently addressing the service backlog that was carried 
over from the TMLC system and the backlog that is accumulating due 
to the rapid population growth within the city. The municipality’s 
main aim is the reduction of this backlog and for this purpose, the 
municipality does not necessarily seem to need immediate and 
thorough consultation with communities on these already identified 
and well documented backlogs. The same conclusions were echoed by 
Project Consolidate facilitators (supplementary interviews) who have 
realised that more emphasis is on the attainment of services quantity 
targets and that, like any other municipality, the city struggles in 
achieving service quality targets. 
 
b. For all services other than the backlog, the municipality makes 
provision on a need basis and also on the services’ nature and urgency. 
Some of these services relate specifically to upgrading the aging 
electricity and water supply systems and the demand for these 
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supplies in newly established residential areas. City Power, however, 
seems not to cope with this new demand, especially on the West Rand 
where outages have became a daily occurrence. 
 
The municipality acknowledges that due to high population growth after 
1994 and due to a need for uniformity in service delivery in all suburban 
areas, service levels may have deteriorated during the transitional phase. 
The deterioration of service standards in the townships is also compounded 
by the movement out of the townships by the middle class households. The 
city expects service levels to pick up once again in the interim phase, 
described to be the period after the second local government elections. 
 
The lack of municipal capital, which is exacerbated by the accumulating 
municipal service debt, is making it difficult for the city of Johannesburg to 
render free basic services to all. The debt and poor service charges collection 
is partly due to the dysfunctional billing system, which categorises some well-
off suburban areas and households as poor and in need of ‘free basic service’ 
and some poor households as well-off. It seems that the reintroduction of 
privatisation in the city of Johannesburg since 1922 and the installation of 
prepaid service meters were partly aimed at overcoming the debt and non-
payment problems. Although the concessions of municipal services are legal 
and also a ‘strategic decision’, this possible solution to the debt and non-
payment problem has social consequences like disconnection of electricity to 
the poor in the absence of good databases for indigent households. The only 
comfort is that the municipality remains responsible for service pricing, 
although there is currently no evidence that adherence to section 74c(i) of the 
Systems Act is enforced, which requires that only the operating and 
maintenance costs should be recovered from poor households. Population 
growth, backlogs and poor finance recovery may be acceptable justification for 
the current poor service provision. Poor publicity of these facts and the 
municipal plans to rectify these, however, have tarnished the image of the 
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municipality, leading to negative perceptions and conclusions regarding the 
current service provision system. 
 
From the proxy municipality of Govan Mbeki, role confusion between the 
political and administrative offices was revealed to affect the efficiency in 
service delivery. Roles, responsibilities and process maps which are not 
clearly defined for identifying services, reporting community concerns and 
executing council resolutions lead to the dysfunctional municipal 
management structures. The functions of the political committees are often 
largely undefined and the lack of by-laws to guide roles and responsibilities of 
especially ward councillors and to guide decision-making processes is a 
serious problem. Councillors through the Portfolio Committees are seen to 
exert a lot of delivery pressure on administrators while perceived to have 
little knowledge of the functionality of service departments. 
 
7.2.2 Municipal perception of quality of services provided and application of 
quality management standards 
In terms of section 38 of the Systems Act, a municipality must establish a 
performance management system that is in line with its priorities, objectives, 
indicators and targets contained in its IDP. Mechanisms for monitoring and 
reviewing outcomes and impact of the system and set targets should be 
carried out at least once a year. In section 42, communities are required to be 
involved in the development, implementation and review of not only the IDP, 
but the performance management systems as well. The interviewed 
communities attend the general municipal ward committee gatherings and do 
not have any idea of IDPs or municipal performance management systems. 
 
Since its establishment of services utilities, the city of Johannesburg has not 
as yet finalised its service provision performance systems. Thus, the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the service utilities are currently unknown. 
Efficiency is described by Cockayen et al. (1999) as the quantity and quality 
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in service provision and effectiveness as the final outcome in comparison to 
alternative systems (cf. chapter two). For utilities to be regarded both 
effective and efficient, their contracts with the city of Johannesburg have to 
reflect fair, equitable, transparent, cost-effective and competitive delivery 
targets. Discussions with the CMU reveals that in the absence of 
performance contracts, the utilities are expected to prepare annual business 
plans, which outline tentative KPIs against which the CMU and the 
municipal council can evaluate their performance. Performance indicators 
were, however, expected to be finalised before the beginning of 2005. 
 
7.3 General conclusions 
Local government is an enormously significant sphere of government and has 
been given the attention it deserves, including incremental national funding 
from R45.8 billion in 1996/7 to R86 billion in 2003/4, which is an increase of 
between 7% and 15.3%.31 There has, however, been a series of other problems 
like community protests against firstly the disestablishment of cross-border 
municipalities and their reincorporation into various provinces, and secondly 
against the lack of or poor service delivery by municipalities, especially in the 
townships of the Free State, Western Cape and Mpumalanga. In his 
parliamentary opening address of 2005, President Thabo Mbeki remarked 
about the importance of local government as an instrument for fighting 
poverty by delivering the basic services to poor communities: 
 
Last December we passed the 10-million mark in terms of South 
Africans who have gained access to potable water since 1994. Free basic 
water of 6 kilolitres per household per month is now being provided to 
about three-quarters of households in the areas of our country that have 
the infrastructure to supply potable water. Project Consolidate of the 
                                                
31 Information is reflected on Budget Trends given by the National Treasury of the Republic 
of South Africa in the report called Trends in Intergovernmental Finances: 2000/01-2006/7. 
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Department of Provincial and Local Government will further increase 
the capacity of the municipalities to improve our performance. Our social 
sector programme for the coming year will include the intensification of 
the programmes we identified last year, to meet our long-term objectives 
such as the provision of clean running water to all households by 2008, 
decent and safe sanitation by 2010 and electricity for all by 2012.32 
 
The President admitted that there were serious failures brought about by the 
lack of capacity in government, but that government would in the course of 
2005 complete discussions with Eskom, the provincial governments and local 
municipalities to ensure that free basic electricity is provided to all with the 
minimum delay, and that municipal capacity is improved to ensure that the 
target of providing sanitation to 300 000 households per year is met as from 
2007. 
 
On the 29th of October 2004, the Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government, Mr Mufamadi launched the above-mentioned Project 
Consolidate, which is defined to be “a practical hands-on programme of 
support to municipalities”.33 In his address, the Minister indicated that 
“…We announced a range of measures aimed at revitalizing local government 
because our municipalities are best positioned to address the daily needs and 
challenges of our people…”. The basic understanding is that the policy 
framework is sufficient and thus the principal purpose of Project Consolidate 
would be to deepen the thrust and impact of existing policies and 
development programmes, accelerate the removal of service delivery backlogs 
and facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of government’s 
programmes on social and economic transformation. The focus will be 136 
                                                
32 Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the second joint sitting of the 
third democratic Parliament in Cape Town, 11 February 2005. 
33 Press statement on the occasion of the launch of Project Consolidate, which is a hands-on 
programme of support for local government, 29 October 2004. 
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municipalities that were identified to require targeted additional support. 
The primary aim of the targeted hands-on engagement programme will be 
areas requiring immediate and direct action. Teams will be deployed to work 
at municipal level to assist in addressing practical issues of service delivery 
and local governance, specific in areas like: 
 
• Public participation, ward committees and community development 
workers 
• Indigent policy, free basic services, billing systems and municipal 
debt 
• Expanded public works programme, municipal infrastructure grant 
and local economic development 
• Performance management framework, indices and communication34 
 
The task team will be made up of development professionals and specialists 
deployed in this two-year engagement programme that brings together the 
national and provincial government and other key partners in the private 
sector and parastatals, to find new, creative, practical and impact-orientated 
modes of engaging, supporting and working with local government.35 
 
Although more than half of the country’s municipalities, including the city of 
Johannesburg, are not part of Project Consolidate, this does not necessarily 
suggest that the excluded municipalities do not require support. To the 
contrary, excluded municipalities do also require additional support, 
although perhaps not to the same extent as the identified municipalities. As 
revealed in chapters five and six of this research, the city of Johannesburg too 
still faces many challenges regarding service delivery, service performance 
standards, the billing system and ensuring community participation. 
                                                
34 Ibid 
35 Press release statement by the Minister of Provincial and Local Government on the 
Launch of Project Consolidate on 1 April 2005 
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7.4 Recommendations 
 
7.4.1 How gaps in the service provision and community participation system 
could be addressed 
In order to overcome the perceptions of the municipal services level 
disparities that are formed on the basis of black townships versus white 
suburbs, the municipality should address uniformity in service provision to 
all suburbs. Currently, Eskom provides electricity to Soweto while City 
Power provides electricity to all other suburban areas and this causes 
suspicion among township communities. 
 
A single tax base system for all of Johannesburg, as was recommended by the 
Soweto Commission, now exists (PLANACT, 1998). Although this expands 
the revenue base for redress in Soweto, the city of Johannesburg still faces 
numerous challenges regarding its billing system. In order for the 
municipality to overcome its debt and service charges collection problems, it 
will be important that it immediately institute mechanisms to rectify the 
faults associated with the billing system. Since one of the focuses of Project 
Consolidate is helping municipalities with their billing systems, it would be 
necessary for the Project Consolidate team to identify municipalities other 
than the 136 that have deficiencies and require possible assistance. The city 
of Johannesburg is one of those municipalities that may benefit from 
assistance with its billing system. Central to the billing system is the 
identification and categorisation of poor households that qualify for indigent 
services provision. Without a proper municipal database for the classification 
of households according to their ability to pay for municipal services, the debt 
problem is likely to remain. The problem of revealing community ability to 
pay for municipal services is compounded by the community’s unwillingness 
to be classified as able to pay, as this raises fears of incremental service 
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charges. There is therefore a need for the municipality to explore alternative 
methodologies for revealing household preferences of the municipal basic 
services and of ability to pay. At the same time, there is also a need for 
dedicated service meter readers to overcome the problems associated with 
aggregated service charges, which are not a true reflection of municipal 
services consumption. The activities of the already contracted service meter 
readers who pinpoint dates on which service consumption will be read in all 
municipal wards require monitoring at all times. 
 
The municipal ward committees are a relatively new governance institution 
in South Africa. In some municipalities, these are not as yet established. In 
his parliamentary opening address, the President remarked that 85% of ward 
committees were established. This suggests that some communities are not 
exposed to the activities of the ward committees and that even functional 
ward committees may also not be very experienced. The same can be said 
about ward councillors with regard to their responsibilities for ward 
committee activities. It is important that the municipality take the training 
further than the empowerment of ward councillors to training other ward 
committee participants. The empowerment process could impart useful skills 
to the community structures, thus overcoming the prevalence of poor ward 
committee attendance and effecting better community and municipal service 
co-ordination and management. 
 
The current roles and responsibilities of the municipal regional 
administrative or service centres seem to comprise menial activities like 
capturing community service concerns relating to municipal basic services 
like water, waste and electricity. The interaction between the ward 
committees and the regional service centres seem to be undefined. 
Discussions with the former Mpumalanga MEC for Local Government and 
Traffic Safety revealed that if empowered, the regional services centres could 
play a meaningful role in their interaction with ward committees regarding 
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service provision. The current reporting lines between ward committees and 
municipal administration do not influence communication with and directly 
to regional services centres by ward committees. Even in the presence of 
functioning ward committees, the lack of direct contact between communities 
and the regional administrative centres, which are responsible for services 
delivery, renders the ward committees powerless and regional service centres 
inefficient. The directing of urgent service management and delivery matters 
from ward committees to the municipal council through the municipal 
speaker rather than seeking timely resolutions result in huge service delivery 
backlogs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Alternative municipal service delivery models 
 
Decisions regarding service rendering seem to be one-way traffic, that is, 
dictated from the political wing of the municipality through portfolio 
committees to the administrative wing. It is for this same reason that 
municipal councillors, especially those that sit on portfolio committees, are 
perceived to be interfering with service delivery systems. The broken lines in 
the above figure depict the missing link, whose enforcement could result a 
different service delivery perspective. The redefinition of roles of regional 
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services centres, including communication and liaison between the centres 
and ward committees, could enable speedy service delivery and provision of 
immediate solutions to community queries and complaints. 
 
Municipal administrative staff, especially the services personnel, are the 
‘face’ of the institution. Their behaviour and treatment of community 
members is a reflection of the image of the municipality. The proxy 
municipality of Govan Mbeki revealed that some of the complaints that 
communities raise relate to the treatment that they receive both from service 
officers and from other frontline staff. A possible solution to the image 
tarnishing behaviour by municipal staff is their exposure to or training in the 
Batho Pele principles to foster amongst them a culture of good customer 
relations. Since the city of Johannesburg came into being through the 
amalgamation of various TMLCs, it is possible that the municipalities 
brought together varying organisational cultures and norms and these need 
to be harmonised through training workshops etc. 
 
7.4.2 Recommendations for policy purposes 
The findings of this research, especially from the benchmark municipality of 
Govan Mbeki, suggest that roles and responsibilities between the political 
and administrative offices are either confused or not clearly defined. Without 
a clear definition of roles and responsibilities of significant municipal 
structures like the portfolio committee, the likelihood is that services 
managers will remain under dual reporting systems and thus continue to be 
frustrated. There is therefore a need for by-laws that clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of individuals who sit on committees that bring together both 
the political and administrative wings of the municipality. 
 
The usage of two different providers of the same municipal service in one 
municipality has serious consequences relating to differences in service 
efficiency and effectiveness and possibly service charges. The city of 
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Johannesburg is currently making use of two electricity providers, which are 
Eskom and City Power. The problem is not only that there are differences 
between the two service providing entities; but the communities that are 
served are historically divided as white and black suburban areas. The city of 
Johannesburg therefore should enact a policy to enforce uniformity of service 
provision throughout the municipal suburbs; alternatively, the need for this 
disparity should be outlined, including its possible benefits to the residents. 
 
At present, numerous households are dissatisfied with service estimations, 
which either indicate excessively high charges that do not reflect household 
consumption or low charges that rob the municipal coffers. The use of 
aggregates when it comes to municipal services does not benefit either the 
communities or the municipality and this way of doing things should thus be 
reviewed. A policy is required that will enforce meter reading, either by 
contractors or by households themselves. 
 
7.4.3 Further research 
Areas where further research is required are as follows: 
 
a. The privatisation of municipal services or installation of prepaid 
meters: There is currently no empirical research to suggest that the 
privatisation of the basic municipal services or installations of prepaid 
services meters in the city of Johannesburg have led to better access of 
the basic services by many and improved efficiency in service provision 
or in payments. Eskom supplies prepaid electricity to nearly 300 000 
households as stated by Sindane (undated). The APF (2003) argued 
against prepaid meters and said that they had no consideration for the 
poor. At the same time, the Social Package has been revealed, which 
seems to take care of the poor. How the two balancing acts affect the 
state of access to the basic services remains unknown. 
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b. Now that almost 80% of ward committees have been established 
throughout the country, there is a need for research to establish their 
functionality, including those in Soweto. A study on the functionality of 
ward committees by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in 2004 
revealed that 67% of surveyed ward councillors and other stakeholders 
believed that ward committees had no delegated powers and 60% did 
not hold meetings. Research into this area would enable ward 
committees to learn from each other’s experiences, but also enable the 
identification of areas where interventions are required. 
 
c. It can be concluded from the findings of this study that it is relatively 
easy to identify community preferences for municipal services (cf. 
chapter five). From both the public choice theory and also from the 
findings of this research, it becomes evident, however, that revealing 
ability to pay by individual households is a bit more difficult. There is 
a need therefore for new socio-economic methodologies for exploring 
the various ways in which households’ actual ability to pay may be 
revealed. The use of consumption as propagated by Meyer and Sullivan 
(2003) would be a better start, provided that household consumption 
could easily be quantified and converted into monetary value. 
 
d. In the previous decade, numerous organisations which included 
SALGA and IDASA provided training to municipalities on councillor 
functions and responsibilities, performance management systems and 
IDPs, etc. However, problems relating to councillors’ inefficiencies and 
their improper interference in the administrative activities, 
inefficiency in community needs identification and poor monitoring 
and evaluation continue to be heard. There is currently no empirical 
evidence to correlate provided interventions with current performance 
or simply the effects or outcomes of these interventions. 
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Appendix 1: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Household Survey Instrument for the_ Local Government Service 
Provision and non-payment within Underdeveloped Communities 
of the Johannesburg Unicity: Consumers' Perspective. 
 
To be filled by fieldworker 
 
Questionnaire Number 
 
   
 
a). Municipal region  b). Township (e.g. Meadowlands Zone 2) 
Region 6 
Region 10 
1 
2 
  
…………………………………………………. 
 
 
Household information 
 
Household 
schedule 
Write in from 
oldest (top) to 
youngest (bottom) 
Age in 
complete 
years 
Gender 
M=1  F=2 
Relationship 
01    
02    
03    
04    
05    
06    
07    
08    
09    
10    
11    
Please list all 
persons in the 
household who 
eat and reside 
in the same 
household from 
the past 30 
days 
12    
 12+ Yes No    
 
Select a responsible respondent in the household, preferably a parent, “head” or in their 
absence, any adult of the household over 16 years of age 
 
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
1. Gender 
 
Male 1 
Female 2 
 
2. Age of respondent in complete years 
 
 
 
Years 
 
3. What is the highest education level that you ever completed? 
 
No schooling 00  Grade9/Standard7/Form2 10 
Grade 0 01  Grade10/Standard8/Form3 11 
Sub A/Grade1 02  Grade 11 / Standard 9 / Form 4 12 
Sub B/Grade2 03  Grade 12 / Standard 10 / Matric 13 
Grade 3/Standard 1 04  Diploma/Certificate with less 14 
Grade 4/Standard 2 05  than Grade 12 / std 10 15 
Grade 5/Standard 3 06  Diploma/Certificate with Grade 12 / std 10 16 
Grade 6/Standard 4 07  Degree 17 
Grade 7/ Standard5 08  Postgraduate degree 18 
Grade8/Standard6 09  Other, specify………………………………. 19 
 
4. What is your home language? 
 
Sesotho 01  Xitsonga 07 
Setswana 02  IsiZulu 08 
Sepedi 03  Tshivenda 09 
Siswati 04  Afrikaans 10 
IsiNdevele 05  English 11 
IsiXhosa 06  Other, specify………………………………. 12 
 
UNDERSTANDING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS 
 
5-7. What do you think are the three main functions of 
municipality? (Do not read options) 
 
The delivery of and/or maintenance of…  
Water 1 
Electricity 2 
Sanitation/Sewerage 3 
Refuse removal 4 
Health 5 
Parks 6 
Other, specify………………………………….. 7 
Do not know 8 
 
8. What is the name of your municipality? Please provide a municipal 
name. 
 
Municipality known 
Municipality unknown 
1 
2 
 
  App 2
 
9. In which municipal region do you belong? Please provide a region name. 
 
Municipality region known 
Municipality region unknown 
1 
2 
 
10. Who is your ward councillor? Please provide a name 
 
Councillor known 
Councillor unknown 
1 
2 
 
11-12. Which two of the following activities do you think your municipality 
should be focusing most of its attention? (read list) 
 
 Priority 1 Priority 2 
1. Consulting communities 1 2 
2. Improving service quality 1 2 
3. Dealing with corrupt officials 1 2 
4. Creating employment 1 2 
5. Meeting community expectations 1 2 
6. Providing free services 1 2 
7. Combating crime 1 2 
 
 
PARTICIPATION 
 
13. Do you attend ward committee meetings? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 If No, skip question 14 
 
14. When do you attend ward committee meetings held in your are? 
 
Every time it is held 1 
Once in a while 2 
On need basis (when I require certain information) 3 
Can not remember 4 
 
15. How easy or difficult do you think it is for people like you to 
influence municipal decisions? 
 
Very easy Easy Neither Difficult Very difficult Do not know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
16. Do you know where your municipal offices are located? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
17-20. How well do you think your municipality…? 
 
 … Respond to 
your needs 
Respond to 
enquiries 
Consult on 
matters affecting 
communities 
Respond to 
community 
feedback 
Very well 1 1 1 1 
Quite well 2 2 2 2 
Neither well nor badly 3 3 3 3 
Quite badly 4 4 4 4 
Very badly 5 5 5 5 
Do not know 6 6 6 6 
 
 
21-24. When last did you…? 
 
 … Visit municipal 
offices 
Communicat
e with ward 
councillor/s 
Paid your 
municipal 
levy? 
Attend a ward 
committee 
meeting 
In the last 3 week 1 1 1 1 
In the last 3 month 2 2 2 2 
In the last 5 months 3 3 3 3 
In 6 months + 4 4 4 4 
I have never 5 5 5 5 
I can not remember 6 6 6 6 
 
25-26. How does your municipality mainly communicate with you? 
 
Through… (one response) Language of communication (one response) 
Regular mass meetings 1 my mother tongue 1 
Committee meetings 2 my second language (which I clearly 
understand) 
2 
News letters 3 a third language (which I hardly 
understand) 
3 
Community radio 4 a language I do not understand at all 4 
They do not communicate with 
me at all 
5   
Other specify…………………….. 6   
 
27-29. How accessible is…? 
 … Municipal 
information 
Municipal 
councillors 
Municipal 
offices 
Very inaccessible 1 1 1 
Inaccessible 2 2 2 
Neither accessible nor inaccessible 3 3 3 
Accessible 4 4 4 
Very accessible 5 5 5 
Do not know/uncertain 6 6 6 
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30. Do you intend voting in the next municipal elections? 
 
Definitely yes 
Possibly yes 
Possibly no 
Definitely not 
Do not know/Undecided 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
31. If not intending to vote, which factors do you think are influencing your decision 
not to vote? (do not read options) 
 
Too young to vote 1 
Not interested 2 
Not registered as a voter 3 
Disillusioned with politics 4 
Poling stations too far 5 
Other specify……………………… 6 
 
32. Which one of the following factors would most likely motivate you to participate 
in municipal activities? 
 
Loyalty to a political party 1 
A feeling of duty or obligation 2 
An improvement in the delivery of services 3 
More honesty amongst politicians 4 
More evidence of commitment to my area 5 
 
 
SERVICES DELIVERY 
 
33. After 2000 local government elections, how well do you think your 
municipality has performed? 
 
Very well Well Neither Bad Very badly Do not know enough about it 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
34. Which three services do you think are most important to be rendered 
in your locality? 
 
Water 1 
Electricity 2 
Sanitation/sewerage 3 
Refuse removal 4 
Health 5 
Combating crime 6 
Other (specify)………………………………………………………. 8 
Do not know 9 
 
35. Do you think that the living conditions in your community will improve or 
get worse within 5 years from now? 
 
Strongly 
improve 
Improve Remain the 
same 
Worsen Strongly worsen Do not know 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
36-41. How well would you say that your municipality is handling the 
following matters? 
 
 Very 
well 
Well Neither Badly Very 
badly 
Don’t 
know 
Water supply  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Electricity 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Refuse removal 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sewerage system 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Health services 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
42-45. How affordable do you think the following services are to your household? 
 
 Very 
affordable 
Affordable Neither Expensive Very 
expensive 
Water supply  1 2 3 4 5 
Electricity 1 2 3 4 5 
Refuse removal 1 2 3 4 5 
Sewerage system 1 2 3 4 5 
 
46-49. Between government and private sector, of the following basic services, 
which would you prefer provided by what sector? 
 
 Private 
sector 
Government Either Not sure 
Water supply  1 2 3 4 
Electricity 1 2 3 4 
Refuse removal 1 2 3 4 
Sewerage system 1 2 3 4 
Combating of crime 1 2 3 4 
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PAYMENT AND NON-PAYMENT OF SERVICES 
 
50-57. Indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following statements. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disa
gree 
Neit
her 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Don’t 
know 
I am not prepared to pay for 
municipal services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I am too poor to pay for 
municipal services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Where people do not pay, 
nothing happens to them 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Government has promised us 
free services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Everyone should pay for his 
service consumption 
irrespective of poverty level 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Government should not render 
free services to all 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
A standard fee on services 
should be levied to all people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Only the rich should pay 
municipal services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
58-61. When would you decide not to pay your municipal services 
 
Indicate your agreement or 
disagreement… 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disa
gree 
Neit
her 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
Don’t 
know 
When and if the levies are too 
high 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
If other community members 
are not paying 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
When the quality of services 
rendered is too low 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
If delivery is frequently 
interrupted 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
62-69. How much trust do you have in the following institutions in your area at present? 
 
 Strong 
trust 
Trust Neither Distrust Strong 
distrust 
Don’t 
know 
The police 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Municipal councillors  2 3 4 5 6 
The media (newspaper, radio & 
TV) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Municipality/local government 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Political parties 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The church 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Other community members 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
70-74. Indicate your agreement or disagreement. 
 
If you were dissatisfied 
with municipal actions, 
would you resort to…? 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree Strongly 
agree 
Do not 
know 
Strike action 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Refer matter to the courts 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Boycott payment of services 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Boycott municipal meetings 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Refer matters to public 
protector 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
 
75 What is the total number of rooms in the dwelling that your household 
occupies? (excluding bathrooms and toilets) 
 
 
76. Which one of the following is the most often used source of drinking water in this 
household? 
 
Piped tap water in the house 1  Borehole on site 4 
Piped tap water in the yard 2  Rainwater tank 5 
Public tap 3  Other (specify) 6 
 
77. What type of working telephone does your house have? 
 
Cell phone 1  Both land line & cell phone 3 
Land line 2  Non phone in the household 4 
 
78-.91. Which of the following working items, do you have in the household? (read all 
options) 
 
 Have Do not 
have 
  Have Do not 
have 
Fridge 1 2  Washing machine 1 2 
Vacuum cleaner 1 2  Coal stove 1 2 
Television 1 2  Electric stove 1 2 
Hi-fi or music centre 1 2  Computer 1 2 
Radio 1 2  Heater/Air conditioner 1 2 
Geyser 1 2  Other (specify)………. 1 2 
Microwave 1 2     
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92. What type of toilet does the household use? 
 
Flush toilet outside the house 1 A pit latrine 3 
Flush toilet inside house 2 Bucket system 4 
 
 
RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
93. What is your current employment status (tick one option) 
 
Unemployed, not looking for  work 1 Self-employed (full-time) 6 
Unemployed, looking for work 2 Self-employed (part-time) 7 
Pensioner (aged or retired) 3 Employed full-time 8 
Housewife, not working 4 Employed-part time 9 
Student 5 Other (specify)……………. 10 
 
94. How many other people in the household, apart from yourself are employed or self-
employed and earn a salary? 
 
 
 
 
95-97. What are three main accounts that you are paying monthly at the moment? 
 
House bond 1 Student fees 4 
Car instalments 2 Supporting a 2nd/ rural family 5 
Furniture accounts 3 Insurances/personal policies 6 
Other (specify)…………………………………………………………………. 7 
 
98. What amount, in general estimates do you think goes into monthly accounts in this 
household? 
 
R………………………… 
(Don’t know = 999) 
 
99. Please indicate firstly, your own monthly income followed by the household MONTHLY 
INCOME (including all sources like pension, government grants and investments) 
 
 Personal Household 
No income 1 1 
R1             - R500 2 2 
R501         - R750 3 3 
R751         - R1 000 4 4 
R1 001      - R1 500 5 5 
R1 501      - R2 000 6 6 
R2 001      - R3 000 7 7 
R3 001      - R5 000 8 8 
R5 001      - R7 500 9 9 
R7 501      - R10 000 10 10 
R10 001         - R15 000 11 11 
R15 001         - R20 000 12 12 
R20 001         - R29 999 13 13 
R30 000+ 14 14 
Refuse to answer 15 15 
Do not know 16 16 
 
 
100. What monthly income level do you consider to be minimal for your household, i.e., 
your household could not make ends meet with less? 
 
R………………………… 
(Don’t know = 999) 
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26 April 2003 
 
 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern/ 
Soweto Community Member 
 
 
 
 
PERMISSION FOR FIELD INTERVIEWS 
 
 
This letter serves to notify you that these individuals who are seeking interviews 
with you or your household, do so in their professional capacity as field researchers 
of the project “Local Government Service Provision and non-payment within 
Underdeveloped Communities of the Johannesburg Unicity: Service Providers’ and 
Consumers' Perspective”. The study, as reflected in its title has two phases and 
looks at the possible gaps, between government and communities that may be 
overlooked regarding service provision, community participation, satisfaction and 
payment. 
 
When and if selected to participate, please do so, as your participation is highly 
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Appendix 3: SAMPLE FOCUS GROUP TRANSCRIPT 
 
Meadowlands Zone 6 (5 participants) 
Date: 24 January 2004 
 
Interviewer: What I am really about is the issue of local government service 
delivery in the city of Johannesburg. Looking prior to 1994 people did 
not participate in local government elections and there were cases of 
rent boycott and non-payment of municipal services. The one question 
that I would like to ask you is: when you look at the city of 
Johannesburg, what is it that you can say about service delivery? 
Respondent 1: Ok, right I will tell you. Service delivery is very-very poor. First 
point, if the window breaks now you have to pay or once there is blocked 
sewerage, you go to the municipality and report it and they appoint a 
contractor to come and only un-block it after you have paid him R150 to 
R200. Now you come to doors, we used not to buy our own doors to pay 
rent and like in a flat, the landlord fixes all the problems once you 
report. They just put increments from nowhere forgetting that 95% of 
the people are unemployed. Even if they are employed, most of them are 
paid low wages, poor salaries whatever it is… whereby you can’t be able 
to supporting their children, paying for water and house renovations. 
And their increments you know, they just come from nowhere, whereby. 
From the blue they just say that now we are going to increase prices of 
water and electricity. It is not that people do not attend meetings, they 
do go but people are confused. Even when there are meetings, it is not 
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that people do not want to attend meetings; it is because they do not 
know now what is good now, the old government or the new 
government. Because the old government builds free houses, not these 
low cost houses. Whereas the new government has promised free 
services, you still have to pay for it. They promised they would give you 
free service. It’s because they are no longer involved, they are 
contracting these companies, what do you call it,  
Interviewer: Are they not providing free services?  
Respondent 1: No… you see these jobs that we give them are for them to fight old 
retired women who have no money to pay for blocked sewerage. And if 
you have no money, you endure the smell until…until you pay. Often 
the blockages are not from a single house, it is an inter linkage that 
links numerous houses. But they will go to one house to demand the 
payments for the repairs. I was shocked. You can tell them that I stay 
alone and I can’t cause these blockages but they will not listen. 
Respondent 2: Our municipality is failing the people. Most of the services are not up 
to scratch. We can say the government is part and parcel of the 
structure though they do not monitor. What they said, they do not do. 
They are less concerned and the only time when they come is during 
elections. Now they want to know what is happening, “can you tell us 
what your problem is?” They go and build 10 houses and they give them 
to you in the next 10 months you go and vote and then damn, no more 
movement. You will never see them again. To be honest, services are 
very poor compared with the apartheid times. Services were cheap. Now 
they said services will be better, but services are now worse because you 
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will pay those thousands of Rands. R400 to R800 a month without 
improvement and within a year, you see they make increases forgetting 
that there are no improvements that they are making, you understand? 
When you take something in a company, a product, if it increases in 
value, it is because they increase its quality but here, it is different, the 
quality stays the same. 
Respondent 1: They only do one street when there are elections, “but you will pay”. 
They say Soweto will be like Johannesburg, no it won’t happen. There is 
no monitoring. You see, there is where the problem lies. If they were 
going to evaluate the performance of all ministers, they say we take 10-
50% of your salary away. No, they do nothing like that, instead they say 
thank you and change your office to another portfolio. What kills 
performance is that our seniors, they do not monitor. RDP houses have 
been built, but they have no value. If there were big storms or 
earthquakes, many people would die. Because it is one layer. No house 
can stand with one brick, they must be doubled.  
Interviewer: You said they are playing with elders, do you know if there are 
differences with other age groupings? 
Respondent 2: Because if we compare townships and suburbs, there is a big 
difference. In the suburbs, if a drain blocks today, by the evening it will 
be fixed. But here in the townships, it will take three to four weeks. 
After a lot of paper work, that is when it gets fixed because service is 
highly poor. Even though local government said it will provide free 
water services, no one gets free water. No one gets free water everybody 
has to pay even though they said 600 free litres. You still end up paying 
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a lot and there is no difference. There is nothing new despite promises 
of free this and free that. 
Interviewer: Let me follow up on… firstly you spoke of breaking of windows and 
doors and that the municipality does not fix. What I would like to know 
is, “are the houses still the property of the municipality or the people?” 
Respondent 2: Some of them have acquired title deeds. 
Interviewer: For those that do not have title deeds, it means that they are still the 
property of the municipality and that the municipality should take care 
of whatever goes wrong? 
Respondent 2: But they will tell you that they are in the process of issuing title 
deeds. They will tell you to fix all the problems and say the house will 
be yours ultimately. Even when they have not issue title deeds, the 
thing is that they are going to charge you rental. Like if you rent a flat, 
you pay rent; anything that breaks there, the landlord had to take care. 
Le me give you the example of the sewerage. If it rains, how much of 
the soil has been swept into the sewerage system? 
Interviewer: You spoke of the people who should pay, who can’t afford charges and 
as it is, they get charges and notice to pay from the municipality. The 
municipality has spoken of an indigent policy to say if you don’t work or 
are a retired person then you are not required to pay… what about 
that? 
Respondent 3:  The whole thing about all those policies is often meant to brainwash 
you. The government creates all those policies, nice policies but after 
that, what they say in parliament is not implemented. They don’t make 
follow up on what they say in parliament. They don’t go down and check 
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if their policies are being implemented, they just take their cars and go 
home after creating policies. I can only mention one man and it is only 
Mandela who does what he promises the people. He is developing the 
country. Who is a person in the whole country who has sacrificed more 
than Mandela, at the age of 80? Mandela complained about the RDP 
houses and said they are not conducive for human residence. They built 
a small hall and parent and children stay in one room that is very bad 
because there is no privacy. Just one wall to say this is for mommy and 
daddy would be very good. 
Interviewer: Another thing that you raised here is about difference between 
townships and the suburbs. You said if there is a blockage in the 
suburb, it gets fixed quickly. 
Respondent 1: You can write all, the blockages and traffic lights among other 
things. All those services, blockages of sewerage, it can be blocked and 
by 6pm, they won’t sleep until the white area is back to normal again. 
Never, it can’t happen, the lights must function. 
Interviewer: Now let us try to find out the answers to this. Why does it happen like 
this that if there are blockages here, they are not quickly fixed? 
Respondent 1: The problem is that most of our administrators, including politicians 
stay in the suburbs. There is no one who stays here.    These people are 
dangerous. When they travel, they use the main roads. They don’t get 
into the townships, they use main roads. 
Interviewer: Why really? Why would people move to the suburbs and not come to 
the townships? 
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Respondent 2: Ja, what happens is that they have less concern with where they 
come from. They are very happy now that they live next to Helen 
Suzman, etc. Let me tell you, I have friends who tell me that Soweto is 
very dangerous.  Where he grew up you know I was shocked by that, I 
could not believe. They say no… “Sam, you will never see me there any 
more”. They say there is very high crime. They say boys will blow you 
up. They didn’t see it before they left? 
Interviewer: Let us look at what you said. People’s attendance of municipal 
meetings. What is attendance like of these meetings? 
Respondent 4: That now…they go if they feel like because there is no gain. They 
only preach what they don’t deliver. We will do this and that for you 
and then they don’t deliver. They do their braai and from there it is 
over. You see now, they preach, but there is no delivery. 
Interviewer: But now let us look at attendance since 1994. Has it changed or are 
people attending more or less these days, these council or municipal 
meetings? 
Respondent 4: Promises, but they were not there. Mandela used to speak reality. 
But when the government pulled out, and you have the new 
government, people saw that now there is nothing here. They went and 
vote again. That is why we had historically in our voting campaigns, 
two voting days. This was done to increase the numbers. Can you see 
now, people are getting sick and tired. These kids are clever they can 
not take it. You see now, when Mandela came, things were great 
because the old man meant business and everybody understood him, 
everybody could listen, but now with this government, they don’t know 
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what they are doing. You can see how much they blame each other on 
TV the Hyfer Commission. If Mandela was there, this would not 
happen. He once said you do not wash your dirty linen in the public. 
They are just blaming each other instead of sitting down and solve the 
problems.  
Interviewer: Let’s look at that issue… when you get the statement from the 
municipality, does it indicates the number of free litres or electricity 
that have been given for free? 
Respondent 2: No, they don’t indicate. It just indicates that R300 or R500 is due by 
you. What I can tell you is that, they can write what they write but the 
thing is that when it comes to paying, there is not comparison; you pay 
what you used to pay in 9 months. 
Interviewer: When it comes to payments, when you look, are people paying? 
Respondent 3: People are paying, but most cannot afford. One will pay that R100 
and next month it will be R200 and it continues to grow. 
Interviewer: Is there anything that the municipality is doing about those who do not 
pay? 
Respondent 1:  At the moment, they went as far as to say, out of what you owe, we 
will cancel so much. But still even if they cancel, if you do not have the 
money it does not help. These people are so surprised because they were 
not used to paying this much. I remember we used to pay R40 rental. 
Now it is R400, R500 and up. And the more you pay, the more they 
charge you. If you continue to pay, they say this one can manage and 
can double the price. If they charge you R1 000 and you pay, it grows to 
R1 500 and they say you are paying for those who cannot afford. And 
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you must know, the water that we use here compared to suburbs is very 
little. We do not have swimming pools. The water here is too little you 
run it in the morning for bath and back to work and you use it again to 
cook. They can’t charge you like you like in Sandton. 
Interviewer: You make an interesting point, you say, if one is paying, next month 
charges are higher? 
Respondent 1:   Yes, you can afford. I have seen it many times. I have seen people 
charged R1 500 and it goes up to R2 000. 
Interviewer: Let’s assume it is R150 this month and I don’t pay, what will likely 
happen next month? 
Respondent 2: It will likely be R100 or remain the same. They have now sent people 
to the lawyers, to the debt collectors. If you can’t pay R150 per month, 
you end up listed by the lawyers for R15 000 sometimes. 
Interviewer: Those who have been sent to the debt collectors or lawyers, what 
happens to them? 
Respondent 4: They promise you that we will take the house. Some have many kids 
and instead of buying them food, they end up paying the lawyers. 
Interviewer: In actual fact are there houses already taken by the municipality from 
people for non-payments? 
Respondent 2: It is the lawyers who do these things but they were told that no one 
is allowed to take houses from people. They said you are increasing our 
problem if you take house from people because you expect us to build 
more houses once more. 
Respondent 3: Those councillors, most of them were previously without jobs. And 
most of them said they will stand and talk for the people but when they 
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get there, and they get these big salaries, they forget their people. 
People are run by lying councillors. They can lie to their own people. 
They know the problem your mothers have got and they still do not do 
anything. The government does not know that women and grown ups 
are signed papers of eviction from their homes. 
Interviewer: You say and always make reference to rent, but people are paying for 
services these days are they not? Was rent in the apartheid days 
inclusive of rental and service at the same time? 
Respondent 1: It included everything, water, when a window is broken you get a 
service, and they come and fix it. And when the sewerage is blocked 
they come. Now you pay your own money. If it is blocked in your yard 
and it is not caused by you, perhaps a cat or soil runs down the drain, 
such things. This means you will pay all the time to unblock sewerage. 
The contractor is charging. The municipality phones the contractor and 
the contractor comes and fix. 
Interviewer: Doesn’t the contractor charge and gets paid at the municipal offices? 
Respondent 1:  I don’t know if they are paid already, but when they come here, they 
say they want to be paid before they fix the problem. 
Interviewer: If you compare the old rent and the new one with separate service 
charges which system do you think is affordable?  
Respondent 1: The system that old ladies recommend every time they come from the 
municipal offices is the old one. They don’t support apartheid, but they 
paid less. Do I lie? We are not saying that we do not like our 
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government, we love it but things are not done as promised because 
they don’t monitor. They don’t know what is happening. 
Respondent 1:  If you could go out and check the RDP houses, you could see that 
those are not houses. The old houses were 100% better and bigger. If big 
rains come, these houses would fall. The whole furniture would be in 
water. 
Interviewer: Let me try and summarise this, you are saying that people are less 
interested in the municipality due to lack of services delivery. You say 
they come here more when elections are imminent. To make people 
more interested once more and to get them participative, what do you 
think should be done? 
Respondent 2: It is to better those services. It is every simple, you do what you said 
you will do and come back to the people. “Are you happy, are you 
satisfied?” Yes or no? They promise us streets but go and look, they 
used pure soil in their construction. You go there now with your white 
shoes and they will come out dirty. The rain is washing away all that 
work, no improvement. The old government made this road here, up to 
today, nothing. They tell us we will plan, after elections they get R4 
billion, they come and give you the figures but they don’t do anything. 
The government comes after 5 years. We have paid R200 billion in 
service and tax and some people are giving business to their brothers-
in-law. They only go to government to enrich themselves. We have now 
seen it; most people who go into political parties are just enriching 
themselves, not to work for you and me. Forget about it. Never, it is like 
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in the taxi industry, the driver does not wait to be paid by his boss; he 
steals R20 every day for the whole month. 
Respondent 2: If Mandela could see what they are doing, he would say that I didn’t 
have to suffer for 27 years for all this corruption. He said for all that we 
have sacrificed for there is no achievement. That old man tells these 
boys daily and they don’t listen. He tells them you will get caught they 
don’t listen. Where is that one who used to wear nice clothes? They call 
him Mr 4X4, he was in parliament. The only thing I can say is this; they 
should pay a certain contractor to run the streets. There is no mayor or 
councillor whatever it is and after that period, they can change. But if 
you are sending money to these structures, they don’t know what they 
are doing. 
Interviewer: Let’s go back to the one on the ones who do not have title deeds. What 
charges do they get? Is it rent or do they get service charges as well? 
Respondent 1: The next thing that they will tell you is that you are coming within 
the next group. But they can’t have 2 charges because this one will ask 
how much I paid and I say R40 and it will cause problems. Title deeds 
or no title deeds, it does not matter.  (I must leave now, I have another 
appointment, and they will finish with you.) 
Interviewer:  Thank you, it was a great help. 
Respondent 1:  Bye bye… tell them I am gone.  
Interviewer: I think we covered a lot of things. Are there certain important things 
that relate to services and the municipality that we did not cover that 
you think is important? I am looking at the notes. But the interesting 
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part is the one you said, if you pay, the charges increase. This means 
that if you pay… 
Respondent 2: You can afford and you pay for those who cannot.  
Interviewer: What becomes the tendency then? 
Respondent 2: People stop paying. If you stop paying, it goes down. You pay R150 
next month is R300 and you pay, it goes to R500. It will never go down. 
Interviewer: Does the municipality know families where there are people who do 
not work, you think? Or where old retired people live? 
Respondent 3: They do not know. They only check payments or non-payments. They 
evaluate through the statements. A flat rate for all will be better. 
Interviewer: Is there a flat rate? 
Respondent 4: It used to be in place but not any more. We don’t pay the same now 
irrespective of our consumption. Others pay R100 and some R1 000 
even if we use the same rate. 
Respondent 4: How can a businessperson pay R65 using all the services, water and 
electricity and an ordinary household pay R500? 
Interviewer: Do you think, what kind of charges may help the situation? 
Respondent 4: A flat rate. The flat rate still may have to be set at different levels for 
pensioners at lower rate compared with those who work. 
Interviewer: But the problem is that it seems the municipality does not know who 
works and who does not? 
Respondent 2: No they do not know and they don’t check that. 
Respondent 2: Un some houses they are using cards. 
Interviewer: This prepaid, is it used here also? 
Respondent 3: There are many who are using it here even in Zone 10. 
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Interviewer: Which one is better then, the prepaid or these estimations? 
Respondent 3: The estimations are better because if you do not have money in the 
middle of the month, then you can’t function. If you buy for R200 and it 
may get finished in 2 weeks and you will have no electricity. 
Interviewer: If we check, for those people who do not pay, does the municipality cut 
off the power or don’t they? 
Respondent 4: There are places where they go and cut. But they check first. If they 
go and there is only one lady, they may cut, but if there are many young 
men, they may feel intimidated. And not cut off. This means the old 
lady will take her pension money and pay. You see the problem? 
Interviewer: It means they check the place first? 
Respondent 3: The old people are the ones who suffer the most. 
Interviewer: Don’t they indicate that we will cut off if the debt is this much? 
Respondent 3: No they just come. 
Interviewer: Does it mean they may cut off where there is small debt and leave a 
place with big debt? 
Respondent 3: Yes, it happens at all times. 
Interviewer: Do you have anything else that you think we did not talk about to add? 
Respondents: No….no, nothing. 
Interviewer: Ok, I think we have covered a lot. I will see what comes from other 
groups. Thank you of the information. 
----------------------&&&-------------------- 
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Appendix 4: MAP OF THE STUDY AREA 
 
 
 
 
Soweto re: 1996 census 
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